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Foreign Ministry Spokesman Briefing 23 Jan

On Talks With Japan's Nakayama

LD2301163191 Moscow TASS in English 1557 GMT 23 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—Chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate Vitaliy Churkin opened today's briefing here with a report on Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama's visit to the Soviet Union. He informed journalists that President Mikhail Gorbachev met the Japanese foreign minister today. "Their almost two-hour talk was very comprehensive," Churkin said, adding that it touched on the concrete dates of the Soviet president's visit to Japan, scheduled for Arpil.

Commenting on yesterday's two rounds of talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Taro Nakayama, Churkin said they "clearly showed" that Soviet-Japanese contacts at ministerial level "were marked by broader and deeper dialogue, as well as increased mutual undertanding". In light of this, he noted that "comprehensive discussion of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, including problems of security, as well as detailed exchanges on problems of the Korean peninsula" have become a "comparatively new element" of Soviet-Japanese contacts.

"The ministers did not overlook such far from easy problems as the Soviet-Japanese peace treaty," Churkin continued. "I wish to recall that the team working on the peace treaty was set up in December 1988. It made substantial progress during the six rounds of meetings. Points of contact were found in many cases. The ministers have agreed that the seventh meeting of the working team will be held on February 18 in Moscow."

"The sides devoted much attention to practical aspects of President Gorbachev's visit to Japan," Churkin said. "Yesterday they signed a memorandum on additional matters, related to this visit."

"It can be said with sufficient confidence already now that more than ten or even fifteen agreements will be signed during the visit, which will substantially expand the foundation of Soviet-Japanese relations," Churkin noted. "The importance attached by both sides to the Soviet president's visit is borne out by the fact that the ministers have decided to have another meeting."

At the invitation of his Japanese counterpart, Bessmertnykh will visit Tokyo for this purpose on the eve of the president's official visit to Japan.

Churkin noted that a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry attended the "official talks at foreign ministers level", which is quite a new element in Soviet foreign policy. "We are cooperating with the leadership of Russia and the Russian Foreign Ministry in shaping our relations with Japan, especially as regards problems concerning Russia," Churkin said. "We have agreed with Russia's representatives on the text of the draft agreement on coastal trade, which will be transmitted to the Japanese side."

Churkin described Soviet-Japanese talks in Moscow as "very fruitful and successful". Rounding off the talks, he said, "Bessmertnykh described their atmosphere as friendly and frank".

"This is the spirit in which we want to conduct affairs with our Japanese partners in the future," Churkin stressed.

On Gulf War Developments

LD2301172091 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 23 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow 23 Jan (TASS)—The events of the past few hours in the Persian Gulf confirm how well-founded was the concern voiced by the USSR president in his address in Moscow yesterday, said Vitaliy Churkin, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry at a briefing today.

He noted that the third missile attack by Iraq against Israel, and also the sabotaging by Iraqi occupation troops "of individual oil reservoirs," has caused "profound anxiety" in the Soviet Union. As for the missile attack, said the diplomat, the position of the Soviet side expressed in the 18 January statement of the USSR Foreign Ministry on the first similar action by Iraq "remains in force." As for the blowing up of oil reservoirs, the Soviet Union is anxious because, on the one hand, this action "will undermine and destroy Kuwait's economic potential yet further," and on the other, will lead to "obvious dangerous ecological consequences." "The situation is very serious," the Foreign Ministry spokesman added.

In response to a question as to whether the Soviet Union regards the armed actions by the United States as going beyond the limits of the mandate of the UN Security Council resolution and whether the Soviet side has any serious objection with regard to the strategy of the allied troops, the USSR Foreign Ministry representative drew the attention of journalists to yesterday's speech by the USSR President. Mikhail Gorbachev, he recalled, stressed that we continue to take a principled stand. At the same time, he voiced concern about the trend toward a further escalation of military action, and said that we must do everything to prevent the conflict spreading. Mikhail Gorbachev also indicated that we must do everything to keep these events under control, expressed deep regret about the death of people, especially the civilian population, stressed the need for the developing situation to be evaluated in an appropriate manner, and stressed that this is the common concern of the world community.

Vitaliy Churkin confirmed that Baghdad's reply to the USSR president's appeal to Saddam Husayn "has been received through diplomatic channels." At the same time, he recalled that in the USSR there is no "practice of publishing messages and appeals between the leadership of countries."

Replying to a question about the number of Soviet citizens left in Iraq, the USSR Foreign Ministry representative stated that, according to the latest information he has received, there are no Soviet specialists left in Iraq. At the same time, he reported, there are, as before, 41 people in the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad.

Vitaliy Churkin categorically denied the existence of any link whatsoever between the events in the Persian Gulf and the events in the Baltics. "These are two quite different problems, and they need to be solved independently," he stressed.

On Relations With Poland

LD2301165991 Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT 23 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Alexander Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—"The Soviet Union's policy of promoting good-neighbourly relations with Poland is based on immutable principles and cannot be affected by transient considerations," head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate Vitaly Churkin told a briefing here today.

According to Churkin, statements made by Polish President Lech Walesa and Premier Jan Krzysztof Bielecki about Poland's readiness to promote and strengthen good-neighbourly relations of partnership and cooperation with the USSR fully meet the interests of both sides.

"The intergovernmental agreement to switch over to hard currency settlements in commercial relations on the basis of current world prices as of January 1, 1991, opens up broad prospects for fruitful cooperation and will allow us to make use of market economy methods", he noted.

"At the same time," Churkin said, "The initial stage of this new cooperation will by no means be easy, since the sides have little experience in this domain and their goods are not very competitive. Moreover, they experience a shortage of hard currency. The Soviet Union believes it is important not to allow economic relations to slump during the transition period when the new trade system will be shaped. We believe each side must seek mutually acceptable ways to settle arising problems, must display goodwill and readiness to promote effective cooperation", Churkin said.

United States & Canada

Deputy Foreign Minister Receives U.S. Envoy 22 Jan

PM2401135191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 22 January A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister, received J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

The talk touched on questions of mutual interest. It was of a businesslike nature.

'Misinformation Campaign' Against Iraq Cited

LD2301090791 Moscow TASS in English 0849 GMT 23 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Klimentov]

[Text] New York January 23 TASS—The United States has mobilized its entire arsenal of psychological warfare against Iraq in parallel with combat operations. The sharp edge of this warfare is sometimes turned against the United States itself.

Three classified directives signed by President George Bush charge the Central Intelligence Agency and European secret services with waging a propaganda and misinformation campaign against Iraq's civilian population and Army "to destabilise the Husayn regime", THE NEW YORK TIMES reports.

Distributing leaflets over the territory of occupied Kuwait and organising radio propaganda programmes and underground radio centres on the territory of Iraq itself are cited as examples of this activity.

At the same time, there are facts that fabrications by psychological warfare specialists are presented as truth to allies and U.S. journalists as well, according to the newspaper. At least once, on January 7, the Pentagon was forced to deny a fake report released by Army special units.

It was announced then that six Iraqi Army helicopters flew over to Saudi Arabia and their crews asked for political asylum. Representatives of the Saudi Government denied this report, however. It appeared that a report "for general use" was circulated erroneously. It was designed to demoralise Iraqi military men, the newspaper writes.

Paper Reports Upgrade in U.S. Embassy Security

PM2301170791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 91 Union Edition p 5

[Unattributed caption to V. Sokolov photograph: "Security Bastion on Sadovoye Beltway"]

[Text] We have never seen anything like it, during "cold" or "hot" wars: Literally in the space of one or two days concrete fortifications have sprung up outside the U.S. Embassy building on the Sadovoye Beltway in downtown Moscow. Perhaps they will be even higher in a day's time—and then the already substantial building will become an impregnable fortress. Although a narrow passage has been left for visitors to the embassy.

Who is threatening U.S. diplomats in the USSR capital?

A U.S. Embassy employee, who did not want his name in the press, replied that the heavy wall is being constructed not because diplomats have suddenly developed an overwhelming fear of Muscovites. Nor is the erection of the fortifications directly associated with the events in the Persian Gulf and the threat of a worldwide intensification of "Arab" terrorism, although these factors, if common sense is anything to go by, should not be discounted. Our interlocutor stressed that a variety of protective systems is currently being erected at U.S. embassies in many countries—and always with the local authorities' permission. So this "construction project" is not by any means an example of American willfulness.

Well, in our troubled times everyone protects himself as best he can. As far as the legal authorities allow.

Grain Purchase Deal Concluded With U.S.

LD2301105491 Moscow Central Television Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 23 Jan 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The Soviet Union has concluded a deal for the purchase of the first 500,000 tonnes of wheat from the United States. This is the first deal this year, its value assessed at $46 million.

Poll Says Most Americans in USSR Cooperation

LD2401112691 Moscow TASS in English 1112 GMT 24 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Babich]

[Text] New York January 24 TASS—Most Americans are interested in developing various forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union, according to a public opinion poll taken by the Public Agenda Foundation.

Seventy-seven percent of respondents said relations with the Soviet side should develop step by step, in a well-considered and cautious way.

Poll organisers were interested in finding out fields in which cooperation between the two countries should mainly develop. Americans believe that the United States should respond to the Soviet side's proposal to find ways for mutual cuts in nuclear arsenals.

Then cuts in conventional arms in Europe should be achieved. Most respondents believe that U.S. arms cuts

should not be significant, however, since the situation in Europe still remained unstable.

The Soviet Union's image in the eyes of Americans is changing as well. In 1985, 60 percent of those polled who believed that the Soviet Union sought world domination, whereas now only 20 percent of people polled shared this belief.

The results of the public opinion survey reflect the deep changes taking place in the Americans' minds as regards the Soviet Union, Mr. Double, vice-president of the Public Agenda Foundation, told TASS.

The previously widespread distrust is being replaced by belief in the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions, [words indistinct] dialogue, Double said.

Northeast Asia

Gorbachev, Japanese Foreign Minister Meet 23 Jan

View Territorial, Other Issues

LD2301180491 Moscow TASS in English 1751 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev, receiving Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama in the Kremlin today, said his visit confirms the dynamics of the Soviet-Japanese dialogue.

The Soviet leader expressed hope that, together with his new Soviet counterpart, the Japanese minister will strive to prepare in a proper way the forthcoming summit visit to Japan due next April.

The Japanese official handed to Gorbachev a message from Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu who hopes that the visit will become a landmark event in bilateral relations.

The minister said that Japan's legislature, general public and businessmen welcome Gorbachev's visit, which is confirmed in numerous invitations, letters and other messages to the Soviet leader from Japan.

Gorbachev and Nakayama considered specific dates for the trip and discussed preparations for the event which, as Gorbachev put it, may acquire a truly large-scale, fruitful character.

The sides had a preliminary discussion of the most difficult—territorial—issue related to a peace treaty. The president called for taking into account all aspects of the problem, its historic and present-day contexts, Japanese and Soviet viewpoints.

It is necessary to discuss and look for ways to combine them all, now that both sides do not lack goodwill. The search will be successful if it is directed at attaining a balance of interests.

At Nakayama's request, Gorbachev expressed his view of the Gulf war. He reaffirmed the principled assessment of the causes of the conflict, the significance of the Soviet-American accord on the issue and the determination to pursue a policy agreed upon at the U.N. Security Council.

Gorbachev stressed the importance of taking into account possible consequences of hostilities, the scope of which should be adequate to the objective put forward in the Security Council's resolution. Otherwise, he said, it would not be possible to avoid numerous casualties and destruction and great complications upon the completion of the war.

Nakayama raised the issue of the developments in Latvia and Lithuania. He reiterated that problems should be resolved in a humane, peaceful way even though the president is convinced of that more than anyone else.

The discussion of this subject confirmed the fact that correspondents' conclusions, based on hastily gathered information, do not always apply to conclusions at state level, the more so when this information is used to question fundamental gains in world politics.

The president and the minister agreed to continue intensive preparations in all areas towards the Soviet-Japanese summit meeting.

Discuss Baltics, Reforms

OW2301144491 Tokyo KYODO in English 1414 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Excerpt] Moscow, Jan. 23 KYODO - Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on Wednesday assured Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama that he will use political means to solve problems in the Baltic states and will not divert from his policy of perestroyka, Japanese officials said. Nakayama spent an hour and 45 minutes with Gorbachev discussing bilateral relations and the international situation.

During the visit, Gorbachev indicated in response to a formal invitation included in a letter from Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and conveyed by Nakayama, that he "tentatively" plans to visit Japan between 16 and 19 April.

Nakayama told Gorbachev that Japan considers the "large number of casualties" in recent Soviet suppression on civilians in Lithuania and the Baltic region as "very regrettable." He said Japan does not approve of the use of force in the region and that it runs against perestroyka. Nakayama called for a peaceful solution to the problems in the region.

Gorbachev responded that he will continue to seek a political solution and not divert from perestroyka-based democratic reforms, officials said.

Nakayama told Gorbachev that Japan firmly supports the use of force by the multinational coalition in the

Persian Gulf war and hopes for continued close cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the war.

Gorbachev said Moscow will continue to cooperate with the United States in its handling of the Gulf war and support the U.N. stand on the issue.

Nakayama, who is currently on a four-day visit to Moscow through Thursday, had two rounds of talks with new Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. In a joint news statement released after their meetings, the two ministers confirmed they would work toward the success of the Gorbachev visit to Japan and bilateral cooperation.

During the meeting with Gorbachev, Nakayama also called for the Soviet president to reach a "political solution" to continued Japanese demands for the return of four islands off Hokkaido which were occupied by the Soviet Union at the close of World War II.

The Nakayama-Gorbachev meeting was the first time a Japanese foreign minister has met the Soviet leader since may 1989, when then Foreign Minister Sousuke Uno visited the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Bessmertynkh-Nakayama Talks 22 Jan Reported

World, Bilateral Issues Discussed

LD2201135591 Moscow TASS in English 1336 GMT 22 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Georgiy Shmelov]

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—Soviet-Japanese dialogue gains special importance in the light of the Gulf war, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama said at a luncheon in Moscow today, hosted by his Soviet counterpart Aleksandr Bessmertnykh.

Japan supports measures taken by the allies in the Gulf to end Iraq's "aggression against Kuwait and restore peace in the region," Takayama said.

Commenting on Soviet perestroyka, the minister said that renewal in any society confronts numerous difficulties.

The Japanese people, who have lived through several economic and social reforms in the recent past, are well aware of this, he said.

"However, we cannot but express deep concern with the fact that domestic difficulties have led to the use of military force in some regions," he said.

Nakayama expressed hope that "the situation will not worsen further and problems will be settled peacefully and democratically".

Commenting on Soviet-Japanese relations, Nakayama said conditions are shaping up" to tap their potential.

Speaking about Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan, Nakayama said Gorbachev will be the first Soviet state leader to visit Japan.

"I believe there are no differences between our countries that they both strive to make this visit a historical event, using it to make a "breakthrough towards settling the territorial problem and releasing every opportunity for bilateral cooperation," Nakayama said.

Baltics, Gulf Issues Addressed

OW2201145791 Tokyo KYODO in English 1422 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Excerpt] Moscow, Jan. 22 KYODO—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh on Tuesday told Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama that the Baltic republics independence issue should be settled by peaceful means.

Bessmertnykh, expressing concern over the crackdown by the Soviet Armed Forces in the rebel Baltic republics, Lithuania and Latvia, also said the killing of even a single person cannot be justified under any form of political thought.

The new Soviet foreign minister made the remarks in response to an expression of deep regret by the Japanese foreign minister over the Soviet military repression against secessionist movements in the republics, according to Japanese officials traveling with Nakayama.

Nakayama and Bessmertnykh held two rounds of regular minister-level talks in the Soviet Foreign Ministry annex, exchanging views on bilateral and international affairs, including the Persian Gulf war.

During the talks, Nakayama expressed strong hopes for a peaceful solution to the independence problem, saying the use of force contradicts the aims of the perestroyka reform policies, according to the officials.

Soviet troops reportedly killed 14 civilians and injured 230 in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius on January 13. They also killed five people and wounded nine others in Riga, the Latvian capital, on Sunday.

On the Persian Gulf war, Nakayama briefed the Soviet foreign minister on Japan's staunch support for the U.S.-led multinational forces fighting Iraq, the officials said.

In response, Bessmertnykh was quoted as saying the Soviet Union has fully endorsed the U.N. resolutions calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Nakayama and Bessmertnykh agreed to issue a joint statement Wednesday urging an immediate pullout of the Iraqi troops from the oil-rich emirate, the officials said.

Responding to a request by Nakayama to maintain the "new thinking" in diplomacy, the Soviet minister

pledged to pursue the foreign policies which the Soviet Union has been implementing.

Bessmertnykh also added that the Kremlin does not want to return to the cold war era, according to the officials.

Bessmertnykh assumed the foreign ministerial post just one week ago, replacing Eduard Shevardnadze, who resigned in late December in what he called a protest against the advance of dictatorship.

A representative of the Russian Federation, the largest Soviet republic, which administers a group of Soviet-held islands off Hokkaido claimed by Japan, took part in the talks for the first time.

Also attending the meeting were Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada, Ambassador to Moscow Sumio Edamura, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, and Ambassador to Tokyo Lyudvig Chizhov. [passage omitted]

Second Round of Talks Held

LD2201152491 Moscow TASS in English 1505 GMT 22 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—"the second round of talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and his Japanese counterpart Taro Nakayama, which began here today, will focus on the situation on the Korean peninsula, the Cambodian settlement and preparations for the Soviet president's visit to Japan. After a brief eye-to-eye meeting between the two ministers, the negotiations were continued in plenum," a high-ranking Soviet diplomat told TASS.

"In the course of today's exchange of views," he said, "Taro Nakayama positiely assessed the normalisation of relations between the USSR and South Korea. He said Japan intended to normalise its relations with North Korea". According to the diplomat, the Janapese minister noted several difficulties that had to be settled before complete normalisation could be achieved. Japan wants, primarily, guarantees from North Korea that it would place its nuclear power industry under IAEA control and, secondly, it did not want its relations with North Korea to upset the equillibrium between the North and the South.

Today's talks are expected to end up with the signing of a memorandum on additional matters, related to preparations for the Soviet president's visit to Japan, and of exchange letters to increase the number of correspondents accredited in both countries from 20 to 30.

Bessmertnykh To Visit Tokyo

OW2201175191 Tokyo KYODO in English 1705 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Excerpt] Moscow, Jan. 22 KYODO—Japanese and Soviet Foreign Ministers Taro Nakayama and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh agreed Tuesday that Bessmertnykh will visit Japan in late February or March to prepare for Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April.

In the second round session of their regular Japan-Soviet foreign ministerial consultation, the foreign ministers confirmed Gorbachev's Japan visit scheduled for mid-April, Japanese officials said.

The foreign ministers also agreed to hold the seventh session of Japan-Soviet vice foreign ministerial talks in Moscow on February 28 to discuss a bilateral peace treaty.

In Tuesday's second round session, Nakayama also urged that Moscow agree to meet Japan's demand for the return of four Soviet-held islands off Hokkaido, northern Japan.

Nakayama said Japan is making utmost efforts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union in line with its proposal of technical and other cooperation for perestroika reform policies in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Memorandum Signed

LD2201181891 Moscow TASS in English 1728 GMT 22 Jan 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and his Japanese counterpart Taro Nakayama ended their talks here today, signing a memorandum on additional matters, related to preparations for President Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan and letters to increase the quotas for journalists accredited in the Soviet Union and Japan from 20 to 30 reporters on each side.

The memorandum reads that the Soviet president and the Japanese prime minister will sign four agreements in addition to those seven, about which the sides agreed last September during Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo.

A total of eleven documents have already been prepared for signing during President Gorbachev's visit to Japan in mid-April.

Four new intergovernmental agreements and documents deal with such issues as burials on Soviet and Japanese territories and other related issues, cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, cooperation in holding

exhibitions and fairs in the Soviet Union and Japan and cooperation in protecting historic and cultural monuments.

On the initiative of the Japanese side, the sides also signed letters to increase the quotas for journalists accredited in the Soviet Union and Japan.

Nakayama is in the Soviet Union on a three-day official visit.

TASS Memorandum 'Text'

LD2201213191 Moscow TASS in English 2108 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—Follows full text of the memorandum on additional matters related to preparations for President Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan. The memorandum was signed during Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama's official visit to the Soviet Union.

"Proceeding from the principal agreement to hold an official visit to Japan by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama held talks in Moscow on January 22, 1991. The talks resulted in understanding on practical issues concerning preparations for the visit.

"In addition to issues mentioned in the memorandum on issues concerning preparations for the Soviet president's visit to Japan, signed in Tokyo on September 6, 1990, the sides will exert necessary efforts to work out and prepare for the Soviet president's visit to Japan bilteral inter-governmental agreements and documents on issues mentioned below:

"—on burials on Soviet and Japanese territories and other related issues.

"—on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

"—on cooperation in protecting historic and cultural monuments.

"The sides agreed to continue consultations to improve conditions for diplomatic and consular activities in the partner-country and develop cooperation in fishing and on other issues, relating to the development of bilateral relations in practical spheres, and work to clarify those spheres where the sides could reach agreement and mutual understanding."

Rogachev Views Talks

LD2201202291 Moscow TASS in English 1951 GMT 22 Jan 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—All involved and unsettled issues in Soviet-Japanese relations should be resolved on the basis of rapprochement, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev told TASS.

Rogachev was commenting today on the results of talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and his Japanese counterpart Taro Nakayama. Nakayama is in the Soviet Union on a three-day official visit.

During the talks, the Japanese side raised the "northern territories" issue, Rogachev said. It claimed that they are Japanese lands and were "occupied" by the Soviet Union after World War II. The Japanese side also said the issue should be settled as soon as possible, and the complete normalisation of Soviet-Japanese relations depends on resolving it.

"I can say for sure that we are open for discussions on the issue. Such a discussion will be held during President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan," Rogachev said.

"At the same time, I am convinced (we have told the Japanese side about it today) that the issue cannot be resolved during one visit, as the issue is quite delicate. It concerns national feelings of the Japanese and Soviet peoples, including the population of the Soviet Far East. It will take time to thoroughly and comprehensively study and discuss all aspects of the problem," Rogachev said.

"President Gorbachev's visit to Japan is expected to be followed by a return visit by the Japanese prime minister. We believe that it will take several such visits to settle the issue," Rogachev said.

Rogachev noted that some assessments of the situation on the Korean peninsula coincided or were close. The sides agreed to hold constant consultations on the Korean issue.

The Soviet Union holds such consultations with the United States and China. Now Japan will join these countries, Rogachev said. "We understand that a relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula depends on an agreement between the north and the south. But there are four other countries near the peninsula, and they have their own interests there," Rogachev said

The Japanese minister expressed his government's concern about the situation in the Baltics. The Soviet side outlined the reasons for the current situation. The Soviet leadership is planning to settle the problems by democratic and peaceful means, Rogachev said.

"Of course, we feel regret—even greater than our foreign colleagues—about what happened in Vilnius and Riga," Rogachev said. "I have clearly told this to the Japanese side."

IZVESTIYA Reports Talks

PM2401115191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On Threshold of New Stage"]

[Text] The war in the Persian Gulf has shaken the international world order. The situation in the Near East, to which the attention of the planet is riveted, was one of the main themes of the 22 January Soviet-Japanese talks in Moscow conducted by the two countries' foreign ministers, A.A. Bessmertnykh and T. Nakayama.

It is symptomatic that this meeting opens the diplomatic calendar of the USSR and Japan for this year. Soviet-Japanese dialogue, which is traditionally one of the main features of the world order, is developing in 1991 under special conditions. The agreement on USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the Land of the Rising Sun this year has become a powerful incentive and precise guideline in its development. T. Nakayama's present visit is assigned an important role in the preparation of this event in bilateral relations, which is designed to impart a fundamentally new quality to them.

The leaders of the foreign policy departments put their signatures to a memorandum on additional questions concerning the USSR president's visit to Japan and reciprocal letters on the question of a mutual increase in the number of the two countries' journalists permanently accredited to Moscow and Tokyo. Commenting on these documents following a request from TASS correspondents, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev said that preparation for the USSR president's forthcoming visit to Japan was the focus of attention at the talks.

He reported that it is proposed, in addition to the accord reached earlier on signing seven agreements during the forthcoming visit, that the USSR president and the Japanese prime minister will sign a further four documents. They will concern the burial of Soviet citizens on Japanese territory and of Japanese citizens on USSR territory, the safety of nuclear electric power stations, the development of exhibits, and the conservation of cultural and historical monuments.

Speaking of the course of talks as regards the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the deputy minister said that there were many assessments which were close or which coincided. We agreed that in the future we will consult permanently with our Japanese colleagues.

I.A. Rogachev announced that at the talks the Japanese side had raised the question of the Northern territories. The diplomat recalled the USSR president's recent words in an interview with the newspaper ASAHI to the effect that we must go halfway to meet each other in resolving this problem. At any rate, the deputy minister continued, we are open to discussion. And this dialogue will probably take place during the summit meeting. At the same time the deputy minister is convinced that this question cannot be resolved in one visit.

Soviet-Japan Gulf Statement Prepared, Cancelled

Moscow Cancels Statement

OW2401034191 Tokyo KYODO in English 0315 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Excerpt] Moscow, Jan. 24 KYODO—Japan and the Soviet Union agreed to seek a "fundamental" improvement of their relations to "the phase of a new nature" and called for a "swift and unconditional" withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, a joint press release said Wednesday.

The document, issued by Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama and his Soviet counterpart Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, however, stopped short of expressing support for the U.S.-led multinational forces fighting Iraq in the Persian Gulf region.

It also failed to make any reference to the Soviet military crackdown on pro-independence movements in the Baltic republics.

Officials traveling with Nakayama said the two sides had agreed to issue a joint statement on the Gulf war but that the statement was cancelled at Moscow's suggestion. [passage omitted]

TASS Reports, Kills Statement

LD2301170991 Moscow TASS in English 1631 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Moscow TASS English at 1634 GMT on 23 Jan transmits a service message killing this item]

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—The Soviet Union and Japan expressed serious concern about the failure of international efforts, which continued until the very last moment, to achieve a peaceful settlement of the crisis caused by Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

A joint statement issued after Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama's visit to the Soviet Union also said that in their talks here the Soviet and Japanese foreign ministers had a frank and substantive exchange of opinions about the situation in the Gulf.

They "expressed deep regret that Iraq has not responded to repeated calls by the international community to withdraw from Kuwait, refused to fulfill the demands of corresponding U.N. Security Council resolutions and thereby effectively blocked a non-military solution", the statement said.

It added that "the sides also voiced serious concern about Iraq's military actions against Israel, which are directed at broadening the armed conflict and giving it the nature of Arab-Israeli confrontation".

"The only way to restore peace and security in the Gulf is for Iraq to immediately and unconditionally comply with all U.N. Security Council resolutions in connection with the crisis," the statement said.

It said the sides agreed that the Gulf crisis is a serious test for the building of a future fair and stable world order, and called out for preserving the unity of all members of the world community.

The sides also pointed out the exceptional role of the United Nations and especially the Security Council in settling crises in various parts of the world.

Soviet Foreign Minister Alexandr Bessmertnykh and his Japanese counterpart Nakayama went on record in favour of settling the crisis both within the United Nations framework and on a bilateral footing.

Japan's Nakayama Meets Yanayev, Shevardnadze

Discusses Ties With Yanayev

LD2301201391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] USSR Vice President Yanayev today received Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit. An exchange of views took place regarding Soviet-Japanese relations.

The sides expressed satisfaction with the positive thrust seen recently in the relations between the two countries. They noted the mutual disposition [nastroy] toward the positive work that has emerged in the relations.

Great attention was devoted to the forthcoming visit to Japan by USSR President Gorbachev.

Visits Shevardnadze

PM2401133591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

["Own information" report: "E. Shevardnadze's Meeting with T. Nakayama"]

[Text] On 23 January Japanese Foreign Minister T. Nakayama paid a courtesy visit to E.A. Shevardnadze. During the friendly talk they touched on questions of Soviet-Japanese relations and the situation in the Asian and Pacific region. Nakayama stressed that the accords on rendering humanitarian aid to the USSR reached during his previous meetings with Shevardnadze are being implemented.

Having thanked his guest for the attention shown to him, E.A. Shevardnadze touched on two questions which in his opinion are of paramount importance: the situation in the Persian Gulf and the domestic situation in the USSR. Attempts to draw Israel into the armed conflict and thus expand the zone of war are fraught with the most catastrophic consequences, he noted. It was also emphasized that the Soviet Union's destabilization is dangerous not only to the peoples of our country but also to the whole world. That is why broad international aid and all-around support for the policy of perestroyka and the process of the country's democratization are so essential now.

Nakayama Ends Visit 23 January

LD2301200891 Moscow TASS in English 1954 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama today departed from Moscow after a three-day official visit to the Soviet Union.

The minister's visit was held within the framework of preparations for President Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan. Nakayama held two rounds of talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh. They discussed international issues and bilateral relations.

The ministers signed a memorandum on additional matters, related to preparations for President Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan and letters to increase the quotas for journalists accredited in the Soviet Union and Japan from 20 to 30 reporters on each side.

They agreed that Bessmertnykh will visit Japan at the final stage of preparations for the Soviet president's visit.

Bessmertnykh and other officials saw off the Japanese minister at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport.

Japanese Official Reviews Nakayama Visit

LD2401100291 Moscow TASS in English 0922 GMT 24 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Soviet-Japanese relations are now at a stage when it is necessary to take a new "leap", a high-ranking representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry said here on Wednesday [28 January].

Speaking at a briefing on the results Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama's official visit to the Soviet Union, which ended on Wednesday, he expressed hope that the "leap" would be taken during President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April.

Speaking about the Moscow talks, the representative said that at Wednesday's meeting with Gorbachev and talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the sides focused on drafting a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR, the most difficult aspect of which concerns the "northern territories".

According to the representative, the Japanese side proceeds from the premise that "northern territories" issue must be resolved" for the final normalisation of bilateral relations.

He added that "we have not found a common approach to this most difficult issue" in Moscow. Japan does not want to postpone the resolution of this issue and wants to make a breakthrough in this field during Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo.

Speaking about the Soviet attitude towards the "northern territories", the representative quoted Gorbachev's words to Nakayama. He said that this issue has many difficult aspects, it cannot be resolved instantenously, and it would be unrealistic to think that it can be settled during one visit.

The sides also discussed the situation in the Baltics and the Gulf conflict.

The Japanese side expressed "regret" at the use of force in Lithuania and Latvia, saying that the Soviet leadership should be able to resolve the present difficult situation in a peaceful and democratic way.

Asked about Japan's possible sanctions against the USSR because of Baltic events, the representative said that "there has been no such a decision for the time being".

Turning to the date of Gorbachev's visit to Japan, he said that "Mikhail Gorbachev expresed his intention to visit from April 16 to 19. This time must be confirmed through diplomatic channels, however."

TASS Previews Gorbachev Planned Japan Visit

LD1801151891 Moscow TASS in English 1320 GMT 18 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Yevgeniy Aleksandrov and Oleg Polovko]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—"Soviet-Japanese relations have changed for the better over the past year," Aleksandr Panov, head of the Pacific and Southeast Asian Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said here today.

In an interview with TASS on the eve of a visit by Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama to the Soviet Union, he noted that "general reorganisation in the USSR, its positive perception by the Japanese and greater realism of our policy in the Asian-Pacific region" have helped improve these relations.

The Soviet desire to better assess the interests of its partners and Soviet measures to decrease its military presence in the Far East and the Asian-Pacific region also helped to promote positive changes in relations between the two countries.

Panov believes that these changes prompted Japan to abandon, for the first time over many years, the thesis about a direct threat from the Soviet Union.

"Last but not least, a report about President Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan played an important role in this process," he noted.

"Although Soviet-Japanese relations are now at an adequately high level, they should be elevated even higher, taking into account changes in the international situation. They should be comparable with the level of Soviet relations with major European countries and the United States," Panov stressed.

He favoured radical changes in politics, trade, economic cooperation, the military sphere and contacts between people.

Asked about problems in Soviet-Japanese relations, Panov stressed that he does not see "reasons in the foreseeable future for a clash between Soviet and Japanese interests".

From the strategic point of view, the improvement of relations with Japan is extremely important to the Soviet Union, he continued.

Panov called the lack of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan the major restriction on the development of cooperation between the two neighbouring countries. He pointed to "various ideas about how to conclude such a treaty, especially in terms of the territorial problem".

According to Panov, a working group on a peace treaty recently held six rounds of talks. During the talks the two sides concluded that, in principle, it is possible to conclude a treaty and that it should not be limited to current problems but should break ground for future relations.

"As for the territorial question, the sides hold opposite positions, and the present situation indicates that this problem will not be resolved now. This is a living reality, and you cannot close your eyes to it," he noted.

Panov looks to creating new relations for real confidence between the two nations, under which it would eventually be possible to conclude a peace treaty.

"To advance towards these relations, the two sides should make efforts not hinged on any preliminary conditions". Panov expressed regret that "the Japanese policy now hinges many issues on preliminary conditions", which, according to him, cannot yield positive results.

The visit by Nakayama to the Soviet Union, to begin on January 21, will be mostly devoted to preparations for the forthcoming visit to Japan by Gorbachev. According to Panov's assessment, preparations for this important event "are going successfully".

"We are sure that we shall prepare a package of 11 or more documents by the beginning of the visit," he said.

Japanese Premier Views Relations With USSR

91UF0351A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 2, 16 Jan 91 p 5

[Interview with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu by Fedor Burlatskiy on 5 December 1990; place not given: "'To the Very Grassroots...'"]

[Text] [Burlatskiy] Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister, do you think that Japan and the Soviet Union are prepared to move toward an appreciable or even a fundamental breakthrough in mutual relations? If so, in which directions and on the basis of which principles will this movement occur?

[Kaifu] President Gorbachev will be the first top Soviet leader since the mutual exchanges of Japan and Russia in 1855 to visit Japan. I believe that the discussions of the Japanese and Soviet leaders that will take place in the course of the visit should be for the peoples of Japan and the USSR a pledge of the rapid development of relations.

Following World War II, the normal development of Japanese-Soviet relations was frozen for a long period of time. Now East-West relations, in Europe at least, have entered an era of an easing of the dramatic tension called the "end of the cold war," and it has been possible to find a common language based on such common values as freedom and democracy. We need to rid ourselves of a difficult past in relations between our country and the Soviet Union also.

Japan and the Soviet Union have until now been making practical efforts to ensure the success of next year's top-level meeting. The preparatory period is now drawing to a close. It will be necessary for the leaders of Japan and the Soviet Union, displaying courage, to make a reality of the big prospects of the new Japanese-Soviet relations which are being opened to our gaze. In the course of next year's visit by the USSR president to Japan I would like together with him to formulate a large-scale outline of new Japanese-Soviet relations.

Together with a solution of the territorial problem, the conclusion of a peace treaty and the consolidation of trust between the two countries it is essential on this basis also to further progressively develop relations in all spheres, in the economic, scientific and technological, and cultural spheres particularly, and in the field of contacts between people, and also to expand substantive dialogue and mutual understanding on international problems, including questions of peace and prosperity in the Asia- Pacific region. I am prepared for serious dialogue with President Gorbachev and sincerely hope that he will come to Japan fully resolved to begin together with me this new era in bilateral relations.

[Burlatskiy] The main task we have to tackle at the present historical stage is, as I understand it, the complete normalization of interstate relations or, in other words, the conclusion of a peace treaty. As you know, between our countries there are problems where our interests coincide and where there will be no debate. But there are also difficult problems that remain a subject of discussion. It would seem to me that if we put the horse before the cart, that is, concentrate primarily on the problems that can be tackled right now, we will thus be able to pull the cart of the most complex problems. Hitherto, however everything between our countries has been just the opposite. But perhaps today everything possible should be done to ensure that we embark on a staged solution of the complex problems, including the territorial issue?

[Kaifu] I agree entirely with your words to the effect that the main task we should tackle first and foremost is the complete normalization of interstate relations, that is, the conclusion of a peace treaty.

I believe there are various opinions as to what should be considered the "horse," and what the "cart." But, one way or another, what is important is that horse and cart really begin to move together.

I would suggest that we take a look at your metaphor, Mr. Burlatskiy, concerning the "horse" and "cart" from opposite standpoints. In my opinion, the essence of the territorial problem is as follows: The territorial affiliation of Japan's four northern islands was not a matter of doubt for anyone, Japan and Russia included, from the time when the Japanese-Russian border was established by way of the natural and peaceful confirmation of the demarcation between the two countries which actually existed as of 1855; however, after World War II was over, the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Stalin, dispatched its forces to these territories without any justification. But even now, under conditions where so much from the history and facts of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy is being revised, Stalin's mistake on the above issue is not being reinterpreted at all and the viewpoint that in World War II only its Far East part was absolutely just may still be clearly traced in Soviet history. This induces in me an even keener perception of the distance that exists in relations between Japan and the USSR and a feeling of strong disappointment in this connection.

I believe that it is a solution of the territorial problem based on the objective approach to it set forth above which would be the most effective lever for securing a fundamental improvement and qualitative change in Japanese-Soviet relations. We have mutually confirmed that as a result of President Gorbachev's visit to Japan in 1991 it will be necessary to effect a fundamental breakthrough and qualitative change in Japanese-Soviet relations. I am inclined to believe that, perhaps, it is a solution of the territorial problem which would then play the part of the strong "horse" which would with effort

alone start moving the big "cart" of Japanese-Soviet relations containing unlimited opportunities for development in all areas.

[Burlatskiy] As you know, the Soviet Union is profoundly interested in an expansion of cooperation in the sphere of the economy, science, and technology, that is, in joint activity in the spheres in which Japan occupies leading positions in the world. Such cooperation between the USSR and Japan has yet to reach a level commensurate with the economic and scientific and technological relations between the Soviet Union and West Europe. Can it be assumed that mutual interest will bring about serious changes here?

[Kaifu] I would like to mention first of all that if it is the view that nothing is happening in Japanese-Soviet relations in the sphere of the economy, science, and technology, it does not adequately reflect current realities. Japanese-Soviet trade amounted to $6.09 billion in 1989, which was the highest level ever. Among the USSR's trading partners from the ranks of Western countries, Japan was in 1989 in fourth place behind Germany, Finland, and Italy.

Our country is rendering as much technical assistance as possible to contribute in every possible way to the Soviet economy's transition to market relations. Now, specifically, efforts are being made to ensure that agreements on commodity turnover and payments, coastal trade, and others be prepared by the time of President Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991.

Of course, nor can we deny the reality that our countries have, as before, big unutilized opportunities. If, together with the implementation in the USSR of economic reforms and the complete normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations following the conclusion of a peace treaty, our country's business world also with full confidence expands assistance to the Soviet Union, the intensification of economic relations between the Asian part of the USSR and Japan will most likely be a new source of development of the Asia-Pacific region.

[Burlatskiy] As you know, Mr. Prime Minister, the Helsinki process is developing in Europe with great success, and new steps are to be taken in this direction in 1991. Do you not consider that opportunities are already ripe for use of the Helsinki process in the Asia-Pacific region and also that, although assistance on the part of the United States and other countries of the region would be needed for this, of course, unification of the efforts of Japan and the USSR could perform a particular role in this respect?

[Kaifu] For the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region importance is attached to not only military but also political, economic, and social factors. I am convinced that the focus of the efforts being made by Japan in this region is correct enough. This area is now exhibiting the most dynamic indicators of economic growth in the world, and a rise first and foremost in the well-being of the peoples of the states of the region by way of the assurance of continued economic development and prosperity is essential for the stability of these states. Our country is the world's biggest donor of economic assistance, and two-thirds of official aid for development purposes, which in 1989 amounted to approximately $6.8 billion, granted on a bilateral basis is channeled into the Asia-Pacific region, what is more.

Such efforts by our country in the interests of the economic prosperity of the region are complementary to the efforts to ensure social stability through a rise in the well-being of the peoples and political stability by way of the formation of democratic institutions based on an aspiration to freedom and also to efforts to introduce to the official structures mechanisms curbing military adventures. It is my profound belief that genuine stability in the region may be achieved only when development, the winning of political liberties, and democratization merge into a single whole.

There are, in addition, urgent tasks requiring priority solution in the interests of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. These include an easing of tension on the Korean peninsula and a Cambodia settlement and also a cardinal improvement in Japanese- Soviet relations. Each of these problems undoubtedly has its own complex history, and they all differ from one another. The most effective approach to a solution of the said problems would be the exertion by the countries concerned of literally all possible efforts for a settlement of each of them.

The structure of the safeguarding of security in the Asia-Pacific region is complex. It is obvious also that it differs from the European structure, which is reminiscent of a chess board with the bipolar confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As far as the Asia-Pacific region is concerned, the core of relations in the sphere of the safeguarding of security here is composed of relations on a bilateral basis, and, in addition, the states located in the region have the most diverse features in political and economic systems, ideology, history and so forth. For this reason I would at the present time advocate a cautious approach to the viewpoint in support of the creation of a general regional structure for the safeguarding of security mechanically copying Europe.

[Burlatskiy] As chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Humanitarian, Cultural, and Scientific Exchange, I have a particular interest in the development with your country of humanitarian and cultural relations in a broad range of fields, particularly in the world of human rights, science and technology, and tourism. Where, specifically, in your opinion, could an appreciable rapprochement of our countries be achieved in these areas? At the present time we are making preparations for the opening of a human rights conference in Moscow. Perhaps thought should also be given to the creation of such a system in the Asian-Pacific region?

[Kaifu] Perestroyka has brought about big positive changes in the human rights situation in the USSR,

particularly as far as political liberties are concerned. The fact that my view will be presented verbatim in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is also possible thanks to these "winds of freedom," evidently.

The Japanese and Soviet peoples could certainly also develop scientific, technical, and cultural exchange in a wide spectrum of fields on the basis of individual initiative. This would make it possible to expand and deepen Japanese-Soviet relations to the very "grassroots," to the masses themselves. After all, true friendship is impossible under the conditions of controlled information.

I know of the meeting in Copenhagen in June 1990 to examine the progress of compliance with the "third basket" of the Helsinki Final Act. I value highly the fact that such consistent efforts have formed the basis of the perception by the Soviet Union and East Europe of political liberties of the West European model.

As far as your mention of the expediency of the creation in the Asia-Pacific region also of a system of supervision on the part of all states of this region of the state of affairs concerning human rights in each individual country is concerned, such universal institutions as the international pacts on human rights, the UN Human Rights Commission, which organizes its activity on the basis of this, and others already exist as international structures for monitoring the situation in this sphere. I believe it important to provide primarily for the establishment of universal foundations of respect for human rights in this region by way, specifically, of its countries' affiliation to the international human rights pacts. Finally, the task for this region is to achieve a combination of "development and freedom," and our country has already made big efforts for its accomplishment.

[Burlatskiy] The Soviet public has profound affection for the Japanese people and Japan's successes. Soviet legislators and representatives of the news media are hoping particularly for the emergence of psychological changes in the approach by Japanese people to the understanding of Soviet people and our efforts in the name of a restructuring of our complex problems also....

[Kaifu] The government and people of Japan are no less interested than any other people in the Soviet perestroyka and support it.

I believe that the people of our country are a people who can understand most distinctly what difficulties are encountered and what considerable sacrifices are required when a state with its own history and traditions changes the general direction of its development, even if this change is correct in itself.

Following the restoration of the Meiji in the mid-19th century, Japan parted with the feudal system and followed the path of rapid modernization and has at the present time achieved the position of a principal progressive democratic state. But in this process the country has experienced the most diverse complications and peripeteias and also made big sacrifices. Therefore when we think of the difficulties being experienced by the leadership and people of the Soviet Union, we are imbued with profound respect for the courage with which you have set about overcoming them. The Japanese Government and our people hope that the correct direction of perestroyka will be upheld.

Japanese Reports on Latvian Events Criticized

PM2301155191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1, 5

[Report by correspondent I. Latyshev: "Japan—Response to Clashes in Layvian Capital: Prejudice Disputing the Truth"]

[Text] Tokyo, 21 Jan—Japanese newspaper correspondents recently dispatched post haste to Latvia have their own vision of the events taking place there. There would actually be no special problem here if the information were not already "preprogrammed" from Tokyo to corroborate first and foremost a version of events whereby violent "punishment" is being meted out to peaceful inhabitants by Army subunits.

Facts, however, are stubborn things: Japanese correspondents there do have to acknowledge in some way the appearance of separatist formations on the streets of Riga. These are armed militants bent on solving by force of arms their disputes with Moscow and with local advocates of maintaining Soviet power in the Baltic.

The reports in YOMIURI filed by its correspondent in Riga, Kiichiro Hirano, describe precisely this. It is clear from the articles that it has been deemed necessary by certain circles in Latvia to "create a national defense organization." The lamentable fact that "everyone wanting to join the organization is issued with a weapon" did not escape the reporter's attention either. "Everyone who wants to obtain this weapon can do so legally at police stations," the report says.

In other words, what is happening in Riga now, as the correspondent explains, is that the Latvian government "is handing over weapons to civilian organizations of supporters of independence, which had not hitherto been armed." The conclusion the author draws is that there is an intention "to put up long, armed resistance to pressure from the Gorbachev government."

In the light of such reports the statement issued at a news conference today by Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Misoji Sakamoto in which those really to blame for yesterday's bloodshed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs building in Riga—separatists who have started illegally arming themselves—are absolved of all responsibility for the clash does not seem very convincing.

Near East & South Asia

Defense Official Views Iraqi CBW Facilities

Views Facilities' Destruction

91UM0280A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Jan 91 p 3

[Unattributed report on statement by Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops; date not given: "Tracking the Danger"]

[Text] According to reports from some information agencies abroad, as the result of strikes by the U.S. Air Force, Iraqi arsenals of chemical and biological weapons, and a nuclear center in the Baghdad area, have been destroyed.

The editorial office asked Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops, about the possible consequences of this.

"I think that in the event that this report is confirmed, the anxiety of the public about the possible consequences of the destruction of nuclear and military chemical and biological targets on the territory of Iraq as a result of a preemptive strike by the coalition Armed Forces is quite justified.

"As far as targets associated with radiation and nuclear danger are concerned, here it is necessary to bear the following in mind. With technical aid from abroad two research reactors have been built in Iraq, one with a capacity of six to eight megawatts (in the Baghdad area) and a second with a capacity of about 20 megawatts. During the period of the Iran-Iraq conflict both reactors were closed down and the fuel unloaded. Because of this, there is no potential danger of radioactive contamination if they are destroyed (demolished) as the result of a bombing raid.

"According to available information, Iraq possesses facilities for the production of chemical weapons, and has stocks estimated at 2,000 to 4,000 tons of war gases. In our opinion, in the event of an air strike using conventional means of destruction on production and storage facilities, the seals will be broken on most of the multi-ton containers and some of the chemical munitions. It can be predicted that if this occurs, the depth to which dangerous concentrations of substances like sarin and tabun will spread under the conditions typical of the Persian Gulf region will not be more than several dozen kilometers, while concentrations above permissible levels will spread to about 100 kilometers.

"As far as biological weapons are concerned, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that Iraq has at its disposal agents for typhus, cholera, anthrax, and tularemia, and also stocks of agents for extremely rare African and Asian diseases that are usually untreatable and lead to death. The consequences of the escape of pathogens into the atmosphere during the destruction of their storage sites are difficult to predict. In principle it is impossible to rule out a situation in which national borders will not be borders for the spread of epidemics.

"Due consideration should be given to the fact that during the destruction of both chemical and biological weapons, it may be primarily the peaceful population that suffers."

Dismisses 'Chernobyl' Threat

PM2301164791 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 24 Jan 91 p 3

[Report by Nikolay Panyukov: "Truth About Iraqi 'Chernobyl'"]

[Text] Reports that the multinational forces in the Gulf are striking Iraqi nuclear research centers and chemical and bacteriological weapons dumps have caused alarm among readers.

"The only thing people are talking about at the moment is the 'Iraqi Chernobyl,'" V. Marfin of Simferopol stated, sharing his fears. "What currently is the radiation, chemical, and bacteriological situation on our country's southern border?"

Here is what Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the Chemical Troops, said on this subject:

"Of course, there is and can be no question of an 'Iraqi Chernobyl.'

"As for strikes against chemical weapons plants and chemical weapons dumps and storage bases, these could cause major losses above all among the local Iraqi population. For the Soviet Union there is virtually no such danger.

"The situation concerning bacteriological weapons is more complex. Strikes against installations producing such weapons could lead to outbreaks of various epidemics—first and foremost, of course, on Iraqi territory. There could be outbreaks of anthrax, plague, cholera, and various kinds of fever, as well as vectors of various diseases that are entirely unknown to us.... Since epidemics, as is well known, do not recognize borders, such acts could create a threat of a complex bacteriological situation for neighboring states.

"That is the reality. But, obviously, we should also state the following: In launching strikes against such installations the anti-Iraqi side would essentially be embarking only indirectly on the use of weapons banned under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention.

"Nobody should forget that 110 states, including states in the anti-Iraqi coalition, have signed these documents."

Nuclear Safety Chief Assesses Reactor Ruins

PM2201203391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Rostislav Nikolskiy, chief of the USSR Gospromatomnadzor's Research Reactor Safety Supervision Sector, by correspondent A. Illesh under the rubric "Our Commentary"; place and date not given: "Following the Attack on a Nuclear Reactor"—first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] One of the first reports about the USAF attack on Iraq was that at 0130 GMT almost all Iraqi nuclear installations had been destroyed. Slightly later it was stated that a nuclear center near Baghdad had been put out of action.... What follows from this?

The destroyed reactor is not just any old destroyed installation. Its ruins themselves pose a deadly danger. But how concrete and great is that danger and what could be the possible consequences—these questions concern us because a five-megawatt "RT"-type research reactor built by Soviet specialists could (according to provisional information) have found itself in the attack zone.

Our correspondent A. Illesh turned for a comment to Rostislav Nikolskiy, chief of the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and Atomic Power Generation's Research Reactor Safety Supervision Sector.

[Illesh] What is your assessment of the possible development of events following the destruction of the nuclear research reactor?

[Nikolskiy] First and foremost, I would say that in this case contamination of the area around the reactor as well as the population depends on several factors: Was the Iraqi RT (a pool-type reactor) working or had it been shut down?

But before giving possible figures I would note that in principle the scale of contamination to people and the surrounding area after accidents at reactors of this size and type are not so significant. In any event they cannot be compared to the Chernobyl tragedy. During the "special period" that a war undoubtedly is such installations should be shut down....

[Illesh] I know that there is a similar reactor to the Iraqi research reactor in the USSR—near Riga and belonging to the Academy of Sciences....

[Nikolskiy] Quite so. It, too, naturally, has currently been shut down. In Moscow, for instance (and IZVESTIYA has already written about this), there are far more powerful reactors. Two specialists would be quite capable of "shutting down" [razobrat] a five-megawatt RT in a single day....

[Illesh] Let us get back to the possible area of contamination. What are your forecasts?

[Nikolskiy] In our forecasts we have proceeded on the basis of the worst-case scenario—the reactor was charged with fuel and was operating during the attack. In such a case its destruction and the burning off of the fuel outside the building could result in the release of radioactive iodine, inert gases, cesium, a minimal amount of strontium, and an even smaller amount of plutonium.

[Illesh] Could you give us an example of just how dangerous this would be?

[Nikolskiy] Calculations carried out on reactors of this type (and our specialists have all these calculations ready—not for the event of war, but for "civilian" accidents such as a plane crash or some kind of explosion) show that the internal irradiation of an individual at a distance of 100 meters would be not more than one rem, and external irradiation not more than 0.3 rems. Internal irradiation in this instance is calculated on the basis of the radioactive iodine. Specialists encountered it on a large scale at Chernobyl.

[Illesh] But after our accident such figures sound simply reassuring....

[Nikolskiy] I would repeat that, in terms of its physical characteristics, the RT cannot compare with the large power-generating reactors used in the national economy. One other important detail: If the core is destroyed the fuel temperature is low (around 500 degrees), whereas at the notorious high-power pressure-tube reactors temperatures can reach 1,500 degrees. The higher the temperature, the greater the discharge of fission products.

[Illesh] Physicists have told me that the possible area contaminated would be no more than one kilometer. Do you agree with that view?

[Nikolskiy] Yes, I more or less agree. In general, I think that in Iraq it will only be a question of the reactor building being destroyed and contaminated. Nothing more. Of course, the research reactor would be completely lost and the personnel might be contaminated.... [Nikolskiy ends]

...On my own behalf I would like to offer readers another theoretical version of the development of events over there. It would be possible, as they say, if a lot of mistakes had been made. If they had been trying to use this research reactor in Iraq to develop "charges" for bombs (which, because of the RT's technical characteristics, is unlikely), if a plutonium stockpile was located alongside, and if during the U.S. attack the reactor was, indeed, at work to this end, then... then the degree of danger to the population and the actual dimensions of the disaster would change fundamentally.

Official Views Advisers in Iraq, War's Duration

AU2401125891 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 23 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Skrilnik, staff member of the Soviet Defense Ministry's Press Department, by "K.A."; place

and date not given: "Soviet Strategists Reckon With Months of War"—first paragraph is NEPSZAVA introduction]

[Text] While the entire world is anxiously following the developments in the Gulf-war, one forgets about the Soviet officers stationed in Iraq. To clarify the contradictory rumors on this subject, we turned to the Press Department of the Soviet Defense Ministry.

[NEPSZAVA] How many Soviet military advisers are working in Iraq?

[Skrilnik] The last nine Soviet military experts left Iraq on 9 January. I stress that these are military experts, not advisers. The essential difference is that, while our military experts were in charge of servicing the Soviet military technology there and training the local crew, the tasks of the military advisers are to draw plans at the Army headquarters and to actively participate in the implementation of these plans. We had no such military advisers in Iraq.

[NEPSZAVA] You are considered to be experts on the Iraqi Army. On the basis of available information, what is your conclusion as to the duration of the war?

[Skrilnik] A center of strategic research is working alongside the defense ministry headquarters. Its deputy head, Colonel General Zhivitsa, is warning us not to overestimate the initial successes of the allied forces. In his view, this war will last long months, rather than weeks, and the confronting forces will suffer considerable losses in manpower.

Japanese Report on Advisers in Iraq Denied

OW2401004091 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman has denied the Japanese newpaper SANKEI SHIMBUN's report that Soviet military advisers are still in Iraq. The spokesman reportedly said that 43 staff at the Soviet Embassy are currently in Iraq, and no Soviet military advisers remain there.

Commentaries Continue on War in Persian Gulf

Raises Difficult Questions

PM2301225391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by political observer Tomas Kolesnichenko under the rubric "My Opinion": "The Peace Test"]

[Text] With every passing day the war against Iraq is raising questions for all the world's inhabitants. Some of these questions require immediate answers, while others can be postponed, although that will not make them any easier.

First and foremost, we know little about this war. For most of mankind "Desert Storm" is a kind of "tempest in a teapot." Somewhere far away in the desert missiles are exploding, people are being killed (how many is unknown), and homes are being reduced to ashes. But it is far away, and if there is no ecological disaster (and the Kuwaiti oil fields are already burning!), then why worry—it is just another war. All the more so as this war has been dubbed a just war and received the blessing of the United Nations itself. The aggressor must be punished. Iraq must leave Kuwait. Yes, that is what should happen. It is just. But questions arise....

We wonder why the U.S. censors have placed such stringent controls on every report from the scene of hostilities by journalists who are so used to freedom. Why have newspapers been forbidden to print "naturalistic" photographs of the casualties, and TV announcers banned from even voicing their emotions?

Public opinion polls in the United States and the European countries (and please note that such polls are being taken daily) show solid support from most of the population for the military operations against Baghdad. But that pointer could move at any time. Particularly if it proves impossible to beat Husayn at "little cost" and thousands of "all-American boys" start getting killed. This means that the question is not so much whether this is a just war or not, but how much it will cost. The censors' job is to minimize that cost.

But censorship will be of no use when just a single retaliation from Tel Aviv against Baghdad could demolish the anti-Iraq coalition and reopen old wounds in the Near East. "There are things more important than peace." To a certain extent these famous words spoken in Washington long ago can, in my view, be applied to oil, too. I would reiterate that there is no justification for Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Just as there is no justification for any aggression. But it was Iraq that was selected for public punishment.

Yet acts of aggression have repeatedly been committed in the Near East. Security Council resolutions have not been fulfilled and are still not being fulfilled. At the moment, it is inappropriate to link Kuwait and the Palestinian problem. We cannot solve one problem by piling others on top of it. But tomorrow that question will reemerge with even greater acuteness. The fate of oil cannot overshadow the fate of a people in exile. The question of convening a conference on the Near East once Husayn is defeated can now be avoided no longer. At any rate, there will be no new world order without a rightful resolution of the Near East conflict.

The priority task now is to localize the conflict and not allow new forces, which could use the war to establish their dominance in the region, to be drawn in. Here, above all, it is a question of NATO. The scenario is as follows: Since NATO member Turkey has provided airfields for the Americans to strike against Iraq, a retaliatory strike is possible. Then NATO countries

which are not yet participating in combat operations would have to fulfill their allied obligations and come to Turkey's aid. Incidentally, this would also mark the FRG's entry into the war. This subject is already being widely aired in the Western press. NATO leaders are evasively stating that, allegedly, "there will be no automatic NATO entry into the war"—but who knows.... Left "idle" in Europe, NATO could well switch to the Near East and shoulder new police functions under U.S. auspices.

'Escalation' Feared

PM2401112791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel V. Markushin: "Military Observer's Comment": "Escalation Must Be Avoided"]

[Text] The world has survived the first, shocking week of war in the Near East. In general terms this is a negligible period, even when measured as part of a single year. What has this week brought for people? Sorrow, suffering, destroyed plans, fear for the future—all that, of course. But there is something else of exceptional importance: the loss of illusions and new historical experience.

Iraq has not been crushed and is not inclined to capitulate. All the indications are that those who predicted a tough war rather than a repetition of the victorious Panama campaign were more perspicacious. Their arguments come back to mind: Baghdad's eight years of war experience, its enormous quantities of arms, the moral and psychological mood of the Army and the population to join in a confrontation with the "strike force of imperialism." While in no way belittling the success of the anti-Iraqi coalition, nevertheless I would say that Iraq has managed to save a considerable proportion of its combat equipment from attack, maneuver its forces, and concentrate on a counterstrike. It has caused its opponent to make a more considered assessment of its combat readiness before the decisive events of the war, when the antimissile prelude ends and the armored attack forces are set in motion.

So what happens next? It is hard to believe in the best option—that is, the localization of the military engagement. So the fears of its escalation are maybe justified.

In this sense the drawing of Turkey into the zone of combat operations is a particularly substantial factor. The Iraqi Supreme Command might be tempted to attack this NATO state, thus gaining even greater authority in the eyes of the Arab world. Husayn would be taking a very serious risk here, of course. Because he would have to conduct hostilities on two fronts. Turkey is a big military force in its own right. Taking account of the fact that it would definitely be supported by the other bloc partners, the situation in the north could prove unenviable for Baghdad.

At the same time, this represents a very dangerous turn of events, in my view. Incidentally, this is well understood in Western Europe, in the FRG for example. Here there are calls both at official level and among the public at large for caution not only in actions but also in words. This is understandable: A word spoken by a high-ranking official can be truly more devastating than a bomb. Because it can inflame the belligerence of an entire country and spark an explosion of hatred or despair. All these are serious things, particularly in the eastern world.

In general terms, a great deal now depends on the coolness of those who could get dragged into the war. Like Turkey, Israel is also in a special situation, of course. For understandable reasons it is difficult to overestimate the significance of its restraint in the current situation since what is at issue here is not only a change in the correlation of forces but a fundamental transformation of the political nature of the war. That would threaten a two-fold escalation.

Zagladin on Allied Bombing Effectiveness

LD2401115291 Paris Domestic Service in French 0700 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Are the Soviets saying what their own analysis of the situation [in the Gulf] is? The day before yesterday a Soviet general said that the allies had only destroyed 10 percent of their targets.

Passing through Paris yesterday a diplomatic adviser to President Gorbachev was more optimistic as far as the coalition is concerned. Vadim Zagladin spoke to Annie Debonton:

[Begin Zagladin recording] I have spoken with a representative of the Arab world, of the anti-Iraqi coalition: I cannot give his name but he is a valid representative. He says that according to the assessments made in his country or in Arab circles, 30 percent of the military—strictly military—potential has been destroyed and 70 percent has not yet been [destroyed]. What is meant is not military factories, etc; what is meant is armaments: and one can really see that the rockets are flying, so they exist, they have not been destroyed yet. But even the American intelligence services, cosmic services etc., are still not giving precise figures. [end recording]

[Later in the same newscast, the announcer says: "A diplomatic adviser to Mr. Gorbachev said yesterday in Paris that he believes that the tragic events in the Baltic countries were contrary to perestroyka. Mr. Zagladin announced sanctions against the servicemen who disobeyed orders."]

Paper Views Allied Bombing, Iraqi Responses

91UM0283A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondent A. Ostalskiy: "Strikes on Communications Centers"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi—As could be expected, the first strike was delivered by cruise missiles from ships, which was followed almost immediately by an air attack by "Stealth" aircraft that made their way to their targets unnoticed. Afterward, thousands of bombs and missiles and the entire incredible power of hundreds of aircraft were hurled at Iraqi military and strategic targets. Besides U.S. and British aircraft, 150 Saudi aircraft took part in the bombardment. The main targets were communications centers, airfields, missile launch sites, headquarters, and military plants and installations associated with Iraq's nuclear program and chemical weapons production.

There is the impression that the Iraqi command, nevertheless, was taken quite by surprise by how powerful the strike was. In any case, there was no opposition other than a disorderly and pointless firing of antiaircraft machine guns and several almost random missile launches, and the Iraqi Army has not yet shown itself.

Judging by everything, the bombing was conducted in such a way as to avoid casualties among the civilian population, or, at least, to keep them at a minimum. According to reports of eyewitnesses, the streets of Baghdad are empty but no destruction can be seen in residential blocks, and municipal services and even telephone lines are working normally.

Iraq's only response for the time being is the launch of several missiles in the direction of Bahrain and the northeastern areas of Saudi Arabia. The missiles did not hit the target and no particular damage was caused, however.

Pavlov Receives Kuwaiti Trade Firm's President

LD2301142991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1340 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jan (TASS)—Valentin Pavlov, USSR prime minister, received 'Abdallah al-Gabandi, president of a Kuwaiti trade and investment firm which deals with operations involving the deployment abroad of Kuwait's state currency reserves, in the Kremlin today.

There was a conversation during which the Soviet side confirmed the principled position of the Soviet Union regarding Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and in support of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

The sides exchanged opinions on issues of developing Soviet-Kuwaiti business ties in the financial and economic spheres. The conviction was expressed that mutually advantageous trade and economic relations between the two countries will also be further developed after the liberation from occupation of the state of Kuwait.

Al-Gabandi conveyed the cordial thanks of the leadership and people of Kuwait for the noble position of the Soviet Union regarding Kuwait. He spoke highly of the state of and prospects for the development of Soviet-Kuwaiti relations.

As the interlocutors noted, the favorable development of bilateral cooperation will be prompted by the readiness of the Government of Kuwait to increase the volume of the financial resources it supplies to Soviet banks and by the signing of a new agreement on Kuwaiti credit to the Soviet Union.

Latin America & Caribbean

Former Nicaraguan President Ortega Visits Moscow

Dzasokhov, Falin Meet With Ortega

PM2301133791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Meeting in the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] A.S. Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, and V.M. Falin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a meeting 17 January with D. Ortega, coordinator of the Nicaraguan Sandinist National Liberation Front National Leadership's Executive Commission.

Both sides expressed deep regret in connection with the military operations that have begun in the Persian Gulf region. The CPSU representatives briefed their interlocutor on the energetic efforts which were undertaken by the USSR leadership with the aim of preventing war and restoring Kuwait's independence by nonmilitary political means.

Taking part in the talk were K.N. Brutents, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and D. Ortega's adviser M. d'Escoto.

Managua Paper Reports Talks

PA2201000791 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 18 Jan 91 p 5

[Text] Moscow—Former president Daniel Ortega met yesterday in this capital with important officials from the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU to analyze the grave situation that has emerged in the world as a result of the attacks launched by the U.S. Government against Iraq in the early hours of 17 January.

Ortega met with Comrade Aleksandr Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, and Comrade Valentin Falin.

Commander Ortega and Comrade Dzasokhov expressed deep regret over the military actions in the Persian Gulf.

The representatives of the CPSU informed the Sandinist leader about the vigorous efforts the Soviet leadership made to avoid the war and to reestablish normality in the area by political means.

During their conversation, the two sides emphasized the importance of ending the conflict as soon as possible on the basis of a strengthened United Nations. They also pointed to the peace initiatives that were undertaken to avoid war.

Former president Ortega and Father Miguel D'Escoto will continue working for peace and for the end of the war as an indispensable condition for a peaceful way out of the Middle East crisis.

Interviewed on Gulf Talks

LD1801113491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Interview with Daniel Ortega, coordinator of the Executive Commission of the Nicaraguan Sandinist Front, and Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, by correspondent I. Mishina in Moscow on 17 January; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded, Ortega speaks in Spanish with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Mishina] Daniel Ortega has a mandate from the Nonaligned Movement to act as an intermediary in settling the conflict in the Persian Gulf zone. Ortega has just returned from visiting a number of countries in the Near East. Today, upon completion of this trip he met in Moscow with Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on foreign policy issues.

How would you describe the group of questions which you discussed today?

[Dzasokhov] We concentrated together on what needs to be done to halt the shooting and to try by political methods to resolve the acute military and political conflict which has existed there since August.

[Mishina] You have just returned from the Near East region. We would be interested to know your opinion on the situation which has come about, your forecasts, and your evaluation of what happened today at 0000 GMT in the Persian Gulf Area.

[Ortega] The conflict which burst out last night will, in my opinion, be brief and will not cause a large number of casualties. Since last year we have had constant contacts both with President Husayn and with leaders of third world countries and the leaders of various European countries, and also with the Soviet leadership. Today I spoke with comrade Dzasokhov and we discussed how to achieve a half to military actions, and we concluded that peace still has a chance.

[Dzasokhov] Politologists, legislators, and diplomats consider justly that perhaps in the whole post-war period there has not been a more dangerous—potentially—military conflict than the one which began last night.

[Mishina] During today's exchange of opinions did you find any points of contact? If yes, on what issues do your opinions coincide?

[Ortega] I am convinced that it is necessary to do everything so that this war does not continue. On this we agree. Both of us consider that this conflict must be resolved within the framework of the international legal order.

Supreme Soviet

Defense Committee Chief on Military Budget

PM1601151591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel V.N. Ochirov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, by correspondent Captian Second Rank V. Urban on 11 January in Moscow: "Why 2 Billion 'Went'"]

[Text] On Friday morning the deputies decided to hold a closed session to examine military expenditure for 1991. The debates lasted for almost two hours.

Remember, the government submitted a proposal to approve a military budget totaling 98.563 billion rubles [R]. The conciliation commission headed by V.G. Kucherenko, chairman of the Planning, Budget and Finance Commission, urged a reduction of R2 billion in the planned military expenditure. In the end, just such a decision was approved by the legislature.

The arguments and comments on this issue are many and varied. So immediately after the session our correspondent V. Urban, captain second rank, asked Colonel V.N. Ochirov, deputy chairman of the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, to explain the situation.

[Urban] One could call your committee the legislator in vindicating military spending. So why is it that the conciliation commission then came to the conclusion that expenditure should be cut?

[Ochirov] This proposal was made by Comrade Kucherenko personally. It represents the Planning, Budget and Finance Commission's opinion. Incidentally, they put forward the "minus 2 billion" idea on the pretext that it would help the collapsing economy.

But my opinion is this: This decision is groundless and unsound.

[Urban] But nevertheless, the Supreme Soviet has supported the commission. Why?

[Ochirov] It seems to me that this is connected with the state of our society today, including the mood of the deputies. Of course, everybody feels they want something better. But why is it that nobody has thought to mention that over the last two years we have reduced the military budget significantly? You only have to look at the facts to see that since 1989 there has been a R12.5 billion reduction. But has this really been reflected in the country's economy and people's living standards? Furthermore, R2 billion will not retrieve the situation. On the contrary, it will even entail R2.5 billion in new expenditure on the defense industry.

[Urban] Incidentally, even before the legislature's decision, the press was full of assumptions that there were insufficient funds in the new budget to maintain the Army and Navy. I know that your committee examined everything in detail...

[Ochirov] Yes. I have the statistics to prove everything. By the way, the Defense Ministry had a case on the issue of maintaining the Armed Forces. But the committee did not agree with the ministry on everything. The committee recommended an increase in expenditure on maintaining the Army and the Navy.

[Urban] So why, in your opinion, did all this talk emerge?

[Ochirov] The policy for compiling the military budget needs to be fundamentally reformed. This has not yet materialized because serious economic reforms are not taking place.

What then do I have in mind? Only one person must hold the purse strings—that is, the defense minister. Then we would not have cases where we have several versions of military hardware "on the go" at the experimental-development stage (in short, there is a competitive basis) but then all of these versions go into series production. And here...

[Urban] So what happens?

[Ochirov] Not even the defense minister can do anything then.

So several versions of hardware go into series production. And some or other type has specific and at times major quality defects. In a word, it doesn't satisfy the personnel. So what should be done?

In my opinion, it should be possible to reject any hardware program and stop financing it even at the series production stage. Those who should be delivering quality hardware will just have to manage somehow or other—that's their problem. But this never happens in this country and never will under today's system.

[Urban] People in the forces and the Navy are well aware of this. Consequently, is it possible to implicate your committee too?

[Ochirov] Right now the task is beyond the committee no matter how much it might want it to be otherwise. The system can only be altered on the basis of radical economic reform.

Take this as an example. Let's say there are two helicopters—one from the Mil firm and one from the Kamov firm. They have been developed on a competitive basis. One should be given preference over the other. Those are the conditions. But who can give a reasonable explanation today as to why both helicopters go into series production. By some parameters one is inferior to the other, but both are destined to fulfill the same tasks.

What if you try to scrap the inferior design? A cry goes up that the workers must be fed and the plants must not cease production. I think that there is only one way out—a market economy.

PRAVDA Text of Referendum Measures Resolution

PM2301122391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution signed by A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the Kremlin, Moscow, on 16 January; under the "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" rubric: "USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution 'On the Organization and Measures To Effect the Holding of a USSR Referendum on the Question of Preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'"]

[Text] Based on the fact that nobody except the people themselves can assume the historical responsibility for the USSR's destiny, in fulfillment of the decision of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies and in accordance with the legislation on the USSR referendum, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To hold a USSR referendum Sunday 17 March 1991 in the whole of the USSR's territory on the question of preserving the USSR as a federation of equal republics.

2. To include on the secret ballot sheet the following wording of the question being put to a referendum and the answer options for voters:

"Do you think that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should be preserved as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedoms of a person of any nationality will be fully guaranteed." "Yes" or "No."

3. To determine the voting results throughout the USSR as a whole by calculating voting results for each republic separately.

4. To establish that, in accordance with Articles 17 and 18 of the USSR Law "On Nationwide Voting (on the USSR Referendum)," the powers of the Central Commission for the USSR Referendum to be held 17 March 1991 are to be exercised by the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of USSR People's Deputies.

5. That, in strict accordance with legislation on the USSR referendum, republics' supreme organs of state power, local soviets of people's deputies, and their executive and administrative organs will provide guarantees of citizens' free expression of will on the referendum question and will exclude the possibility of citizens being put under any illegal pressure impeding the exercise of their rights to participate in the referendum.

6. That republics' supreme organs of state power:

will resolve questions of organizing Central Republic Commissions for the USSR Referendum before 26 January 1991. That they will grant Central Republic Commissions for the USSR Referendum the right to determine, within the boundaries of the relevant republics, the borders of districts where voting in the USSR referendum will take place;

will resolve the question of forming district commissions for holding the USSR referendum before 2 February 1991;

will ensure the organization of referendum precincts and precinct commissions no later than 11 February 1991.

Recommend that republics' supreme organs of state power and local soviets of people's deputies, following the constitutional principle of USSR citizens' equality, ensure that the formation of the relevant USSR referendum commissions takes account of voters' ethnic representation.

7. That the USSR Foreign Ministry will organize the holding of the referendum for Soviet citizens resident abroad, where the necessary conditions for so doing exist.

That the USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR KGB, and USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs will organize the holding of the USSR referendum in military units.

That proposals on these questions will be submitted to the USSR Central Commission for the USSR Referendum for consideration before 21 January 1991.

8. That the USSR Government, represented by the USSR Central Commission for the USSR Referendum, will resolve questions of material and financial backup for the USSR referendum and the provision of transportation and communications for it by enterprises and organizations.

9. To recommend that public associations, the mass media, and their editorial collegia provide, in forms accessible to wide sections of the population, comprehensive and objective explanation of the nature of the referendum issue and of the voting procedure, and also of the historical importance of the decision that citizens are making as a result of the voting.

10. In accordance with Article 29 of the USSR Law "On Nationwide Voting (on the USSR Referendum)," the decision made by means of a USSR referendum is final, has binding force in the whole of the USSR's territory, and can be reversed or altered only by means of a new USSR referendum.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet
The Kremlin, Moscow
16 January 1991

Political & Social

TASS Views Gorbachev 22 Jan News Conference

LD2301172491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1601 GMT 23 Jan 91

[By TASS observer Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jan (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev, who immediately after the Baltic crisis found himself at the epicenter of harsh criticism "from the left," has made an attempt to take initiative. In a statement yesterday at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center concerning the situation in the Baltic republics, the USSR president raised a number of points not seen earlier in his public utterances.

The first thing to draw journalists' attention was the presence at the meeting of members of the recent "team" of Mikhail Gorbachev, in particular Aleksandr Yakovlev and Yevgeniy Primakov. This was instantly interpreted by our Western colleagues as an attempt by the Soviet head of state to convince the world around him that "nothing has changed." In fact, the president himself asserted this, emphasizing that "neither domestic nor foreign policy have undergone change." The president offered condolences to the families of those who died in Vilnius.

At the same time Mikhail Gorbachev resolutely stated that "the events in Vilnius and Riga are not in any way an expression of the policy of presidential power, or the purpose for which it was created." The president spoke of the intolerability of "arbitrary actions by troops."

The main thrust of Mikhail Gorbachev's message amounted to both sides of the confrontation having to act exclusively according to constitutional methods. It is, however, surprising that this applies equally to legally elected bodies of authority, for which "abolition of anticonstitutional laws" was prescribed, and to various public organizations, including the salvation committees, which "should make their claims to power solely by the constitutional road." It was reasserted that republics will only be able to secede from the Union according to the results of decisions by referendum.

The sharpest arrows of criticism were launched against Boris Yeltsin, leader of the Russian legislature, whom Mikhail Gorbachev (without naming him) accused of attempts to "dismember the armed forces." And while observers saw in Boris Yeltsin's speech at the Russian Supreme Soviet on Monday an invitation to dialogue with the country's president (although I saw it rather as an unconcealed challenge), the possibilities for dialogue with Yeltsin following Mikhail Gorbachev's speech would seem insubstantial.

It is interesting that the two politicians—both Gorbachev and Yeltsin—appealed in their speeches to the forthcoming session of the Federation Council, at which the "Baltic question" will be reviewed. It looks as though it is there that the decisive battle could take place that will not only clarify the position of the two leaders, but also determine the further direction of political processes in our country.

Gorbachev Issues Decree on Moscow Administration

LD2301191891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Decree issued by USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 23 January; from the "Vremya" newscast—read by announcer]

[Text] Decree of the President of the USSR on Improving the Administration of the City of Moscow:

In connection with the drawing up of a Union treaty and a Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] federative treaty, the need to legally formulate the position of the city of Moscow as the capital of the USSR and the RSFSR and the normalization of the city's vital services and functioning, I hereby decree:

1. That a joint commission be formed from representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet with [Nikolay] Pivovarov, chairman of a committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at its head to consider the material prepared by the USSR presidential commission and the proposals by Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, work collectives, and individual citizens on the question of improving the administration of the city of Moscow as the capital of the USSR and RSFSR, and that the commission be instructed to prepare within one month a USSR draft law on the status of the city of Moscow, the capital of the USSR and the RSFSR.

2. That the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet be recommended to consider the draft law and adopt it in the established way.

[Signed] Gorbachev, president of the USSR

Gorbachev Responds to Questions on Authority

91UN0767C Moscow GOLOS in Russian No 1, 5-11 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev by GOLOS special correspondent Lydiya Lukyanova; place and date not given: "Mikhail Gorbachev: I Will Not Be a Dictator!"]

[Text] [Lukyanova] Mikhail Sergeyevich! Why did you decide not to respond to the proposal to give the president a no-confidence vote? You have not commented on it, either. After all, it came up virtually during the first hour of the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies session. It is clear that it expressed in a condensed form the opinions that are fermenting in society.

[Gorbachev] For me the last six years had been equal to several decades and several of my own lives. I feel as if I am Nasreddin of Bukhara. First he mounted a donkey and got on his way. The people shouted at him: Who ever heard of anything like this? Why is he making the animal suffer, riding it in such hot weather?.. So Nasreddin puts the donkey on his back and carries it. And the people shouted again: Who ever heard of anything like this?.. You see, I wanted to respond after this demand for the president to resign came up. After all, this was a prearranged action on behalf of various groups. I already know who it is who likes to intertwine speeches with verses as if they were ribbons woven into a braid. I could say who it is... I can see who pulls in what direction. But that is not the point.

I saw that the discussion was shifting to the substance of the problem; it remained sharp, and constructive proposals started to come up. So I decided not to speak up. They say that when I speak too often I impose my opinion on others. Let people decide for themselves. However, we should not permit demagoguery and politicking to take over when thousands of enterprises are on the verge of stoppage, when the market is disintegrating into pieces, and economic ties are being severed... Should I start, at such time, to recite what we have inherited? What kind of power institutions and what kind of society, what kind of mental blocks, and how much overloaded with problems?.. Then they would say: There he goes again, Gorbachev talks while the problems are already strangling every family, every collective, and while everybody is concerned with what will happen tomorrow. Will there be a job, a salary, an income for the enterprise to pay that salary... And I would come to the podium and start again from the global positions... No. Therefore I started right away with the issue of power. It cannot be made of jelly. When the market is falling apart, it also gets torn into pieces—on the republic level and even smaller ones... We need a firm power, but it is not a return to dictatorship. All this talk is nonsense...

[Lukyanova] How do you feel about the accusations that you want to become an autocratic, shall we say, ruler, by acquiring additional powers?

[Gorbachev] I will not be a dictator! I think everybody is already convinced of that.

[Lukyanova] Do we have your word, Mikhail Sergeyevich?

[Gorbachev] I could have been a dictator a long time ago, because the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee had such power as nobody else in world had. Not a single dictator, not a single Pinochet!

[Lukyanova] That is right!

[Gorbachev] Nevertheless, I chose a different way. Therefore it is, perhaps, more difficult for me than for others; mine may be the biggest drama. There you go! I cannot step on my own throat, step on something that has already started. I cannot falter, get scared. Of course, there is a serious danger...

[Lukyanova] It is as if your two halves are engaged in a struggle, Mikhail Sergeyevich...

[Gorbachev] Yes, yes... You know, when it comes down to it, we are now in the last defensive trench on all fronts of perestroyka. Take the Union. A Union of sovereign republics makes it possible to preserve this multinational state so that it could carry through its sovereignty, meet peoples' expectations, but at the same time remain a Union and use the opportunities presented by unity. To go further? Further there is disintegration, further sovereignty will turn into losses.

I think that in the renewed federation nobody will be able to do without a common market and cooperation. Here is one of those last trenches; it cannot be abandoned because beyond that lies disintegration.

My idea of sovereignty is being twisted in such a way now that it becomes absurd. This is how we get sovereign cities and rayons... Because of that the power and the market are tearing at the seams, and isolated fiefdoms emerge. As a result one diktat may end up turning into a hundred small diktats. We are learning. We are walking the road of democratic development that took others centuries to get through. And I would like (at least once in the history of this country) to do it without spilling blood, without the division into the reds, the blacks, and the blues...

[Lukyanova] Do you get upset by the criticisms?

[Gorbachev] I do not get upset with criticism, but I must say that even I, being such a fan of humor and satire (it really is my soft spot) can see how much we all lack culture—the culture of criticism.

[Lukyanova] Including the parliament?

[Gorbachev] Yes! Sometimes I am ashamed. But I stop and think: Why should I defend myself? Let society think. There is a law. Society should finally understand that disrespect for its president, for the democratically elected power, is disrespect for the people itself.

At the meeting with culture workers I really got to the point of being very frank. The story of my family, I said, is such, that I have heard a lot of unjust things in all these years, but I remember my grandfather. He came back home after 1938, in 1939, after all those tortures... We spent the whole day listening to him, the whole family was crying when he told us what they had done to him. But then he never returned to this talk. For 17 years he had been a kolkhoz [collective farm] chairman. A rural man, a peasant. What do you expect me to do, go against my grandfather? It never even occurred to me... Or take my father... He went through the entire war—Kursk, the Dnieper. His blood was spilled, he was seriously wounded at the end of the war; the war undermined his health. And he is no longer with us. So, will I go against

him? Should we announce that they—our father and grandfathers—lived for nothing?! What would then we be worth? Then we should be swept down to hell... But it does not mean that we are unaware of repressions and tragedies, the repetition of which should not be permitted. But we should not linger on it...

[Lukyanova] Do you believe that the press helps?

[Gorbachev] I am convinced of that! Otherwise all of this would not have taken place.

Requests Objectivity

91UN0767B Moscow GOLOS in Russian No 1, 5-11 Jan 91 p 1

[Unattributed interview with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev; place and date not given: "The USSR President Counsels the Independent All-Union Newspaper of Journalists"]

[Text] [GOLOS] What is the priority task of the fourth power, as the press is now called?

[Gorbachev] One monopoly cannot be replaced with another. This is the main principle of the objective press.

[GOLOS] What kind of help from journalists do you personally need, if any? We want to be of assistance to the president in achieving accord and peace in the Motherland, in stabilizing the situation.

[Gorbachev] Listen to more than just one point of view and reflect processes objectively. Otherwise the press will again become tendentious. If we are abandoning one monopoly—I mean a well-known monopoly—we should not give in to another one so as not to go from one dictate to another dictate. Only democratic principles and proceeding from the laws of a rule-of-law state may save us. We are not yet ready for this: We do not have either proper culture or proper experience. However, everything will be accomplished. Just as long as we do not break each other's ribs in the meantime.

[GOLOS] May we consider your wishes for the press to be advice to GOLOS, the independent newspaper of journalists?

[Gorbachev] You may. However, since we are now under democratic conditions, this is my personal appeal rather than a directive.

Yanayev Addresses Peace Conference

LD2301184591 Moscow TASS in English 1823 GMT 23 Jan 91

[by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Golovanov]

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—Soviet Vice-President Gennadiy Yanayev, at the opening of the 12th all-Union Conference of Peace Supporters today, called on participants to support President Mikhail Gorbachev's policy aimed to "ensure genuine people's power", "effective economy" and "protect society from supporters of old ways and proponents of extremism".

The idea of peace-making has for too long been subjected to "corrosion, deformation and dogmatism", Yanaev said.

He warned against overdoing "another fledgleing tendency—discarding government policy".

A total of 786 delegates representing republican and regional peace committees will meet for two days to discuss a report by the Soviet Peace Committee about its activities in the past five years. The committee is expected to be renamed the Federation of Peace and Accord.

Delegates will also discuss a new programme and rules and ruling bodies and will elect a USSR people's deputy from the Soviet peace movement. Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Grodno has been nominated for the seat.

Yanayev summed up the results of the new Soviet foreign policy that helped German unification—"a fact of historic, but not indisputable importance"—and the holding of the Paris summit.

These "positive processes" should spread further East, including to Japan, he said.

Unfortunately, the Gulf crisis was not resolved by political means, he said, blaming the Iraqi leadership from whom "God took away reason".

Paper on Coup Possibility in USSR

AU2201152091 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19-20 Jan 91 p 7

[Dawid Warszawski commentary: "Whose Soviet Army Is It?"]

[Text] "The Army has no intention of taking the Lithuanian parliament building by storm," said a Soviet military commander in Vilnius yesterday. "The Army does not need this building."

More and more statements like this are to be heard from the lips of Soviet military men. Official communiques are talking more and more frequently about "defending the interests of officers and soldiers" and about the fact that the Soviet Army "will not permit a neglect of its rights." Seldom is there any mention of "defending socialism," "preventing bourgeois deviations," and even "restoring law and order." The Soviet Army seems to be speaking exclusively in its own name and aiming toward objectives that are known only to itself.

Gorbachev confirmed this indirectly when he said he had not been informed of any planned attack on the television tower in Vilnius and had not granted any permission for such an operation. The decision was allegedly made by a local commander. If one believes what the USSR President says, that means that a mutiny

has occurred within the Soviet Army. The fact that no remedial measures have been taken would imply that the mutineers have succeeded. But if the Soviet president is not speaking the truth, that means that he has joined the mutineers.

The impression that the Soviet Army has acted for the sake of its own interests with or without the Kremlin's approval is strengthened by what Defense Minister General Yazov has said. He said that the Army in Vilnius acted in a accordance with article 38 of the rules of guard service. "The minister confused the rules of guard service with the USSR Constitution," said MOSKOVSKOYE NOVOSTI. But what if he did not?

The USSR Constitution is completely impotent. The aims of democrats and nationalist movements go far beyond what the Constitution permits, and the party apparatus is unable to enforce an observance of the Constitution. Instead of pinning its fortunes on the Constitution, the Soviet Army has acted in accordance with its own private constitution, i.e. the rules of guard service and other pieces of military legislation. These guarantee a defense of its interests and clearly state who may exercise power and how.

But not all senior commanders approve of such an autonomous Army. The commander of the Kaunas Garrison has stated that his forces will not shoot civilians. But, on the other hand, General Dubinin has said in a well-known speech that his forces will only leave Poland at an appropriate time and manner. That means not only disobedience toward Moscow, currently negotiating a treaty on this subject with Poland, but also an independent formulation of policy vis-a-vis the Polish authorities. That is not the way a military commander behaves. That is the way a member of an independent political movement behaves.

In the face of this and thousands of similar facts, the question of a military coup in the USSR is quite academic. Not only may the Army take power in the USSR, it has already done so, even if only in certain areas and only to a limited extent. Gorbachev's decrees are not respected more in the army barracks of Vilnius than they are by the parliament in Vilnius. Both localities have centers of authority that are autonomous vis-a-vis the civilian authorities in the Kremlin.

But what objectives of its own may the Soviet Army or its mutinous faction have? Cornelius Castoriadis once wrote that while the USSR civilian economy is in ruins, the military economy is functioning according to world standards, and the people employed in the military economy enjoy a far better standard of living than the average Soviet citizen. The assessment of the economic efficiency of the Soviet industrial-military complex has proved exaggerated, but the assessment of the standard of living was, until recently, accurate. I say until recently, because the growing economic catastrophe, coupled with the effects of the mass withdrawal of forces from Germany, has leveled out the differences between the standard of living of civilians and soldiers.

This leveling out has now been added to the collapse of the imperial military ideology and the crisis in political power. The Soviet Army, the beloved child of the regime, has suddenly become an orphan. Now it is fighting for survival, its own status, and the kind of order inside the USSR that will allow it to win back its privileges and status. So far, no politician has been able to lead the Soviet Army to battle, so the Soviet Army is leading itself.

Soyuz Leader Alksnis Calls Gorbachev 'Weak'

PM2401113991 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Jan 91 p 7

[Flemming Rose report: "Will Fight for Power to the Last Drop of Blood"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union is on the verge of a large-scale war between the Communist Party's armed forces—the Red Army, the KGB, and the Interior Ministry's special troops—and that section of the population supporting the democratically elected legislatures of the various republics around the country. Only a few hours after several hundred thousand people had demonstrated at the Kremlin wall in Moscow against the Red Army's slaughter of civilians in Lithuania, Soviet special troops attacked the Latvian Interior Ministry in Riga and killed a further four civilians. [passage omitted]

"A meeting of the Soviet Union's highest legislative assembly, the Congress of People's Deputies, should be called immediately so that it can form a national coalition government consisting of representatives of all wings. We must put aside all ideological conflicts about capitalism or socialism," "Black Colonel" Viktor Alksnis told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. Alksnis is the leader of the old-style Communist legislative group, Soyuz, which was behind the campaign which forced former foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze to resign.

According to Alksnis, President Gorbachev is behind the national salvation committees which have been formed in the Baltic republics and Russia.

"I have had contacts with members of the National Salvation Committee in Lithuania, and they said that they had done everything Gorbachev had asked them to. Last night Latvian Communist Party leader Alfreds Rubiks rang me and said: 'You were right. Gorbachev has betrayed us.'"

Alksnis believes that the committees were formed with the aim of establishing two competing power structures, a so-called dyarchy. "Afterward Gorbachev would then be able to 'resolve' the conflict by dissolving the Baltic countries' national salvation committees and legislatures and introducing direct presidential rule from Moscow."

"But halfway he got cold feet and became afraid, and as a result the Army is being given the blame for the bloodshed," said Alksnis, who himself comes from Riga and who throughout the night had been in contact with all the central power structures involved in the night's bloody events there.

Viktor Alksnis described Gorbachev as a funk who dares not assume responsibility when it comes to the crunch. That is why the Soviet president must resign. Gorbachev could learn much from U.S. President George Bush. When Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait, Bush carried out the attack he had been threatening. But Gorbachev is weak. [passage omitted]

KGB Conference Rejects Criticisms

PM2301202391 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "From the KGB Public Relations Center"]

[Text] In January this year a conference of the USSR KGB leadership was held to comprehensively analyze the circumstances and reasons preceding the appearance in the press (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA [Russian Newspaper] for 29 November 1990) of a letter from 64 staffers of the USSR KGB Administration for Sverdlovsk Oblast. A number of operations personnel who had signed the letter were invited to the conference.

The appeal, addressed to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, attests that staffers of the KGB Administration for Sverdlovsk Oblast, like the overwhelming majority of the country's security officers, show interest in successfully implementing perestroyka and concern about its future and the growth of social tension and extremism. It also certainly contains conclusions which deserve support—the urgent need to ensure stability in society and enhance the prestige and effectiveness of law enforcement bodies.

The groundless claim by the letterwriters that KGB bodies pose a potential danger to the democratic transformations under way in the country evoked well reasoned criticism from the conference participants. It was stressed that KGB bodies will never be on the opposite side of the barricades from their people and see no alternative to the long overdue profound transformations in society. There is much confusion in the letterwriters' arguments regarding questions of depoliticizing and departyizing the KGB and of the conformity of the USSR KGB leadership's orders and instructions with existing legislation. Conclusions that the KGB's activity is still geared to the interests of the party apparatus and is outside the sphere of monitoring by the USSR Supreme Soviet are totally groundless.

The conference participants said that the atmosphere in the collective of the USSR KGB Administration for the Sverdlovsk Oblast is not conducive to openness and constructive dialogue. Methods not conducive to trust in mutual relations with the operations personnel predominated in the work style of the administration's leadership. Staffers were poorly informed about the progress of perestroyka in the USSR KGB system. Discipline was slack. One reason why all this became possible was that the USSR KGB poorly monitored the administration's work.

Measures to resolutely eradicate stagnation phenomena in the work of the KGB Administration for Sverdlovsk Oblast and to renew its work and bring it into line with present-day requirements were outlined during the discussion. Confidence was expressed that Sverdlovsk's security officers, with a sense of great responsibility, will make a sober and principled analysis of the atmosphere prevailing in the collective, will do everything necessary to consolidate their ranks of ensure our motherland's security, and will honorably fulfill their duty before the Soviet people.

Petrushenko Denies Interview's Slant

PM2401113491 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by USSR People's Deputy N. Petrushenko "on curtailed glasnost": "Like Looking Into a Distorting Mirror"]

[Text] "The press is the mirror of public life," A.N. Yakovlev, former member of the political leadership of the country said only recently as he instructed us in the fundamentals of democracy. I completely concur with this profound thought, but with the qualification that the mirror often distorts. At times so much so that even you cannot recognize your own political portrait. I became convinced of this yet once more when I read the weekly ROSSIYA's interview with me by its correspondent A. Melnikov. At the end of the interview I cautiously expressed my doubts about the objectivity of this organ of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium. And it was as if I was looking into a distorting mirror: A number of my judgments had been sanitized, and the most pointed and unpleasant for those presently standing at Russia's parliamentary helm were simply expurgated. I hope with SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's help to reestablish the truth.

I will begin with those elements not reflected in the version of my interview printed by the weekly ROSSIYA.

First. They expurgated my words stating that at the beginning of November the Russian leadership, behind the back of the USSR Defense Ministry, summoned to Moscow 600 deputies from the military—who were, of course, of "democratic" orientation in the view of that leadership—and proposed that they vote in favor of a resolution of...no confidence in the USSR Government and Defense Minister Marshal D.T. Yazov.

Second. They omitted my criticism of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's leadership, headed by B.N. Yeltsin, who as is well known has already on many occasions been repeating that he will not permit "infringement of the sovereignty" and "national interests" of the Russian people. I drew attention to the fact that the leaders of the Russian legislators had in effect resigned themselves to selling off Russia in the interests of certain groups. And as evidence, I alluded to the Agreement on the Demarcation of the Bering Sea Area, concluded between the USSR and the United States. Under this document, the USSR, and that means Russia, loses more than 150,000 tonnes of fish and an as yet unknown quantity of oil and gas over a territory of 37,000 square km (or according to other estimates several times more still) in the regions ceded by our generous diplomacy. And they do not want even the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviet members to know about this agreement, preferring to maneuver behind the scenes, behind closed doors. And according to some sources the Americans are in the meantime proceeding to develop the territories ceded to them, without waiting for the agreement to be ratified and taking advantage of our Foreign Ministry's goodwill.

Third. They expurgated from the interview my assessment of the stance of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and in particular its "sovereign" chairman, regarding the Russian-speaking population living in the union republics as "treacherous." I said that in the Baltic region Russians are subjected to real racial discrimination, they are hounded, persecuted, and worn down by methods borrowed from the South African rulers. And the leaders of the Russian parliament are concluding economic agreements with the Baltic nationalists helping them to stay afloat, agreements so shameful they are painstakingly concealed both from the public and the people's deputies. And, I emphasized, on what grounds do the Russian leaders suddenly at the height of the harvest refuse the Ukraine supplies of fuel and lubricants causing it to lose thousands of tonnes of grain? And at the same time petroleum, gasoline, and solar oil from the Russian oil fields at an eighth of the price of mineral water were pouring into the "democrats'" hands in Lithuania and Latvia.

Fourth. They also concealed from Russian readers my attitude toward several RSFSR people's deputies who were so stuck on the idea of privatization that they even began talking about the privatization and "republicanization" of nuclear weapons.

And finally they greatly played down, or to be more accurate, distorted my assessment of the documented facts in Western newspapers about the links between the Interregional Deputies' Group and the CIA. I spoke about how Uncle Sam supplies our "democratic" deputies abundantly with faxes, computers, duplicating equipment etc. Presumably for the benefit of the Russian people, whose interests prominent members of the Interregional Group are supposed to protect in the union parliament.

As you see the weekly ROSSIYA clearly demonstrated its real attitude to objectivity and the "pluralism" of press information. Exactly in the same way as its protectors from the Russian parliament, who handle dissidents and dissenters even more unceremoniously than the "partocrats" they are demolishing so completely. I say this with full justification as I have had the chance to satisfy myself as to the "objectivity" of Russian "democrats'" publications many times.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my position regarding the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and its leaders, first and foremost B.N. Yeltsin. It is becoming painful and shameful to hear the reports from Russian parliament sittings and its leaders' statements and press conferences. After all, of the RSFSR people's deputies the majority are Communists, really sober-minded people; so why do they allow themselves be crushed by loudmouths who openly support capitalism and are steering a course harmful to the working people? Surely it is clear, for example, that B.N. Yeltsin's appeals to servicemen of Russian nationality not to obey the command's orders, and his statements about the possibility of Russia creating its own army, open the way for a large-scale civil war? Why cannot the Russian deputies, among whom there many Communists, stop this dangerous adventurism?

Colleagues, how can your indifference and passivity be explained? Are you afraid of being hounded, repressed, or does habitual obedience rule you? Or have you simply gotten lost and cannot see a way out? Forgive my candor, but if you lack a firm stance, the preparedness and resoluteness to defend the interests of your electorate the working people, then let others take your place who are able to fight and take risks. You will not achieve anything great with trembling hands, you will only help those who are destroying the country.

Take a look at the Baltic region—are not the Russian "democrats" paving the way for an equally "sensational" situation in our republic?

And to conclude, something about the popular theme of "cohesion" and "consolidation." I am rebuked for being "aggressive" and "frenzied," which, as "sensible people" like to repeat, does not win me any sympathy. But I have no need for the sympathy of those who are now privatizing our Fatherland; compromise and consolidation with them is shameful for a Communist, so let them hound and defame me.

Only a blind and deaf person would not recognize now that in our society under the cover of sickly-sweet conversations about "consolidation" and "common human values," a very real ideological, political, and economic class struggle is going on. These conversations are to the advantage of the pseudodemocrats who have set a course for the restoration of capitalism, and who are in practice bourgeois conservatives and in this way pull the wool over people's eyes and prevent a conscious and effective defense of the socialist system.

It is by no means accidental that we see coming from the pages of this same "radical" press a mass brainwashing about the bankruptcy of socialism and hopes for a better life through privatization, and that in it "innovative" conclusions resound about the idea of socialist choice today supposedly not being capable of securing the "consolidation of society." In other words: You're millions of workers, sacrifice your social gains in the name of "consolidation," for the sake of the interests of thousands of mafioso operators! "Unite" with those who were so timid about robbing you in the period of stagnation and now are doubling, trebling, nay increasing tenfold their capital in the period of free enterprise opened up by perestroyka!

I myself prefer to pull together with the working people in the name of the defense of their vital interests. And I will not budge!

Journalists Seek Kravchenko's Recall as Deputy

PM2401142091 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 91 p 4

[Unattributed report under the general heading "To Comrade Kravchenko, as Person and Chairman": "By the Way"]

[Text] A plenum of the Krasnoyarsk Kray organization of the Journalists' Union, in a special resolution, demanded the recall of USSR People's Deputy Leonid Kravchenko, chairman of Gosteleradio [USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]. Elected from the Journalists' Union, he is today in the front ranks of his colleagues' persecutors.

The plenum deemed the suspension of the Law on the Press impermissible, and such a proposal has already on more than one occasion come from the very highest authorities, even from the president's own lips.

Media Figures Refuse To Work With Central TV

PM2401141091 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 91 p 4

[Appeal to "all those who collaborate with Central Television": "To Comrade Kravchenko, as Person and Chairman"]

[Text] We appeal to all those who collaborate with Central Television—actors, musicians, producers, writers, and journalists.

Before our eyes over a period of two months, L. Kravchenko has returned television to Brezhnev's times. The programs "ATV," "Vzglyad," "Vremya," and "TSN" have been banned or ruined and political censorship has in effect been revived. As a result the viewers receive an incomplete or distorted picture of events.

What has happened to Central Television is a most important element in the general onslaught of reaction. It is no accident that in the Baltic region our comrades—television cameramen and journalists—are coming under attack. We cannot and should not reconcile ourselves to this. Until such time as the question of the second channel's transfer to Russian Television is resolved and until the stranglehold of censorship is removed, we, the undersigned, refuse in any way at all to collaborate with Central Television.

[Signed] Vadim Abdrashitov, Regimantas Adomaitis, Arif Aliyev, Nikolay Amosov, Semen Aranovich, Viya Artmane, Donatas Banionis, Mikhail Belikov, Yuriy Bogomolov, Aleksandr Borshchagovskiy, Juozas Budraitis, Rolan Bykov, Anri Vartanov, Aleksandr Gelman, Aleksey German, Grigoriy Gorin, Aleksandr Gradskiy, Yevgeniy Grigoryev, Ionas Gricius, Viktor Demin, Oleg Yefremov, Vytautas Zalakievicius, Arvo Iho, Aleksandr Ivanov, Kalye Kiysk, Vakhtang Kikabidze, Elem Klimov, Yakov Kostyukovskiy, Kirill Lavrov, Konstantin Lopushanskiy, Igor Maslennikov, Yuriy Mushketik, Tatyana Nikitina, Sergey Nikitin, Vyacheslav Nikiforov, Andrey Nuykin, Lilita Ozolinya, Bulat Okudzhava, Raimond Pauls, Edvard Pauls, Andrey Plakhov, Jurijs Podnieks, Mikhail Ptashuk, Andrey Razumovskiy, Nadezhda Rumyantseva, Eldar Ryazanov, Aleksandr Svobodin, Aleksey Simonov, Anatoliy Smelyanskiy, Andrey Smirnov, Sergey Solovyev, Yuriy Trofimov, Lembit Ulfsak, Leonid Filatov, Davlat Khudonazarov, Mikhail Shatrov, Oleg Yankovskiy.

Former Premier Ryzhkov Released From Hospital

LD2301132891 Moscow TASS in English 1311 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—Former Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov was discharged from hospital on Monday [21 January] after a four-week treatment, TASS learned at the Soviet Health Ministry today.

He was transferred to a health resort in the Moscow region to undergo a course of rehabilitative treatment under doctors' observation in order to restore locomotive activity.

The overall state of Ryzhkov's health is satisfactory. He takes well daily walks outdoors and other therapeutic prescriptions. The process of recovery is proceeding normally.

Khasbulatov, Yanayev Appear on 'Who's Who'

LD1901232991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1215 GMT 19 Jan 91

["Who's Who" program with Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR vice president Gennadiy Ivanovich Yanayev, hosted by Igor Fesunenko—live]

[Excerpts] [Fesunenko] Hello, comrades! After a short break, the "Who's Who" program is back on air, prepared by the central television's main editorial office for

sociopolitical programs. As you know, in these broadcasts we introduce you to prominent statesmen, politicians, and public figures in our country. And we are hoping for letters from you saying whom you would like to see and whom you would like to meet on the "Who is Who" program. Well, today, our guests are two quite well known, er, two of our country's statesmen well known to everyone, who need no introduction: Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, and Gennadiy Ivanovich Yanayev, our country's vice president.

May I remind you that this is a live broadcast. [passage omitted] We await your telephone calls with questions for our guests. But comrades, right away I want to warn you and make two little requests of you: First, we were receiving your questions all day yesterday, a special telephone line was operating just for that purpose, and we already have a big pile of questions. I want to ask you right away: Do not ask questions about the situation in Lithuania, about our guests' attitude to these events. Many such questions have already been asked and we shall without fail be talking about this. We just do not want repetition to save time. That is the first thing. second, a fervent plea: Do not ask minor, personal, everyday things, no matter how important they may be for you.

And another request: We invited another person to take part in the program, but he is unable to come. He is Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan. Comrade Nazarbayev wanted very much to take part, but was unable to do so as he is very busy at the moment. [passage omitted] Either he will take part in our next program, scheduled for 16 February, or perhaps, if he is busy, we shall collect these questions from you and go on your behalf to Alma-Ata and he will answer them there. [passage omitted] Before starting our conversation and embarking on answering your questions, I would like to show you some short reports to help you to see our guests in an unusual ambience, in their shirt-sleeves, so to speak, in an everyday situation.

[Fesunenko] So, our guests are Comrades Khasbulatov and Yanayev who are answering your questions. [passage omitted]

Now then. There is even an official letter which we have received from the chairman of the subcommittee on forestry and specially preserved territories, part of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on ecological issues. It is addressed to both of you. You have taken the helm of the country and republic at a time when our environment is undergoing a great ordeal. [passage omitted]

Comrades, are you planning to adopt urgent measures at least to preserve those things we have inherited from previous generations and to punish those who are to blame? Will the Union and republican governments be taking any measures?

[Khasbulatov] Of course. We are not talking only about forestry, moreover. We are also considering the soil, land, lakes and rivers, and air space. [passage omitted]

[Yanayev] [passage omitted] I think that there ought to be a legislative act or president's decree regulating all these issues.

[Fesunenko] what do you think, Ruslan Imranovich?

[Khasbulatov] Well, you see, nature reserves cannot be the subject of privatization. Another thing is that if they were derelict, in absolutely new conditions we should really make sure that these nature reserves do not become the subject of all sorts of privatization.

[Fesunenko] Gennadiy Ivanovich, a further question, that is I would say of a technical nature and not difficult. It asks for information on what posts are held at the present time by members of the former Presidential Council and in particular Comrades Yakovlev, Medvedev, and Bakatin. The question comes Aleksandr Nikolayevich Isachenko from the two of Klaipeda.

[Yanayev] Well, as you know, the Presidential Council no longer exists. Comrades Yakovlev and Medvedev are for the time being working as former members of the Presidential Council, since the new structure has not yet been formulated. I know that the president intends to offer them some fairly important areas of work. As far as Comrade Bakatin is concerned, the president has offered him the post of deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, but he declined it and voiced his wishes. I think that we must definitely make use of Comrade Bakatin's experience and abilities.

[Fesunenko] Okay, thank you. Now, Gennadiy Ivanovich, I would like to address you again as a new, indeed the first vice president. I have a quotation from your first interview, or rather not your first interview but your first news conference. This information was extensively published in various newspapers, but in this particular case I have the KURANTY newspaper. There you were talking about your views and your political credo. In particular, in the course of that news conference you remembered, as it were, that in your opinion the phrase humane democratic socialism has not been used in a proper manner, has not been clear enough. You also said: I am not a supporter of epithets, I am a supporter of the process of construction of socialism. Well then, I would like to ask you—if it is true and the newspaper did not twist your words—maybe you can tell us, without beating about the bush, what you mean by socialism which we have to build. How does it differ from socialism which we are building without actually finally constructing it?

[Yanayev] You understand, when I was delivering a speech at the 28th Party Congress...[changes thought] and this time I repeated the position I had expressed at the 28th Party Congress.

[Fesunenko] Yes, Yes, Yes.

[Yanayev] I said then that regardless of the epithets which we are using to define socialism, we have already been constructing developed socialism and mature socialism. Practically, however, we have not experienced even a single day of socialism as we understand it should be. We have experienced barrack-like socialism and deformed socialism. I suppose when we are talking about choosing the system, people should express their attitude as regards the sort of system they want through a national referendum, if it takes place. I mean socialism which would provide equality of rights and opportunities, provide social protection for people, and guarantee that every person has a secure future. This is exactly the thing we have deprived our people of, even in the course of perestroyka. That is why I am convinced as a human being and as a citizen that we have to carry on building socialism. We should build fundamentally new socialism, different from the caricature we have had hitherto. So this is what I meant when I used that expression you referred to. [passage omitted]

You know, Ruslan, you've touched on the very important topic of the market, and I'd like to make literally just one comment. It seems to me that when we speak of the market, we are unanimous here in our approach, that we've got to embrace the market because by means of market relations we can extricate our languishing economy. But we must see quite clearly the social background against which the transition to market relations is being effected. We must not idealize the market. The market is tough, let us say that bluntly...

[Fesunenko] Not just tough, but harsh.

[Yanayev]...and harsh in the transition period, quite right. Thus we must think about the consequences and the social upheavals toward which our various reforms could lead.

[Fesunenko] So we must develop social protective mechanisms.

[Yanayev] We need a mechanism of social protection to smooth out the possible negative consequences of the transition to market relations.

[Fesunenko] Of course, that is indubitable. There must be social indicators, a whole set, a whole range of social measures and so on.

[Yanayev] Yes, of course. We have already planned [words indistinct], and our session begins soon. Yes, and one of the main sets...

[Fesunenko] [Words indistinct]

[Yanayev] I'll tell you. Several sets of laws and decisions of the Supreme Soviet are being used by us precisely on the principle that since we intend to move decisively toward market relations and formations, it follows that we must, with the same decisiveness, implement the social protection of our people. And in this regard we are cooperating very closely with the trade unions. But now, to answer your question, why we have changed the date by two weeks. We've done so in response to the following circumstances: First, the huge pressure from our deputies. We already have more than 300 or 400 deputies demanding that we convene the Supreme Soviet. Because of two factors. [words indistinct] because of two factors. First, the Lithuanian crisis, and second, there's the external crisis in the Persian Gulf, and the deputies want to express their views.

[Fesunenko] In your answer to the previous question, you at the same time also answered Petr Stepanov, of Tataristan, who asked you what sort of social system you and Yeltsin intend to set up in Russia under the new constitution. [words indistinct]

[Yanayev] Under the new constitution we do indeed want to establish a social system. [passage omitted]

[Fesunenko] There is a similar question to Comrade Yanayev. How are the government and Supreme Soviet of the USSR tackling the problem of repatriating the Meskhetian Turk population? That is a question from Mortazar Isat-Ogly, a viewer at Chervonnyy Molochar state farm in the town of Slavyansk. That is, I think, a difficult question. We cannot answer it right now because it confuses the interests of Georgia, Russia and those self-same Meskhetian Turks. But, at the very least, we can, I think, assure viewers who ask these questions that our people are thinking about these problems.

[Yanayev] You know, Igor, at the Supreme Soviet I was chairman of a deputies commission on the Crimean Tatars. Three commissions were set up at that time, on the Crimean Tatars, on the Meskhetian Turks, and the Volga Germans. We have begun resolving the first problem. It may not be much, but at least a start has been made on solving the Crimean problem, the problem of the Crimean Tatars.

[Fesunenko] Yes, I remember that.

[Yanayev] We have to solve, we have to seek ways of resolving problems, including the problem of Meskhetian Turks and the problem of the Volga German. I am convinced that a solution is possible. It is possible. [passage omitted]

[Yanayev] By the way, as regards this question of refugees, I consider that one of our national tragedies, at the moment, is the fact that we have over 600,000 refugees in the country. These are unfortunate people whose life has been ruined. I feel that we should not delay the drafting and adoption of legislation which would define refugee status, which would resolve these problems which really do worry refugees at the moment.

[Fesunenko] Gennadiy Ivanovich, there are three questions to you, which I think, follow on from your previous answer. One is about Nagoro Karabakh. How does the vice president intend to solve the question of restoring constitutional authority? That is a question from Isat Livernyshev in Moscow. There is a question about North Ossetia from Zaur Petrovich Daguzov. The situation in

the North Ossetian oblast is extremely tense. What is the position of the vice president? And there is another question to Comrade Yanayev from Chekunova, the chief economist of Klyuchevskiy state farm in Krasnoarmeyskiy rayon of Saratov Oblast. What is your attitude toward restoring the autonomy of the Volga Germans on the territory of Saratov Oblast? She adds: the Germans living there currently make up two percent of the population. The local population are categorically against the idea. All these are explosive questions.

[Yanayev] Yes, I know this issue of the Volga Germans really was a very big. At that time the citizens of Saratov and Kuybyshev oblasts expressed their disapproval of this matter. I think that—by the way, we are now working to find a satisfactory solution to the problems. This problem cannot be swept under the carpet again because people are losing confidence, just as with the Nagorno Karabakh problem. Incidentally, I would like to say that the president has instructed me, as vice president, to resume discussions on ways of solving the problems of Nagorno Karabakh. I know that, as you rightly say, a huge number of explosive questions, which could explode, have accumulated there. However, as a result of my first contacts with the leadership of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno Karabakh, I think these problems can be solved. We will probably begin some consultations shortly—I don't wish to speak of negotiations because negotiations are usually conducted between representatives of two different states. I would very much hope that these consultations would lead to the elimination of tension, since by tradition Armenians and Azerbaijans have got on well with each other in this region, in Nagorno Karabakh. We will seek a solution. [passage omitted]

[Fesunenko] Gennadiy Ivanovich, a group of wives whose husbands are still in Iraq asks you, USSR Vice President Yanayev, what specific measures at this present time are being taken to rescue our people who still remain in Iraq. Who specifically will be responsible for the fact that over 100 of our people remain in Iraq at the start of a war, with the obvious probability of impending war?

[Yanayev] I would like at once to say who will be responsible. Remaining in Iraq at the present time are 100 people who voluntarily and contractually—voluntarily without any duress—remained there to complete the work that they had begun. Over the past year, or rather over the past few months, we have reduced 70-fold the number of Soviet specialists in Iraq.

We are now undertaking, or rather I want in addressing the esteemed women who are asking these questions, to say that not a single one of our Soviet citizens has been a casualty in Iraq at the present time, and the president has instructed the relevant bodies to do everything possible to evacuate our Soviet citizens from Iraq in the very near future.

[Fesunenko] Do you think this is possible then? After all a war is in progress. Surely an aircraft cannot now be sent to Baghdad?

[Yanayev] I think that there are certain other possible ways of solving this problem.

[Fesunenko] What—overland to Jordan, or something like that?

[Yanayev] Well, at any rate this is already getting into specifics. I do not think that the viewers need to be interested in the mechanics invloved as set by the president.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. [passage omitted on Fesunenko saying there have been many telephone calls reproaching Russia for driving a wedge between itself and the center, asking if Russia can find a common language with the center, asking why Yeltsin and he favor confrontation and the disintegration of the state, and why Russia is adopting laws which contradict Union laws. Khasbulatov says he will try to answer briefly and complains of a lack of respect by those above toward Yeltsin and the Russian state]

[Khasbulatov] The fact is—to our great regret it should be said directly—that despite all our attempts to find a truly common political line, despite all our cooperation, very often we come up against a stone wall of incomprehension. Well, you will agree, take the latest example, along economic lines. It seemed that I, just as all my comrades-in-arms, my colleagues, breathed a sigh of relief when we signed the budget agreement, a temporary economic agreement. It seemed that now we would travel along a common path. But suddenly the Lithuania crisis led us to completely different sides of the barricades again and, well, as you can see, that gave rise to a rush of feelings. Although one cannot help asking, let us say, why did Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin fly there? yes, well, I assure you that if he had not flown to Tallinn, if he had not held those talks there, it is quite possible that we would have been faced with a more large-scale, a bloodier drama. [passage omitted on question about what measures the Russian Supreme Soviet is taking to protect the Russians in the Baltics and another on how the Russian Government and Supreme Soviet intend to guarantee the legal security of the Russian-speaking population of Lithuania]

[Khasbulatov] We envision the most concrete mechanism of protection. First, I would like everyone to know that we began talks with the Baltic republics somewhere beginning in August or September, but they came to a standstill. Why? Because at that stage, the Baltic countries did not want to observe our demands on guaranteeing the legal mechanism of protection. Therefore we brought them to a standstill, we stopped them. But when we saw that they were ready, and in particular, well, the agreement with Tallinn, the agreement with Riga, we envisioned in the course of one month that we would provide for the elaboration of an entire program protecting the interests not only of the Russian-speaking

people but also of the nonindigenous population, the nonindigenous population as a whole. After all, thereby we are creating the possibility for a legal guarantee of protection. Otherwise, what mechanisms for protection are there? Absolutely none at all! None at all!

The main meaning of these agreements lies precisely in insuring the precise and guaranteed protection of our fellow citizens. But just ask yourself what other aims can there be, in the first place, the social, political, and cultural interests of our fellow citizens, and in the second place, the preservation of economic links? But by preserving them, we are creating the prerequisites for these republics remaining in the Union. So why does there have to be criticism? Why doesn't that position have to be appreciated? Why, one wonders? Well, I simply do not understand the logic of those who are against such activity of ours.

[Fesunenko] You know Ruslan [words indistinct]

[Khasbulatov] Just a moment. It seems to me that this is not the problem. The fact is that the central departments are against the very principle of our treaties with the republics. They were just as against the treaty which we concluded with the Ukraine...[Fesunenko tries to interrupt] ... just as against ... the central departments...

[Fesunenko, interrupting] Well, did they ban the signing? I do not understand, in what form did they come out against it?

[Khasbulatov] They came out categorically against it, considering that to be the prerogative of the center only. And we think that we will create the basis of a new Union treaty first and guarantee the rights not only of the Russian-speaking people but also of our fellow citizens of other, nonindigenous nationalities in this way, and thereby we will create the prerequisites for the expansion, for the development of our economic, cultural, and political possibilities and, at the same time, for the solution of very acute socioeconomic problems.

[Fesunenko] Gennadiy Ivanovich, since you represent the center, maybe you could say two words. But I would ask you not to get involved in polemics.

[Yanayev] Yes, I would like also to say a few words very, very, very briefly of course. I think that we have been speaking for 50 minutes already and have been speaking very correctly. I think that there is a problem of mutual relations between the center and the republic, the RSFSR, and we cannot, so to speak, permit ourselves the luxury of allowing this problem to continue further. We must build correct and respectful relations with all the Union republics and naturally with the Russian Federation. I think that those misunderstandings which arise, arise only as a result of the fact that one or another legislative act which is adopted by the parliament of the republic very often contradicts the Constitution of the USSR or some other Union act. But I am absolutely convinced that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin has any evil desire to deepen that, well, crisis, in mutual relations.

If one can speak about a crisis at all. I consider it is possible to find a common language, proceeding from the declaration, respecting the declaration of Russia's independence and sovereignty. One can find the solution to any complex problem. What, let us say, we have today, the economic foundation of the future Union treaty, in the form of the...

[Khasbulatov] The interim economic agreement.

[Yanayev] The interim economic agreement. After all, this will all determine the process of the reconstitution of our union. Of course, the principles of the relations between the center and the republics must change in accordance with the new realities and the new declarations.

[Khasbulatov] I agree with this, of course, of course. [passage omitted]

[Fesunenko] Now that we have been speaking about the relationship between the Center and Russia there is a further question for you that has been pouring in. To be honest I shall not bother to enumerate them. Dozens of questions have been received about a Russian army—that idea of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin about which much is now being written in the press, and so on. There have been a mass of questions. To save time I shall not read out the names of the comrades. All of your questions have been received asking whether this army is necessary, against whom it will fight, and what is the aim of creating a Russian army when, so to speak, we have a union army. For my part, too, as an international affairs journalist, I also have some questions. I know of many federal states, such as the Swiss Federation, for instance, but everywhere there is just one national army for a state.

[Khasbulatov] Igor Sergeyevich, why do you think that this question has been pouring in?

[Fesunenko] Well, it seems a very complex one to me.

[Khasbulatov] Why should it be complex? It is an extremely simple one. First, I must quite officially make a statement...

[Fesunenko] Yes, if you would.

[Khasbulatov] ...that There has been no demand on Yeltsin's part regarding the creation of a Russian army. We have had the decisions of the First Congress of People's Deputies. That is the first thing. We have had the decisions of the Second Congress of People's Deputies. That is the second. We have already had over almost 400 legislative acts adopted by the Russian Supreme Soviet, and not one of them hints that we intend to create an army. In exactly the same way there has been no such demand or declaration on Yeltsin's part.

What was Yeltsin speaking about? Well, just look. When this Lithuanian crisis occurred, the Russian Supreme Soviet Presidium hastily met. Within the presidium members of the presidium were saying: see what has happened. See what aggression there has been against Lithuania. Tomorrow it will be against us. Boris Nikolayevich, why do you not raise the issue of creating an army? We have such telegrams from people's deputies. We have had thousands of telegrams from citizens. Answering questions from journalists, Boris Nikolayevich said: We have been conferring at the Supreme Soviet; perhaps it will be necessary. Surely one cannot...

[Fesunenko] As yet it is just an idea.

[Khasbulatov] No, even the idea does not exist. Surely one cannot...

[Fesunenko, interrupting] But he has spoken of it.

[Khasbulatov] But I have explained how this idea came about. Surely one cannot on the basis of such reasoning aloud by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet ascribe to him an official statement, and then our other number one leader makes the claim on this basis that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has made a deliberately provocative statement. This is not true, to put it mildly. Why is there speculation at present on this matter? With total responsibility I now state that this is a completely incorrect and false interpretation. Obviously it is to someone's advantage to ascribe this to him.

[Fesunenko] That is to say, the issue of a Russian army has not yet been decided.

[Khasbulatov] No, not only has it not been decided, but it will not be decided. We consider that the army that is located within the territory of Russia is indeed the Russian army. This is our way.

[Fesunenko] Good.

[Yanayev] Does it not seem to you that, basically, both in Russia and in the country, there are forces trying to play the Lithuanian card. I do not think that the decision of the three chairmen of the Supreme Soviets, including Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, was the most felicitous political decision...

[Khasbulatov, interrupting] Understood.

[Yanayev] ...to appeal to the United Nations for discussion of the Lithuanian problem, postponing, let's say, discussion of the Persian Gulf problem, and so forth, and so forth. Well, this decision does not stand up to criticism, either from the point of view of international law, or from the moral point of view,and I think that we should not whip up the situation in this way. Why am I talking about the attempt by certain forces to play the Lithuanian card? A tragedy has indeed occurred in Lithuania. I, as vice president, wish once more to express condolences to the nearest and dearest of those who died as a result of these actions. Let's ask ourselves, however, why all this happened. At the root, you see, of the conflict, of the great confrontation, that has taken place and, unfortunately, remains in Lithuania, is the fact that since 11 March the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has been adopting a thought-out series of legislative acts that, unfortunately, discriminate against the Russian-speaking population, the Russian people who are living there.

[Khasbulatov] And we are striving for the abrogation of them and are setting up a mechanism to ensure that they are not discriminated against.

[Yanayev] Very good, it would be very good if this were not simply a declaration...

[Khasbulatov, interrupting] Yes, of course.

[Yanayev] ... but that it were a genuinely guaranteed right of both the greater people and the lesser people, both of the indigenous ethnic group and the non-indigenous ethnic group. We must do everything to ensure human rights, to really ensure the observance of those civil rights that have been infringed and continue to be infringed in Lithuania, according to the latest reports.

[Khasbulatov] You know, Gennadiy Ivanovich, I agree with you that, perhaps, this form, that is, the appeal to the United Nations by the leaders of the four republics was not completely felicitous. Possibly. That is, now, when we are sitting with a clear sky. It looks as if everything is sufficiently calm, although alarming as well. But imagine the situation: A lot of blood had been shed the night before, and the situation had been exacerbated. Here paratroopers, there patrols, here a state of siege, or martial law,—I don't know if there is some kind of small, substantial difference—and what should the leaders do in these conditions? It seemed that at any moment they would attack and seize everything. War, seizure, was beginning. One has to appreciate these aspects, after all. Therefore, it seems to me that at that period, perhaps, this appeal was in no way, as it were, groundless. One has to appreciate this situation.

[Fesunenko] By appeal you mean to the United Nations?

[Khasbulatov] Yes, of course. I think that at that period, and at that, as it were, point in time, and in those specific conditions it did not look bad at all, nonetheless.

[Yanayev] Just look. Even after the situation nonetheless started to bate, although it is still tense...

[Khasbulatov] Yes.

[Yanayev] A series of calls, as it were, by certain people's deputies of both the union and Russia, have ensued, to declare a political strike as a token of solidarity with Lithuania. I want to stress quite categorically that I, personally, as a citizen, view this as a game, a political game, because this is a means of satisfying political ambitions through the people's suffering. We must now

think about how to stop the further escalation of confrontation. We must now think about what legal decisions to adopt, indeed, to protect the Russians there, to protect the Poles, to protect the Lithuanians, so that blood is not shed. Because at present the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet is again whipping up this situation.

[Fesunenko] That is, you are against political strikes in principle?

[Yanayev] Absolutely. Absolutely Against them.

[Fesunenko] Then...

[Yanayev] And I think that this is not the right time for the country,.

[Fesunenko] Right, so I'll put a counter-question to you straightaway: Do you support, or can you justify, for example, the strike at Ignalina hydroelectric power station, or the strike by Klaipeda workers, the strikes by workers at enterprises in the Baltic, where the population is predominantly Russian-speaking? They are always talking about going on strike.

[Yanayev] You know, Igor, there is, I think, the political strike, and there is the social strike. And in principle, I think that the situation in the country is such that we must avoid both political and social strikes. But we should always ask the question: What lies at the root of the conflict? How can it be that suddenly, quite out of the blue, such a great confrontation emerged, when tens of thousands of people stood, quite simply, ready to kill one another? Incidentally, had it not been for the army, there would have been considerably more casualties. To summon the entire country to a political strike, in a winter, when there is, in effect, a total shortage of everything on the domestic market, in my view smacks of political irresponsibility, smacks of a political game for the realization of one's own political ambitions.

[Khasbulatov] Unfortunately, things are much more complicated than that. The use of the armed forces, the blood that was shed there, has created an exceptionally exacerbated situation between various ethnic groups. This has made the contradictions deeper; that's the point. Was this really not clear to us after the Tbilisi tragedy, after those intolerable things in Central Asia. Of course they should have been settled by other means...

[Yanayev] Political means?

[Khasbulatov] Of course. Now, you know, I find it hard to pass judgement. Morally, I am not ready to condemn those who want political demonstrations. Kemerovo and Magnitogorsk are another matter, however, where the workers' committees want to declare a lengthy production strike, as I have already said. I said in this regard that this will lead to nothing good, only to deterioration of our economic situation. I draw attention to this question in particular because people are already starting to accuse us of calling for lengthy production strikes. On the contrary, that is not the case.

[Fesunenko] I will intervene here—you will forgive me, comrade guests. I may be interrupting you rather rudely, but I am the program presenter. I beg your pardon [murmurs of assent] but I will continue this topic to involve our television viewers. We have had a telegram from comrade Vinogradov, from Kaliningrad, Ulitsa Bogatyrskaya 44. Can you hear us, comrade Vinogradov? You asked about the position of the RSFSR and USSR—only briefly, in a single phrase—in the event of the Baltics republics seceding. Will they return the funds invested in their economies at union expense over the past 45 years? And what will happen to the refugees—with those Russian people who would in that event wish to leave there? One phrase, if you please.

[Khasbulatov] Leave the Baltic republics?

[Fesunenko] Why, we talked about it. When Boris Nikolayevich talked with Defense Minister Yazov, we proposed that we would create conditions for those of our RSFSR compatriots living there who regard the living conditions there to be intolerable for them. We will create the relevant conditions; we are ready to use all possible means to resolve this whole problem, just as long as it does not assume a bloody nature.

[Yanayev] Where the issue of secession of Lithuania, or any other Baltic union republic is concerned, firstly secession must be carried out in accordance with the free expression of the people's will. There must be a referendum, that is the first condition. Secondly, in the event of a decision on secession being made, a negotiating mechanism must go into operation, by which we must settle all issues, such as those relating to property and a mass of other issues, including...

[Khasbulatov] Of course, [words indistinct] negotiating mechanism...

[Yanayev] Yes, quite, a negotiating mechanism. By the way, I am a member of the union delegation on talks with Lithuania, and I very much regret that through the fault of the Lithuanian side, these talks have not yet taken place. We have held two consultations, and given the position of the Landsbergis team, insisting on ultimatums, we have been unable to start these talks. Yet we are open for these talks.

[Khasbulatov] Now just a minute, things are not exactly like that. The fact is that the constant blackmail and threats of introducing presidential rule... [changes thought] that presidential rule itself arouses doubts with regard to its legality, and it is also worsening the situation. We must stop blackmailing the peoples and republics with threats... [Fesunenko, interrupts] Ruslan Imranovich, as a television man, I can judge: We have masses of messages from Russians calling for the introduction of presidential rule. But as a conscientious and objective individual, I can also say that we have masses of messages from Lithuanians arriving here at Central television Protesting the use of troops, protesting the casualties caused by the Russian soldiers, so to speak, by the troops around the tower there at the time. People are of

course overwrought. The situation is very heated, and the right thing to do now would be to make efforts to remove this tension, extinguish it, and to seek ways out.

[Khasbulatov] Of course, I agree.

[Fesunenko] With that, I will bring our program onto the finishing straight. I would like to say to our two guests—you are watching the "who's Who" program, comrades, but it is coming to an end. I would like to give our two guests a minute-and-a-half each on air so that they can say something on the questions that have been put, or perhaps wish the viewers something. But do make it a minute-and-a-half each, for I will be very tough. I have a watch, and we cannot allow our program to overrun its allotted time. Now, since we live in a democratic country, let's do it in alphabetical order, so, Ruslan Imranovich, you go first.

[Khasbulatov] Very well. comrades, before I came here, I had a word with the leadership of the Supreme Soviet and the government, and I was given ther job of saying a few words: Given the present difficult circumstances, when we are witnessing a real offensive on the part of forces that are far from progressive—but rather reactionary—we will, of course, act according to the law, and call on all our fellow citizens to keep calm and rest assured that the Russian Supreme Soviet is very much concerned with their interests. We will seek out all means to somehow overcome those contradictions that exist between us and the central leadership. Of course, we very much need the broad support of our people. We will accomplish all the tasks and reach all the goals set by the recently ended second extraordinary congress on implementing agrarian reform. Of course, at the present moment, everyone is excited and everyone is filled with a sense of alarm over these bloody events. I believe we will resolve these problems if we maintain our unity, if we keep calm, and if at the same time we remain vigilant. Thank you very much.

[Fesunenko] And now, Gennadiy Ivanovich, before you have your final say on this program, I would like to put this fairly trenchant question to you. (Galina Dmitriyevna Zautskaya) from Belorussian congratulates you on your appointment to your lofty post, and wants to know whether—now that you have been appointed—elected—vice president—the attitude of the center to Belorussia will change? She is thinking of the Chernobyl tragedy. (Galina Dmitriyevna) complains that—in her opinion—too little attention is devoted by Moscow to resolving the problems that have arisen over protecting the populace, migration, the miserable level of material aid, etc. That's what she's...

[Yanayev] The question is, indeed, a trenchant one. Moreover, I say this not as someone who is far removed from the solution to this problem. As All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions chairman I visited Gomel oblast and virtually all six of the worst rayons—in the radioactivity sense, that is. Moreover, it was on my initiative that we embarked on contacts with some of Japan's business quarters, and are now supplying aid to Gomel oblast—medicaments, equipment, the creation of diagnostic centers, and so on, and so forth. I believe that, yes, there ought to be a state program to cope with Chernobyl. There should be one both at union level and at republican level, and there must be very close...

[Khasbulatov] [words indistinct] Russia there exists...

[Yanayev] Yes, Russia has just such a program, and we must coordinate all this work to achieve the greatest possible success. Addressing my fellow citizens, I would like to say: Esteemed comrades, the country is indeed going through a complex and crucial period. I would like to say that I cannot share in the claims that the country is threatened by some kind of right- wing coup, a repressive coup, and so on.

Both the president and the people who work with the USSR president are firmly convinced that we must continue perestroyka. We must continue the democratic process. We must bring about legal order in the country so that people may really feel confidence in the future. This does not mean a harsh hand, it does not mean dictatorship, it means the elementary order that exists in every country. It means, firstly, order in complying with the constitution and complying with laws. It means order in production and in the establishment of national-economic links, and so on, and so forth.

I believe it was Virgil who said that whatever the problem, it can be overcome with patience and willpower. I realize that those words of Virgil as applied to us could, well, as they say in the East, "It won't be sweeter in the mouth just from talking about halva," but I believe we do have the opportunity to convert these conversations into truly practical actions. In order to ensure that our long-suffering people are finally freed from the humiliating shortages, from the humiliating lines, from the fear of appearing on the streets in the evening in case they are mugged, raped, or whatever—that is what I mean by bringing about elementary order. I want to say once again that the center will work with the republics in such a way that—while respecting to the utmost these republics' declarations of independence, and while at the same time debating the draft concepts of the Union Treaty—we can restore our state, restore its dignity, and restore the Soviet people's confidence in the future.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. And in conclusion, just a few words each. All you have just said is interesting enough, but it is all in the realms of what I would call high politics. But there is one very specific question to which you must reply yes or no. The question is addressed to both our guests—Ruslan Imranovich and Gennadiy Ivanovich. (Aleksey Samuilovich Fomintsev) from the town of Pozharnyy Syzgan, Ulyanovsk oblast. He is the director of a local enterprise, though he doesn't say which. He asks a specific question requiring no theorizing: We directors of enterprises are wondering which law on enterprises to be guided by—the union law or the

Russian law? We need a straightforward and clearcut answer. You will agree that to work he needs an answer.

[Khasbulatov] I believe that if the enterprise is on the territory of Russia, and if it is not an enterprise engaged in military production, then it should operate in line with Russian jurisdiction. That is the straightforward answer. Particularly since, as everybody knows, we have many advantages for enterprises from the point of view of the tax system. Furthermore, the principle behind our provisional economic agreement—that we have just ratified—is a budgetary principle. It provides for us, Russia, to make payments, contributions, to the pan-union budget. Consequently we are taking the road of freeing our enterprises from direct taxation by the central budget. Thus, there is every reason for an enterprise to be documented and to switch to Russian jurisdiction.

[Fesunenko] Right, Gennadiy Ivanovich, we have three minutes.

[Yanayev] Yes, all right. I would say the following. This very question causes alarm. [Khasbulatov, in background, says: "Correct"] We must have laws operating without contradicting one another.

[Khasbulatov] One another.

[Yanayev] One another.

[Khasbulatov] We need agreement.

[Yanayev] Quite correct. Knowing the Russian leadership and the country's leadership as I do, I am convinced that there is no matter that an agreement and solution can not be found. We must not bring matters to the stage where distressed enterprise directors ask such questions.

[Khasbulatov] Absolutely correct! For six momnths now—ever since the first congress ended, when we set out quite clearly the powers to be delegated to the center, and those matters which the Russian Federation would decide on—we have stated: Let us demarcate these powers specifically, and enshrine them in law. [passage omitted: Khasbulatov says that as far back as 11 November there was an intention to set up a bilateral commission. He says the economic responsibilities of the Union and republic should be clearly distinguished and agrees that difficult issues could be discussed. Fesunenko notes that people need answers now, and demands to know whether Union or republican law prevails. Khasbulatov says that if the enterprises are not of a strategic nature then RSFSR laws prevail]

[Yanayev] I think that one of the main issues that must, without any delay, be resolved is what is the responsibility of the Union and what is the responsibility of the republics.

[Khasbulatov] That is exactly what I was speaking about.

[Yanayev] I want to support exactly what you have just said, Ruslan, and I think that after we have decided-...[changes thought] this is the central issue, by the way, of the Union treaty.

[Fesunenko] No wonder I left this issue for the end of the program.

[Yanayev] Yes, this is the central issue of the Union treaty. After we have signed this Union treaty I think that many issues will be taken off the agenda. They will be resolved automatically. I want to jump at Ruslan's words—I am ready, as vice president, to sit down with you and solve the many issues that have been spoken of and talked about at governmental level, with the participation of the central government and the Russian Government.

[Khasbulatov] There's no need to jump at my words. We have been proposing this for a long time.

Economic

KGB Releases 'Economic Sabotage' Information

LD2301000891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1401 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jan (TASS)—Information is coming into the USSR KGB's operational headquarters about the implementation of state security measures in the battle against economic sabotage, in the course of which underground stockpiles, and caches of goods and food in short supply which have been kept out of circulation have been uncovered in Alma-Ata, Tashkent, Baku, Leningrad, Omsk and Pskov.

The material at the USSR KGB Center for Public Relations which has been made available to TASS underlines the growing tendency toward concealing goods outside storage facilities.

As a result of the measures taken, and also according to the information from the state security bodies, the center has registered that the handling of loads has been speeded up slightly in the sea port of Murmansk, at the border stations on the Belorussian and Lvov railways, and at the Moscow and Irkutsk rail centers. However, on 17 January there were 29,618 railway carriages in the country as a whole which have been standing for more than the amount of time stipulated.

Recently thefts from refrigerated units, robberies and assaults on personnel working on them have been increasing on the territory of Georgia. Due to this there have been instances of the refrigeration work teams refusing to transport food to the Transcaucasian republics.

The USSR KGB reports that recently, according to facts made known about law-breaking and the results of checks carried out jointly with MVD and workers' control bodies, criminal proceedings have been instituted in

Azerbaijan, Checheno-Ingushetiya, Chuvashia, the Altay Kray, the Amur Oblast, Ryazan, Brest, Mogiliev, Tomsk and Kamensk. Three criminal groups who have been stealing loads from railroad cars have been rendered harmless in Moldova, and in the Volgograd and Voronezh Oblasts.

On checking reports which had previously been submitted to the press regarding the sale in secondhand shops and markets of Yerevan of goods which had come as humanitarian aid, it was established that this information cannot be verified.

1991 Capital Investment Decreases Detailed

914A0349A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 3, Jan 91 p 4

[Interview with State Planning Committee official A. Fedchenko by correspondent A. Baranov; place and date not given: "The Investment Sector: In an Austerity Mode"]

[Text] How is it planned to use capital investments in 1991? Will they be cut back? When, finally, will the problems of the incomplete construction projects be solved? Where will the investment flows be channeled and how? These and other questions of our readers are answered by A. Fedchenko, chief of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] Capital Investment and Production Capacity Balance General Department.

[Baranov] Aleksandr Yefimovich, readers are interested in the question: How will the economy's transition to the market be reflected in investment activity in 1991?

[Fedchenko] The market is called such because it makes it possible to determine the true price of all types of resources. Capital investments are no exception. Under the conditions of unprecedented shortages the strictest limitations are essential in this sphere also.

For this reason it is proposed that the USSR Supreme Soviet establish the minimum amount of centralized capital investments and finance via them Union-republic programs pertaining to Chernobyl, Aral, conversion, and the elimination of the consequences of the earthquake in Armenia and natural disasters in other regions of the country. The draft union budget envisages the allocation of 14.7 billion rubles [R] for these purposes.

We could content ourselves with this. But in this case we would be freezing the construction of many very important facilities of the production infrastructure, base sectors of industry, and the social sphere.

[Baranov] To what do you refer specifically?

[Fedchenko] In the fuel and power complex, the commissioning of the power units already installed at the power stations and also 500-kilovolt and higher power lines and oil and coal production capacity.

In the mechanical engineering complex, the creation of capacity for the production of machinery and equipment for agriculture and also progressive types of equipment for the modernization and retooling of sectors of the national economy.

In the chemical and timber complex, the creation of capacity for the production of medicines, disposable syringes and other types of medical equipment, and also for the production of consumer goods and chemical products for agriculture.

In construction, the installation of most important facilities of the construction materials and construction industries for fulfillment of the program of housing construction.

In transportation, the acquisition of trucks and large-capacity containers and completion of the construction of very important railroad lines for the elimination of bottlenecks and an increase in traffic capacity in the main directions.

In the iron and steel industry, maintenance if only at the present level of the mining base and the creation of progressive types of metal product.

There is no need to show, I believe, that all the enumerated capacity is essential for the functioning of our economy, and the expenditure on its creation should be borne by society as a whole. It amounts to R37.8 billion, and the total amount of centralized capital investments, to R52.5 billion. Compared with 1990, capital investments will diminish in respect to:

the fuel and power complex by a factor of almost 2;
the mechanical engineering complex by a factor of 2;
the chemical and timber complex by a factor of 1.5;
transport by 30 percent;
iron and steel industry by more than 30 percent.

[Baranov] Is a further limitation of capital investments in production possible?

[Fedchenko] No, this could create exceptionally difficult conditions for the replacement of the machinery of production, the state of which should be seen as unsatisfactory, that would jeopardize the possibility of the implementation of social programs in the near term.

But additional monies are needed for the retooling, modernization, and expansion of operating enterprises, including the development of their social sphere. Resources for the realization of programs of republic and local significance are needed. All this expenditure will be financed from republic and local budgets and from enterprises' own resources, bank credit, the monetary resources of individuals and income from shares, securities, and other sources (see table).

According to an expert estimate, capital investments next year in the economy as a whole are forecast in the following amount

(billions of rubles, prices as of 1 January 1991)

	1989	1990	1991	1991	
	(reported)	(estimate of anticipated fulfillment)	(forecast)	(forecast)	
				as of:	
				1989	1990
Capital investments, total	327.0	305	262.2	80.2	86.0
Construction and installation	170.7	160	138.9	81.4	86.8
From total capital investments:					
production sphere	240.2	225	164.2	68.4	73.0
nonproduction sphere	86.8	80	98.0	112.9	122.5

Centralized capital investments in the coming year will constitute merely 20 percent approximately of total investments. There will be a considerable strengthening of the social focus of investment resources. According to the USSR Gosplan estimate, capital investments for social needs, with regard for the resources for the development of the sectors directly connected with the social sphere (the agro-industrial complex, light industry, construction materials for housing construction industry, consumer goods production and others), could constitute almost 74 percent of their total from all sources of financing.

[Baranov] What measures does the plan envisage for a reduction in incomplete construction?

[Fedchenko] It is planned to channel almost 80 percent of the capital investments contemplated for 1991 into realization of the startup program of the planned year, whereas in previous years this indicator constituted only 55-60 percent.

But the negative trends influencing the growth of "incompletes" that have been manifested in recent years in capital construction are, unfortunately, assuming an increasingly stable nature. The quotas pertaining to the commissioning of production capacity and fixed capital and social and cultural amenities are being fulfilled unsatisfactorily. The growth of enterprise independence has not stopped but has accelerated even the increase in incomplete construction. The transition to self-financing has led to the formation at the enterprises of considerable resources and a growth of capital investments and their dispersal around numerous construction projects and facilities.

All this has occurred under the conditions of construction management system disintegration simultaneously with the practically total absence of economic regulation of enterprise and organization investment resources and a flexible tax and credit policy and the incompleteness of the mechanism of pricing and economic and administrative responsibility for the adopted decisions.

The growth of noncentralized capital investments under conditions of strict limitation of material and technical resources has led to their diversion from construction projects nearing completion and most important facilities of the government commission and, once again, to a growth of incomplete construction. In the current situation the amount of "incompletes" could by the start of 1991 have approached R195 billion, that is, could have increased by almost R13 billion in a year.

For this reason special measures are proposed for 1991-1992 to curb investment demand and improve its degree of balance with material and technical resources. Thus it is contemplated establishing for enterprises a one-time charge for newly started construction (expansion) of production facilities undertaken from one's own resources in an amount of up to 30 percent of the estimated cost of the facilities. Preferential terms of application of this penalty could be introduced for enterprises for production, processing, and storage of agricultural produce, the manufacture of consumer goods and house-building items and for consumer services.

It is proposed to introduce for enterprises, associations, and organizations an annual charge for incomplete construction in respect to suspended or temporarily closed construction sites and facilities upon the expiration of the first year following the temporary close down (suspension) on the basis of 10 percent of the cost of the incomplete construction.

It is contemplated that the USSR Finance Ministry, USSR Gosplan, USSR State Construction Committee, and USSR banks will in conjunction with the Union republic councils of ministers establish in the very near future the procedure and conditions of the collection of the said payments.

[Baranov] Critical remarks were heard in the process of discussion of the plan to the effect that alternative versions of the plan solutions were not presented to parliament. How justified is this criticism?

[Fedchenko] I believe that such assertions are fair only to some extent and are explained by their authors' insufficient knowledgeability.

First, this is essentially the fourth version of the program of economic development presented to the Supreme Soviet.

Second, this draft also contains an alternative. I refer to formation of the fund to stabilize the economy. The financing of a considerable amount of the capital investments and the construction of most important facilities of the social and production spheres will depend on this.

Third and most material, perhaps: In the process of preparation of the proposed draft the Gosplan developed a whole spectrum of versions in which it examined

various possibilities and sources to mobilize resources for the accomplishment of the urgent social and economic tasks of the coming year with regard for how the adopted decisions would be reflected in economic development in subsequent years. Possibilities of the redistribution of resources of the national product and their channeling in large volume into current needs were studied, for example. Those that were deemed practical were taken into consideration in the draft.

Further, the possibilities and consequences of a reduction in production investments were evaluated in addition to the direct redistribution of capital investments in favor of construction for nonproduction purposes. Studies showed that a reduction in the former, although providing for a certain lessening of the strain on the investment sector of the economy, would not, however, create significant resources for the additional growth of the consumption fund anywhere near the value of unsatisfied consumer demand, which is put at R200 billion. The calculations of specialists of the USSR Gosplan Economics Research Institute showed that the proposed cutback in production investments could provide for an additional increase in commodity resources of only R15-R20 billion. Owing to their specific material and technical composition, the resources thus released could not, for the most part, be channeled directly into a growth of commodity resources. In addition, it is necessary, after all, to think about the long term also: A more substantial decrease in production capital investments could complicate reproduction processes and delay the replacement of the machinery of production, which would inevitably be reflected in economic development and, consequently, in the growth of the consumption fund in subsequent years.

Bunich Suggests Economic Reform Measures

914A0265A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 51, Dec 90 p 1

[Article by P. Bunich, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Economic Reform: "People Do Not Go To Market Alone"]

[Text] The paradox of the situation that has taken shape in the country is that on the one hand we have empty shelves and [word indistinct] shortages and, on the other, huge immobilized reserves in industry, construction, and in trade even. And, of course, household reserves. People are stocking up on everything in turn—matches, salt, cereals. Surveys show that 83 percent of the population has food stocks two to four times in excess of need. What kind of economy could sustain all this, pray?

This is why, were we now to get control of the menacing ninth wave of money which has engulfed us, we should learn that we have not only a shortage but the overproduction even of many commodities. We would in a minute step from a shortage into an overproduction of commodities.

But as yet the shortages and inflation are creating tremendous social tension in society. There is a shortfall in the country of approximately 250 billion rubles [R] of commodities at present prices. The "hot" money can only be eliminated by withdrawing it and increasing the commodity supply. The most powerful means of withdrawing money could be the sale of state-owned property. After all, the state is no stronger for having laid its hands on all property. There are around us many countries where the share of state-owned property is far less than that of private property. Nonetheless, they are far wealthier than us. That is, when individuals own the bulk of property, it is utilized more efficiently.

But I would like to say that the idea that we need not to sell property but distribute and share it has arisen of late and has been taken up by the press. In this case, for example, an aircraft manufacturing plant would distribute capital of R28,000 per person, and the Korolev firm, R1.5 million each, but a shoe workshop, R5 each. This would be an unfair step and is reminiscent of 1917, except the other way about. But by which path to proceed? The distribution of property and its sale are not mutually contradictory. Although some people, L. Piyasheva for example, maintain that we need to distribute everything and sell nothing. This is wrong. After all, even were we to distribute free of charge, some people would suddenly want to sell. And, further, one part of state-owned property could be distributed, the other, not. It could be sold or leased. These options exist throughout the world, incidentally.

In my opinion, one further version of tying up money may be found by raising the interest on deposits. It was recently confirmed that passbook savings remain at the two percent level. Actual inflation is 18 percent. Consequently, depositors are paying the bank an additional 16 percent. Although some people are now maintaining that people are actively depositing money in savings banks. This is, I believe, an illusion. As soon as something appears in the stores, this money will be claimed immediately. We should, therefore, increase deposit interest by a minimum of 20 percent. World experience shows that sufficiently high interest curbs investments.

Who is holding up the immediate sale to the citizens of 5-7 million plots of land? There is just one explanation—it is allegedly necessary to recognize private ownership of the land. Russia has already taken this path. It is a question of the immediate adoption of the appropriate decree.

Now about the new forms of management. Go to the state stores. They are empty. But sales assistants are everywhere. Is such a thing possible in a leased store? No, you will not see such a picture there. Under tenant conditions people would seek alternatives to ensure a supply of merchandise. Where they would find it, that is up to them. In a word, the new forms of management, and 70 percent of the enterprises and organizations that have switched to the new economic relations are now

leased, are showing an annual growth of 2.5-three percent, whereas the national economy is, figuratively speaking, becoming derailed.

The country's government should proceed more boldly toward the share-capitalization of major enterprises. This practice is employed extensively throughout the world, but with us people simply cannot make up their minds to it. In addition, many wrong steps are being taken. Some large-scale enterprise is chosen, and the issuance of stock is effected literally forcibly. The state takes over half the stock and thereby imposes on the enterprise fettering conditions and, most importantly, deprives the work force of the right of redemption.

Practice shows that the optimum form of management is the creation of cooperatives. There is a mass of various flaws here today. But this is because there is here an unhealthy economic atmosphere making it possible to make big money in dishonest business. We are essentially going through the Wild East stage, which is far worse than the Wild West stage. A type of businessman who has neither brains nor talent but only resourcefulness is being formed. And it would be a great pity were the initial accumulation of capital to lead not to efficient and intellectual people but loutish rogues lording it in the economy.

As far as the Union treaty is concerned, I believe that there are two seams here: economic and political. Mastering the two simultaneously will be difficult, evidently. But tackling the economic seam is easier, for all that. I hope, therefore, that it will be possible first to conclude, albeit with difficulty, an economic agreement among the Union republics. And only after this will it be possible to move toward the solution of political problems. The economic agreement would remove many contradictions here and prompt the political agreement, as it were, that is, be a step forward for unification on a qualitatively new basis.

We need to persuade the republics of the need for the adoption of an economic agreement. Nor do I rule out here the fact that the center should consent to very considerable concessions, meaning the transfer of a large number of rights to the localities, if only to achieve a positive outcome with regard to the economic agreement. And time would work toward the republics gaining insights and, learning the hard way, as they say, going deeper in economic relations.

Why, then, is an economic agreement necessary, you wonder. The essence here is as follows. There are in the world currently only common markets. There are no longer individual ones anywhere. Alongside us is the EEC. But we will hardly be admitted there at this time. This community is very cautious in enlarging its composition. We therefore need to preserve our own market which exists within the framework of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Only in this case will we survive. Things could go badly in a big country but not as badly as in a small country. That is, while both may lose, small countries would undoubtedly lose more. Although it may evidently be said with all certainty that no one would win.

It is on this basis that we need to act. In short, we need more quickly than we are doing at present to dismantle the old system in the country. And then the new economic mechanism, with no obstacles in its way, will come about of its own accord.

Industry Experts Criticize 1991 Budget

914A0334A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 15 Jan 91 p 1

[Report by Oleg Berazhnaya on comments by V. Kurtashin, chairman of the Soviet of the Union Commission on Development of Industry, Energy, and Technology, and V. Saunin, deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union Planning and Budget-Financing Commission: "To Get Rich or To Go Bankrupt? What the 1991 Budget Is Aimed At"]

[Text] *The USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted the national plan and budget for the current year. The state's income should come to 250,157,450,000 rubles [R]. To collect this amount, the tax burden on the enterprises—a serious source for replenishing the treasury—had to be increased. However, this is still not enough to improve the situation in the people's economy. It was also proposed that a special stabilization fund be created on the basis of additional withholdings from enterprise profits. Would not such harsh measures undermine the incentives of the workers collectives to increase output? Will we not arrive at the diametrically opposite result—a considerable production decline and, as a result, a drain on the state treasury? Here are the opinions of my two interlocutors on this topic.*

V. Kurtashin, chairman of the Soviet of the Union Commission on Development of Industry, Energy, and Technology, general director of Moscow state association Kriogenika:

"It is not possible to ensure the stabilization of the people's economy as a whole without creating conditions for the stabilization of its main building block—the state enterprises, which account for 90 percent of industrial production. Meanwhile, all the documents adopted lately by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the recent presidential decrees—on the introduction of a sales tax, on the creation in 1991 of an extra-budgetary economic stabilization fund, on special procedures for using hard currency resources in 1991, and, finally, the adopted USSR Law On the National Budget—all these, instead of encouraging faith in tomorrow and inducing the workers collectives to work harder, leave us confused.

"I will give you an example from our enterprise which employs 10,000 people. The introduction of a sales tax on materials and component parts, unless it is included in our production costs, will cost us R1.2 million. Twenty percent of the depreciation charge adds another

R1.36 million, and the increase in the share of the enterprise's hard currency earnings withheld to pay the state's external debts—yet another R2 million.

"One does not have to be an economist to come to a conclusion: Two or three more such decisions, and the conditions for the existence of state enterprises will be completely destroyed.

"All other countries give enterprises an opportunity to accumulate capital funds—which are not even taxed—while we are being deprived of the last opportunity to implement technical solutions and to modernize the enterprise.

"Yes, it is difficult to make ends meet under conditions of an all-out deficit and inflation. And it is possible that there is no other solution than to adopt this kind of a budget. But we have to be honest with each other as to what exactly we are doing."

A. Saunin, deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union Planning and Budget-Financial Commission:

"The richer the enterprise, the richer the state—this is an axiom. By if we follow it mechanically today, we will not get any results. The complexity of today's problems lies in the fact that we have to solve two tasks simultaneously: stabilize the financial situation using all available means to combat inflation and at the same time stimulate the primary economic link—the enterprise—by giving it incentives to expand production. The problem is that these two problems are incompatible. Economic policy cannot simultaneously combat inflation and stimulate production. If we now remove all restrictions from the enterprises, then, given the fact that the economy is unbalanced, it will cause even more inflation. In the end, it will also hurt the enterprise, but from a different angle. Another thing to keep in mind: The incentives of the enterprises are determined right now not only and not so much by their financial resources as by their material and technical supply.

"Here is one example. Before, the unfinished above-norm construction was accomplished mostly on the basis of centralized capital investment; now the picture has changed. Now a huge share of such construction falls on the enterprises. Why? As soon as enterprises became independent, they started their own construction. But... quite often their resources did not stretch beyond the foundation. Would it not have been better to bring the demand for investment in line with resources?

"Now, about the proposal to take 20 percent of the depreciation charge away from the enterprises and put the money into a stabilization fund. Is this fair? Let us recall: In the past the state took away 60 percent, 80 percent, or sometimes even the entire amount of the depreciation charge. So we do have some progress. The other side of this coin is that different enterprises have different start-up opportunities. Some have modernized their fixed assets, while the fixed assets of others are in a totally dilapidated condition. The stabilization fund, among other things, is needed to help the disadvantaged.

"Another thing that we have to understand: The interests of the workers collective are not limited to their enterprise having sufficient financial resources. The important thing is: Who owns the resources. In this respect R100,000 that belongs to the collective may outweigh—and often does—a million on the enterprise's account. Therefore we should speed up the process of privatization as much as possible. But not in a forced way, as is proposed in the presidential decree, by using half of the earned profit to buy out capital assets. I would propose a different approach: to let enterprises use their profits to buy out R3 or 5 worth of fixed assets for each ruble earned. This will increase the collective's incentive to work effectively. It is all the more important to speed up this process, considering that it is doubtful that we will finish the year the way we assumed we would when we were planning this budget last fall. By my forecast, this year production will fall not by two to three percent, but probably by close to 10 percent. This means that the income part of the budget will shrink, too. At the same time, to solve the problem by raising prices is simply extending the illness into the next year."

Price Committee Official on Rising Prices

914D0109A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 2, Jan 91 p 5

[Interview with USSR State Committee for Prices Chairman V. Senchagov by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent N. Zhelnorova; place and date not given: "A Small Question of Big Politics"]

[Text] [Zhelnorova] What do you think will happen to prices this year? Will they rise randomly or in a controlled fashion?

[Senchagov] The main stages of this process are now behind us—new wholesale purchase prices are in effect. It is noted in the economic treaty for 1991 that these prices are recognized by all republics. The "small" question that still remains is: What do we do with retail prices?

[Zhelnorova] This "small question" can throw the whole of big politics off balance!

[Senchagov] As of now, for each ruble of food products sold (excluding alcohol) we have 1.37 rubles in subsidies. This is nonsense! The sales proceeds are less than the subsidies! The result is that any investment is ineffective.

[Zhelnorova] Since the country's leadership is not giving "a green light" to currency reform, should we expect more inflation?

[Senchagov] Last May we needed a small step—to raise bread prices. The national Supreme Soviet, however, did not go along with this, and we did not insist firmly, and lost. Today everybody is coming to the same conclusion:

Prices should be raised, but the difference should be compensated for, to a certain degree. How do we do that now? The congress has approved a gradual liberalization of prices under the control of the state. But to accomplish this we need to reach an agreement with the republics. Without such agreement we will not make any decisions.

[Zhelnorova] Are we talking about some specific date?

[Senchagov] It is better not to mention any dates, since that only creates excessive psychosis. Let the republics decide.

[Zhelnorova] And what will the republics do?

[Senchagov] The republics are saying this to their citizens: "This is necessary; we understand that this is a difficult political decision for the center; therefore we should agree and conduct this action together." The other day I saw the Lithuanian prime minister (by now former prime minister), and she said: "Part of our population wants a high income, while keeping low subsidized prices."

It looks like those who criticized us in the past (I do not mean Kazimiera Prunskiene) have stumbled on the same problem now that they have encountered the reality.

[Zhelnorova] Have you reached any specific agreements with the republics?

[Senchagov] We have agreed to hold coordinating consultations.

[Zhelnorova] Have you reached any agreements in regard to the national budget and the budgets of the republics?

[Senchagov] We are working with the republics both on the budget and prices. When we reach an agreement on all issues, we will present it to the Federation Council.

[Zhelnorova] Right now each republic is trying to establish its own prices. An artificial localization of the markets is taking place. The transition to contract prices without coordinating them with the republics has caused wild price differentials. Speculation has increased even more than before. Is this, in your opinion, a normal process, or should there be some civilized forms for it?

[Senchagov] Monopolist producers in the republics are trying to boost their budgets by raising prices; in response, other monopolist republics are raising prices on their products.

The economic treaty calls for a pricing policy by which prices for a certain assortment of basic goods that form the whole structure are determined by the center. This will stabilize the market. For instance, Uzbekistan decided not to raise cotton prices by three or four times (predicted and expected by many). As a result of its agreement with Russia, cotton prices rose only 10-12 percent in comparison with their listed state price.

[Zhelnorova] Which goods will be sold at floating prices?

[Senchagov] We have survived the first stage (contract prices) with great pains, but this government decision has finally been accepted in all the republics. The results are uneven. In some places supplies improved, while in others they did not. Overmonopolization of production does lead to a situation in which in some instances floating prices on goods go up sharply. Therefore in conducting the second stage we should keep in mind the influence of floating prices on supply and demand. Floating prices will apply to goods in the non-mass-consumption category. But since prices are going up already (this is related to our growth and to the state of the market), we still need a mechanism to manage them.

[Zhelnorova] After the New Year, an article in PRAVDA by your deputy A. Komin caused quite a ruckus. Was it a conscious action, or an accidental slip?

[Senchagov] The worst thing for the people is the expectation of price increases. Actually, during the last few years the population has been in a constant state of nervous tension. Now its actions are governed not by common sense and reason but by frenzy. Everybody is trying to beat time, to buy things—needed and unneeded. To break these expectations we need stability. We need clarity: What exactly will the government dare to undertake. This should then be implemented by agreement with the main political forces, while providing clear social guarantees. They have to be such that while in general prices would go up, prices for a certain assortment of goods would still remain under control. This is necessary in order to avoid a social explosion, to keep the subsistence minimum under control. Frankly, this is all that the state can afford right now.

Beyond that, market prices come into play (although in this an indirect control—by price ceilings—is also needed). Unquestionably, social protection is needed, too. But not for everybody. Only for low-income categories of people living on fixed income. Those who can achieve higher labor productivity by their own efforts and thereby earn more will benefit from the development of the market. They will have things to buy and places to buy them. Second: **The variety and abundance in the market lead not only to higher prices but also to lower prices or to their moderate rise.** This is what we saw happen with watches and computer equipment. The market is saturated, and the price climb has stopped.

[Zhelnorova] Now the whole country is in a state of a coupon boom. Money means almost nothing without coupons. As a specialist, do you believe that coupons are necessary?

[Senchagov] If we fix prices for a certain group of goods, we may be able to avoid a rationing system. But coupons will still be necessary for low-income people so that they can buy goods for the same price as the rest of the population and then receive reimbursement through the social security office. This way it would work as if they

were buying goods at discounted prices. For them subsidies would continue. This system for low-income people has been working successfully for many years in the United States.

[Zhelnorova] The purchasing power of the ruble seems to have hit the bottom. It is really becoming a "wooden" ruble. How can we keep a lid on prices under these conditions?

[Senchagov] The ruble is not "wooden." Not at all. It is backed by large volumes of gold and oil production, and by our mineral resources (this is the ruble's potential). What is bad is that on one end of the pole—in the sphere of natural resources extraction—the ruble is fully convertible, while on the other end it is very thin. Its purchasing capacity is low. This is the result of the activities of such industries as food processing, consumer goods production, and some others, where the value of everything that has been achieved in other industries with so much effort is being wasted. The elimination of lopsidedness in economic development, an increase in the share of Group B industries in total industrial production, and the development of a consumer sector that is oriented towards full satisfaction of consumer needs will be an important factor in strengthening the ruble.

Kuzbass Strike Plan Lacks Support

914F0116A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by Yu. Kotlyarov: "For Whose Benefit Is the Strike?"]

[Text] Kemerovo— **At an expanded meeting of the soviet of workers' committees of the Kuzbass a decision was made to declare a strike beginning 18 January with demands of a purely political nature—from abolition of the institution of the presidency in the USSR, the disbanding of the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet of the country until Soviet troops are withdrawn from the Baltic area, and so forth.**

The sober voices of those who warned about the consequences of halting work under winter conditions and with such a strained social, economic, and political situation in the Kuzbass and in the country as a whole, unfortunately, were not heard. The consequences were quite predictable; they were discussed by the chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, A. Tuleyev, in an appeal to Kuzbass workers which was broadcast on local radio and television. Thus if, for example, the industrial enterprises were to stand idle for days, only the oblast budget with "shrink" by 1.3 million rubles. What would be the point of stopping the delivery of coal to the consumers—energy workers, metallurgists, and other enterprises of Siberia, the Urals, and the Center of Russia?..

But by the end of yesterday it became clear that the decision of the soviet of workers' committees to strike did not have broad support either in the labor collectives or in social organizations. The presidium of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, the federation of Kuzbass trade unions, the bureau of the CPSU oblast committee, the veterans' council, and the city worker committees of Belov and Leninsk-Kuznetskiy...—all were against the strike.

Varied Coverage of Strike Chairman Noted

914F0113A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 15 Jan 91 p 2

["Workers' Life" Desk Commentary: "One Person—Two Faces"]

[Text] *This is how National General Strike Committee Chairman Aleksandr Bukanov appeared before the readers of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*

"...Would you please explain: Is this one and the same person, or two different ones?" insisted the people calling our editorial offices. The subject of this controversy was National General Strike Committee chairman, an interview with whom was published in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA on 10 January. The same day an article about him was published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. However, in the former the chairman's name was given as Gukanov, while in the latter—Bukanov.

In addition, there was a noticeable difference in the contents of his remarks. Judging by his interview with RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, here was a man who was not in a hurry to use the "strike truncheon," a man who advocated a sensible dialogue between the workers and the administration and the government, a man who was against any monopoly: on truth, on power, or on property forms. The article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, however, conjures the image of a not-so-smart extremist, clearly suffering from megalomania, a man who believes, for instance, that it was he who had derailed the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA subscription drives and is now promising to do the same for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

This really makes one believe in the existence of doubles—antipodes.

Let us explain: There are no doubles in this particular case. We are talking about one and the same person, whose name was misspelled by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, for which our newspaper offers apologies both to the readers and to Aleksandr Bukanov. As to the differences of a more substantial character, we will let him speak for himself:

"When I received a call from the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent, I refused to give an interview to that newspaper, but, since he continued to insist, I agreed to a private conversation on condition that it not be published. Therefore I was surprised—to put it

mildly—to find an article about myself in that newspaper. Having published it under the rubric "Without Comment," the correspondent attempts to do exactly the opposite: to comment on the phrases picked by him out of context.

"You have to understand that in a private conversation even the most experienced politicians sometimes permit themselves to use excessively harsh characterizations, blasting all and everything. In a situation when somebody comes to you with an unconcealed purpose to obtain exotic sensational information on the exact timing and slogans of the general strike, it is especially tempting to "play dumb," to pretend to be a common working class peasant, sort of a proletarian hetman... It does not justify my actions, of course. Next time I will be more careful with journalists."

As to my comments on RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, I did say them. In anger. It may be news to you, but somebody is persistently setting the strike committees up against your newspaper by maintaining that it is an organ of partocracy. Do not expect me to name any specific names—I will omit them for ethical reasons. On the other hand, quite often people in strike committees circles refer to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA as a paper that steers clear of the hysteria in evaluating political events that is so widespread these days, and which publishes thoughtful materials on the workers' movement.

If you maintain this line in the future, the ice of prejudice among some strike committee members will eventually melt. At the same time, I would like to ask KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editors not to make sensations out of nothing and not to paint cliched images of the workers, who are in reality much more complex than it may believe.

Scientific

Salyut Station Expected To 'End' Flight 4-10 Feb

LD2301172191 Moscow TASS in English 1714 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Mission Control Centre January 23 TASS—The Salyut-7- Cosmos-1686 space station is expected to end its flight between February 4 and 10, 1991, according to ballistic calculations.

At present, it has the following parameters:
—Maximum distance from the Earth's surface—263 kilometers.
—Minimum distance from the Earth's surface—245 km,
—period of revolution—89.4 minutes
—inclination—51.6 degrees.

Ground facilities located on Soviet territory constantly monitor the flight of the Salyut-7-Cosmos-1686 complex.

Cosmonauts' 23 January Space Walk Detailed

LD2301192991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1815 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Flight Control Center, 23 Jan (TASS)—In accordance with the flight program Viktor Afanasyev and Musa Manarov have today carried out their second space walk, during which they set up and tested a special apparatus which is to carry out assembly work on the outer surface of the complex. This apparatus consists of a mobile, telescopic arrow with a rotating mechanism, the surfaces of which are perpendicular to each other, permitting it to move constructions of great size and mass in outer space.

The outer hatch of the module airlock was opened by the cosmonauts at 1359 Moscow time. They brought out their instruments and the transportable apparatus, which was folded up, to the area where the work was to be carried out on the base of the arrows onto the brackets, which were used to secure nose fairing when the Mir station was launched into orbit.

Upon completion of the mounting work, Viktor Afanasyev and Musa Manarov pulled the telescopic arrows out to a length of nearly 14 meters and assessed their dynamic and working characteristics. Then the cosmonauts set the arrows in the direction of the Kvant-2 module and returned to the airlock.

The assembly work on the outer surface of the Mir station has been carried out in line with the plan for preparations to move the solar batteries from the Kristall module onto the astrophysics Kvant module.

During the work in free space, the commander and the on-board engineer removed the ferritt apparatus with its samples of ferromagnetic materials from the instrument capsule of the module and set up in its place the spectrometer Sprut-5, which is to measure the flow of elementary charged particles.

Viktor Afanasyev and Musa Manarov were in free space for five hours and 33 minutes.

Military

Schlyaga Views New Military-Political Organs

PM1801162791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Military-Political Organs: New Status, New Functions"]

[Text] The USSR president has issued a decree setting up military-political organs in the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR KGB Troops, the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops, and the Railroad Troops. Our correspondent met with Col. Gen. N.I.

Shlyaga, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Ivanovich, how do the military-political organs now being set up differ basically from the old structures?

[Shlyaga] The aforementioned decree by the USSR president is one more practical step on the road of separating party and state functions. As is well known, hitherto the political organs have been the leading organs of the CPSU in the Army and Navy, the KGB Troops, the MVD Internal Troops, and the Railroad Troops. For example, the Main Political Directorate worked in the capacity of a department of the CPSU Central Committee. The Central Committee effected leadership of all party and political work in the Armed Forces via the political organs.

The military-political organs being set up will have a fundamentally different status. They do not belong to party structures but are a component part of the organs of military administration and become conduits of state policy in the USSR Armed Forces, the KGB Troops, and Internal and Railroad Troops. Accordingly they will be subordinate to the USSR defense minister, the chairman of the USSR KGB, the USSR minister of internal affairs, and the chief of the Railroad Troops.

Hence the placement of the leading cadres ceases to be the prerogative of the CPSU Central Committee. Officials of military-political organs will be appointed by the USSR president, the USSR defense minister, the chairman of the KGB, the USSR minister of internal affairs, the chief of Railroad Troops, and also other officials according to an established procedure.

You will agree that this is no "change of labels," as some are trying to prove, but a reform that goes a long way in its radical scope.

At the same time I would like to stress: The new structures are not growing on barren soil. We do not intend to discard the useful experience which the political organs have accumulated throughout their history.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is it possible to assess the transformations being carried out as measures aimed at the depoliticization, the departyization of the Armed Forces?

[Shlyaga] I am forced to disappoint those for whom the idea of the "depoliticization of the army" is a hobby-horse. The Armed Forces cannot be outside of politics. It is to attend to politics professionally that the military-political organs are being set up. I do not mean the elaboration of policy at the higher state levels, but its steadfast realization in Army and Navy conditions.

Now to the question of departyization. CPSU structures will remain in the Armed Forces, which is fully in line with the USSR Law "On Social Associations." Party organizations will receive full autonomy, which will enable their democratic potential to be realized more effectively.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One very important function of the military-politcal organs—implementation of state policy in the sphere of USSR defense and security—has already been mentioned. What other functions would you isolate?

[Shlyaga] Educational work remains the most important sphere of the military-political organs' activity. Today the content of this work is being substantially renewed, and responsibility for its results in the present, very complex sociopolitical situation is growing. Without cardinal shifts for the better in this direction, we will simply not ensure fulfillment of the main tasks.

Here new approaches are needed. We see them in focusing on making this work professional—in other words, in it being performed by professional political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and jurists. It may be said that today this is the most radical issue in the formation of new military-political structures. We are carrying out a major reform of the system of training the political cadres in order for these specialists to come into the troops as soon as possible, and in the necessary numbers.

The military-political organs will carry responsibility equally with commanders for the education, military discipline, and the moral-political and psychological state of the personnel. Their duties include political maintenance of the battle- and mobilizational-readiness of the troops.

The military-political organs will also assume everyday concern for the social protection of servicemen and their families. I would like to put special emphasis on this. Today the situation has arisen where many people would appear to be addressing these problems: the rear services, financiers, medics, builders, the public prosecutor, and so forth. But there is no organ to study and analyze the situation, elaborate the best options for solving problems, coordinate the efforts of the services I have just listed practically, influence them politically, and if necessary go to the state and military organs with legislative initiatives and other proposals. This will be the job of the new military-political organs. Of course, the corresponding machinery to implement this function will have to be created.

In this connection it is not inappropriate to recall the USSR president's decree "On Some Measures To Strengthen the Social and Legal Defense of Servicemen," and the draft USSR "Law On Universal Military Duty and Military Service" and draft USSR "Law On the Status of Servicemen." These lay a sort of legal basis for the new model of the Armed Forces and their relations with society.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Ivanovich, what is the agenda and timetable for implementing the USSR president's decree?

[Shlyaga] We have been given a month to determine the structure of the military-political organs. It will be subsequently ratified by the defense minister. The specific timetable and operational procedure will be determined at that time.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The reform will affect the careers of thousands of people....

[Shlyaga] This is indeed the case. In the course of the reshaping of the political organs, 37 percent of their present number will have to be abolished. Naturally we will assign some of the political workers whose posts are being cut to the military-political organs after the necessary retraining; some will be recommended for work in party committees, and those who have served the established terms of active military service and have qualified for a pension will be discharged into the reserve.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Will this reform not turn into a protracted project? After all, you yourself said: New cadres are needed, specialists in various fields. To train these cadres, you will agree, is not the work of a single day.

[Shlyaga] There is a problem here, but it is one that can be solved. The fact that the troops need these specialists became clear a long time ago. Strictly speaking, we have embarked on their training already. For instance, the process of converting the V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy and military-political institutes, and gearing them for the current needs of the troops, has already begun. A system of courses aimed at retraining and improving the qualifications of cadres of the political staff will also be implemented with this aim in view. Sociopolitical centers are being set up at existing universities of Marxism-Leninism to enable the relevant supplementary training of the political workers to be carried out in the localities. In short, we have at our disposal the necessary capabilities to implement the USSR president's decree in full.

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Asks Gorbachev To Order Army Out

LD2301165791 Kaunas Radio Kaunas in Lithuanian 1552 GMT 23 Jan 91

["Message" to USSR President Gorbachev read by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis at the Supreme Council Session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] In your statement broadcast on 22 January by USSR Television and published through TASS channels, you condemn the USSR Armed Forces' cooperation with any organizations or impostor committees intending to seize power by force. You also stated that events in Vilnius, that is, the murder of unarmed people and the seizure of buildings, do not express your will.

In the hope that this is true, we propose to issue an order: that any USSR Armed Forces units, including the army of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Committee and their officials, leave without delay the occupied buildings in Vilnius.

This message was adopted unanimously by the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Landsbergis Addresses Lithuanian Supreme Council

LD2301114591

[Editorial Report] Kaunas Radio Kaunas in Lithuanian at 0810 GMT on 23 January carries live the 22-minute speech delivered by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, to the Lithuanian Supreme Council which is meeting in Vilnius. Landsbergis begins by saying that Kravec, deputy procurator general of the USSR, arrived in Vilnius yesterday and joined the criminal investigation concerning the killings and military violence in Vilnius. Landsbergis informs the Supreme Council that "today a joint session of both the procurators' offices is under way. We can say it is on the highest level and is proceeding along the lines of a certain agreement on cooperation in investigating the events during which peoples lives were lost."

Speaking of the consequences of these acts, he mentioned the occupied buldings, disrupted communications and press publications. He said: "During the meetings with G. Tarasevich, the plenipotentiary of the Soviet president, during a lengthy meeting with the group from the Union procurators office these issues were raised. I stressed that the investigation could be too lengthy and could considerably help the highest echelons of power in the Soviet Union to avoid responsibility or dissociate themselves from responsibility." Landsbergis said that the members of the group from the Soviet Procurators' Office should have powers to demand answers and explanations from very high-ranking officials in Moscow.

Speaking about the statement made by the Soviet Procurators' Office, he stressed that the most important point made in the statement was the promise that a thorough investigation in the use of arms and military force be carried out.

Another important point raised in the statement, according to Landsbergis, was the inclusion of remarks to the effect that "it is impermissible that individual organizations attempt to use armed forces units for their interests." Landsbergis continued: "Of course, this is only half the truth. This should not happen and it is scandalous and impermissible. World opinion is saying that if this is the way the Soviet Union explains it, it means that disagreements between political groups serve as a pretext for the intervention of Soviet Armed Forces on the side of one of those groups, which means that there is chaos in the Soviet Government. There is no control over the troops by the top civilian authorities. Therefore the dangers, in fact, are international."

"However, the implication here is that allegedly it is the struggle between political forces, between some parties or groups in Lithuania that led to the people being killed." Landsbergis said that attempts are being made to depict it all as an internal struggle and that Soviet troops had been somehow drawn into this.

He said: "Indeed, the Soviet Armed Forces should also become concerned that its troops not be used in political adventures whose initiators are standing much higher than those in some Vilnius party rayon committee or an occupied building."

Landsbergis spoke about the reaction to all these events in the West and said that claims have been made in the West holding Gorbachev responsible for what happened.

Landsbergis continued: "The calculations that the war in Iraq would create a smoke-screen strong enough to cover up the evil deeds in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia turned out to be wrong."

Further, Landsbergis spoke about the Lithuanian delegation in Moscow which is debating the treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation.

He said that several articles in the treaty were agreed upon, provided a supplementary protocol was attached which would offer a wide explanation of these articles and which would be signed jointly. Landsbergis said that these articles "concern the interests of citizens, of Russian citizens living on the territory of Lithuania, the intersts of Lithuanian citizens living on the territory of Russia, and so on." He said that one more editing session would be held in Vilnius.

Landsbergis went on to comment on the campaign of slander and mininformation against the republic and its Supreme Council. He mentioned specifically that this campaign is aimed at making it easier for the Soviet Government to pull wool over peoples' eyes concerning the true aims of Soviet policy in the Baltic states.

Landsbergis said that attempts were made to divert people's attention from the main crimes while imposing

a discussion concerning the mistakes made by the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Landsbergis also spoke about the decree concerning the withdrawal of certain banknotes from circulation. He said: "It was asbolutely an unexpected blow made through money exchange, which is, in fact, the confiscation of money.

"I can hardly imagine how people feel today in rural areas of Lithuania, most often old people who have saved money for their funerals or in case they became unable to work. They will now be informed that their savings in these particular banknotes had been lost. And this is explained as a campaign against speculation. This is robbery of people."

Landsbergis expressed his regrets that the former Lithuanian government did not work hard enough to introduce Lithuanian currency. He said that the Republic of Lithuania was in a defenseless position in this respect because nobody could predict what might happen with other Soviet banknotes in the future. They may be withdrawn or devalued without any warning. "Of course as an independent state our republic will react to this at least by partial measures, and not only within the boundaries of the imposed acts, in order to somewhat reduce the blow on the citizens of Lithuania." He said that today the prime minister would make a report on the issue in the legislature.

Finally, he spoke about the nationwide opinion poll of the population of Lithuania. He said that "we should explain to people in simple terms that what has been written in our decision is an expression of their wish and their opinion." He said that the question was "whether the people of Lithuania wanted Lithuania to be an independent democratic republic." He warned against very intricate misinformation and mentioned the newspaper RESPUBLICA which said that people would either have to support or not support the statement that Lithuania is already an independent democratic republic, "yet we are talking about a constitutional formulation which is our objective, our wish. If the above explanation is presented then people would naturally ask: what kind of independent republic is this if the Soviet Army is raging here, [words indistinct] or at least the result could be achieved that people would be confused and less people would take part in the poll."

He invited all the deputies and other citizens of the republic to understand the real content of the poll as well as "its constitutional and political objectives."

Landsbergis said that leaflets were being disseminated by the same salvation committee that said that terrorist groups were organized and that Soviet servicemen and their families would be attacked.

Landsbergis ended his report by saying that these are the last convulsions of the dictatorship and empire.

Assails Prunskiene Monetary Policy

LD2301151191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 23 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius, 23 Jan (TASS)—Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuanian Supreme Soviet chairman, criticized the Prunskiene government which has now resigned for "being too slow to introduce its own money." This was his first reaction during today's session of the republic's legislature to the decision of the all-Union authorities to withdraw 50- and 100-ruble banknotes from circulation in the USSR.

Landsbergis also said that the Lithuanian legislature delegation in Moscow yesterday continued work on preparing a political treaty with the Russian Federation. "Agreement has yet to be reached on some articles of the treaty" and this work will continue at a meeting planned for this week between the Lithuanian and Russian delegations in Vilnius, he said.

The Lithuanian legislative head said that the basic tasks of the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the Lithuanian Prosecutor General's Office, which are investigating the 13 January events in Vilnius, are "to obtain explanations from officials up to the highest ranks" and to find "the specific people who are to blame." He reiterated that a return to dialogue and the normalization of relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union "is possible only if the buildings which were seized are returned."

Troops Reported at Kirtimai Press Works

LD2301183791 Kaunas Radio Kaunas in Lithuanian 1734 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] At noon today an official who phoned from the central warehouse of the Spauda publishing house in Kirtimai managed only to say: the courtyard is full of soldiers—and the conversation ended.

Roughly an hour later ELTA correspondent managed to get through to Kirtimai. The telephone was answered by a person who said that he was a military official but refused to give any further details. All information could be supplied by Gribanov, working at the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, he said. By the way, this military person spoke Lithuanian.

Nikolay Gribanov, managing the affairs of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, formulated his reply as follows: Armed forces of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs took over the protection of the warehouse. The basis was the decision of the Soviet Council of Ministers of 28 March 1989 No. 295: to introduce order without delay at the party's publishing house so that it can function normally.

At whose request, on whose orders, on whose authorization were these armed and uniformed phantoms acting? Gribanov could not add anything, he was in a hurry to go to a meeting.

By the way, the general director of the Press Department, Pranas Damijonaitis, stated that the newsprint warehouse contains also large quantities of paper belonging to customers. For example, there are 37 tonnes of paper of the Vyturys publishing house for children's books.

Warehouse Takeover Described

AU2401090891 Paris AFP in English 0024 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Vilnius, Lithuania, Jan 24 (AFP)—Soviet troops, accompanied by leaders of Lithuania's pro-Moscow Communist Party, seized control of a newsprint warehouse here on Wednesday, the Lithuanian parliament said.

Special Soviet Interior Ministry troops drove up to the depot, located at the edge of the Lithuanian capital, and immediately took up position around the building, the parliament said in a statement.

Two men who announced they were representatives of the Communist Party told warehouse employees they were taking control of the depot, which stores and distributes paper for Lithuanian newspapers and other publications, the statement said.

According to the Lithuanian parliament, a member of the Communist Party's central committee said the Soviet Interior Ministry troops were "executing the resolution of the Soviet Government regarding the protection of party property."

It was the first action by Soviet troops here since the Army took over a radio and television station in the capital on January 13 in a bloody move which left 14 dead.

In response to the warehouse takeover Wednesday, the Lithuanian parliament voted to ask Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to call on Soviet troops to withdraw from the buildings they control in Vilnius.

Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis told a press conference that Mr. Gorbachev's response would provide "the best means of checking his sincerity" in denying responsibility for the crackdown earlier this month.

He called on Moscow to "identify and dismiss from their jobs" those responsible, and said the condition for a dialogue was "a return to at least the status quo existing in December."

The message to Mr. Gorbachev, drawn up by Mr. Landsbergis, called on the Soviet leader to "issue an order to all army or interior ministry units calling on them to withdraw at once from buildings occupied in Vilnius."

Two Students Believed Kidnapped in Vilnius 23 Jan

LD2401111591 Kaunas Radio Kaunas in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 24 Jan 91

[From the "Lithuania Today" program]

[Text] Adrius Azubalis, representative of the Lithuanian Supreme Council for information, said that last night there were virtually no serious incidents with servicemen. It is thought that two young students were kidnapped last night in Vilnius.

After the military occupied the paints and paper warehouse belonging to the Demidov publishing enterprise, the Deputy USSR Interior Minister was informed about the incident.

He informed V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, that the warehouse had been taken over for protective reasons in connection with the decision of March of last year signed by Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, concerning CPSU property.

Negotiations on the issue are under way today between the leaders of the CPSU organization in Lithuania and the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party.

Contacts with the military are being maintained through Georgiy Tarazevich, an official authorized by the USSR president.

Military Activities, Patrols Continue in Vilnius

LD2301230691 Vilnius International Service in English 2230 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] The past night was calm in Vilnius although the military did not stop patrolling the city. Three military checkpoints were active. The work of the Lithuanian police was also controlled.

This was today communicated by the parliament's press representative, Audrius Azubalis, during a briefing for journalists.

He also said that according to the Supreme Council's defense service officials two witnesses unacquainted with each other had seen at 10 pm the previous night a red laser beam directed from the opposite bank of the river towards the parliament building.

The beam could be observed for 30 seconds and is believed to have been directed towards the windows of the parliament chairman, Vytautas Landsbergis' office.

The journalists were also acquainted with Vytautas Landsbergis' response to the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's statement broadcast yesterday on central Moscow Television.

We do not interfere with the affairs of the Soviet Union and we want the Soviet Union not to interfere with our affairs, said Vytautas Landsbergis.

Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council pointed out that stopping the circulation of 50 and 100 ruble bank notes was a big loss to our citizens, since the Soviet Union's currency is still in circulation in the Lithuania.

Vytautas Landsbergis also said he was of the impression that the Soviet president either had no exact information about the events in Lithuania or did have it but hushed it up consciously for propaganda's purposes.

Vilnius Garrison Leader on Military Activities

LD2301183291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1729 GMT 23 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius, 23 Jan (TASS)—All the conjectures in the republican media concerning the readiness of servicemen to use weapons are groundless and aimed above all at compromising the USSR Armed Forces in Lithuania, according to a statement by Colonel Grigoriy Belous, military commandant of the Vilnius Garrison. He was speaking to journalists here today.

"The only activity that the military is currently engaged in is night patrols of the city and duty at checkpoints outside the city," he said. Moreover, this has been agreed with the local authorities. According to Grigoriy Belous, the situation in Vilnius still remains tense. Almost every night patrols detain people with firearms, chemical weapons, ammunition and explosives. For example, on the night of 17-18 January alone, more than 100 chemical weapons were seized from unknown persons traveling from Klaipeda to Vilnius in a vehicle with foreign number plates.

The news conference was told that provocations against servicemen themselves are also continuing. For instance, a squad commander of a military unit of the local garrison (a Lithuanian by nationality) was kidnapped on 20 January. An investigation of this incident is currently under way. There are also cases of servicemen being beaten up.

'Vremya' Program Reviews Lithuanian Events

LD2301212391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Report by correspondent A. Gerasimov in Vilnius; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The past 24 hours in Vilnius have been fairly calm. This is reported by representatives of both the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Subunits of Internal Troops are continuing to control certain buildings in the town, including the television and radio complex. Nor have the far-from-peaceful strutures around the Lithuanian legislature building disappeared. The anti-tank obstacles, barbed wire, and barricades remain in place.

True, there has been a significant reduction in the numbers of people picketing outside the Supreme Soviet. Perhaps people have grown tired, or perhaps yesterday's decree on the changing of monetary denominations has played a peace-making role in the Lithuanian capital. One may confidently say that there are many more people in the lines outside the savings banks than in the square outside the legislature building.

We are still unable to obtain accurate information from the Supreme Soviet as first hand. For the second day now, our camera crew have been refused accreditation to the legislature. Today the following notice appeared on the wall of the passes bureau: We request journalists from Latvia, Estonia, and the Soviet Union to get accreditation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic; and it gave an address. We regret that everything is happening in precisely this fashion, and hope that the process of normalizing the situation will also affect attitudes to the central press.

The reaction in Lithuania to yesterday's statement by the USSR president—which particularly mentioned the inadmissibility of attempts by any public organizations to appeal to the Armed Forces in their political struggle—has not been uniform. Speaking this evening on local television Algimantas Naudziunas, secretary of the Communist Party [CP] of Lithuania Central Committee, completely ruled out the involvement of the Central Committee of the CP of Lithuania and all of its leaders in the so-called National Salvation Committee, the topic of most of the talk at the present time.

According to the Lithuanian ELTA agency, Vytautas Landsbergis was critical in his attitude toward the Soviet leader's statement. He said that the allegation that there is confrontation in Lithuania was unimpressive. Lithuanian society is unified and the CP of Lithuania is in no way a force that can be taken fully seriously. True, in this connection, in characterizing the CP of Lithuania, the Lithuanian leader did not use the most parliamentary terms.

Yesterday evening the National Salvation Committee, which still remains anonymous, issued a statement appraising the situation in Lithuania. It acknowledged the legality of the election of the present republic Supreme Soviet, but at the same time stated that the acts of 11 March last year which oriented the republic's statehood on bourgeois nationalist values placed the legislature in conditions in which it was functioning unconstitutionally. The committee called the events of a week ago the prologue for a third socialist revolution in Lithuania and against the Supreme Soviet; such a revolution expresses the statement says, the interest of the national bourgeoisie, which developed out of criminal business.

In turn Vytautas Landsbergis, addressing a meeting today of the Supreme Soviet, stated that further talks

with Moscow will only be possible if the property of the Lithuanian state that was seized by force during the days of tragedy is returned.

According to a report by Sergey Reznik, a party central committee instructor, the former Soyuzpechat, which is now Lietuvos Spauda is refusing to distribute the Lithuanian Communists newspaper, citing the unstable political situation, inflated nationalist hysteria, and the absence of law in the republic. In addition to the fact that they are being oppressed in every way, Lithuania's Communists are being totally deprived of their say.

And here is further information on this subject. This afternoon Interior Ministry servicemen, carrying out the president's decree on state property and the property of public organizations, took under their protection the Lithuanian branch of the CPSU Central Committee publishing house, where newsprint, magazine paper and printing inks are stored. According to the information in our possession, the Interior Ministry subunits acted at the request of the CP of Lithuania Central Committee. There have been no casualties.

Finally, at a legislative briefing a spokesman for the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet reported that senior staff-members of the department of protection have information from two witnesses who allegedly saw yesterday evening the ray of a laser weapon which was directed from this church to near the office of the chairman of the republic's supreme soviet. It must be said that amid the general stream of rumors, this information is not the most implausible. [Video shows church and exterior of legislature building]

Lithuanian Intellectual on Talks With Gorbachev

LD2301135891

[Editorial Report] Kaunas Radio Kaunas in Lithuanian at 1000 GMT on 23 January carries a three-minute interview on the "Lithuania Today" program with Vytautas Laurusas, a composer and former USSR people's deputy from Lithuania, by an unidentified correspondent in Vilnius on 23 January.

Laurusas talks about his one-and-a-half-hour meeting with President Gorbachev in Moscow:

"We did not go there to achieve great goals. One of our main tasks was to try hard to find a way to remove the tension in the republic caused by the military presence. We get the impression during our conversation that he understood our mission and simply said that he would not use military force. This was also confirmed yesterday in his statement. We asked him to make a statement so that Lithuania would know and the whole world too what his position is today. He confirmed his position in a statement yesterday. Old things were also included in yesterday's statement. However he said that in the near future talks will start and we believe that many matters can be resolved during these talks."

"Sincere notes toward Lithuania can be found in his speech. Whether this will deceive us or raise too much hope in us, the future will show. I personally look at all this with great caution."

The correspondent points out that Laurusas and the Lithuanian delegation also met with Marshal Akhromeyev who is the president's adviser on military issues.

Laurusas comments: "He made it clear that if the need arises he is prepared to come to Lithuania." "We voiced many bitter remarks about the servicemen who carried out unspeakable willful acts in the republic and continue to do so. The victims are the results of their willful acts. Under no circumstances can we reconcile ourselves to this."

Kryuchkov on Lithuania's Right To Leave Union

LD2401094391 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Nobody is against Lithuania's right to withdraw from the Soviet Union if the republic's population deems it necessary, said KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. He said in an interview that to exercise this right Lithuania merely needs to comply with the Soviet Constitution and the established laws, and hold a referendum. Kryuchkov stressed that the latest events in Vilnius were the results of a confrontation of different political forces.

The KGB leader placed the responsibility for the casualties during the military operations with those who were the first to open fire. He said that those were not Soviet servicemen.

Independent Lithuanian TV Broadcasts Reported

PM2301144191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 91 p 1

[Report by V. Zarovskiy under general heading: "Barricades Still Remain"]

[Text] Vilnius—How best to explain it: Lithuanian state television has resumed work. That is the television that describes the events in and around Lithuania with the participation of those journalists who were expelled from the television center tower.

I succeeded in visiting the underground television studio—so I will not give its location. There is a single television camera there, a domestic tape recorder, four microphones, and not far away a mobile transmitting television center. All the rest, like their personal belongings, incidentally, has remained "under guard." The television center is so feeble that only those who live close by receive a steady signal. I have to walk round the correspondents' center with a portable "Shilyalis" and constantly twist the tuner. They work from 1900 hours to midnight.

The other Lithuanian television, the one that broadcasts from the captured buildings, closes down at 1800 hours. Following the latest political statement by someone from the congress of left-wing forces there are cartoons in Lithuanian and concerts by Lithuanian folk ensembles. Specialists here are obviously confused and do not even know which channel except, of course, the first Central Television channel, to turn on. They had hopes for Leningrad television, but that had a report from eyewitnesses to the tragedy. They cut it out and began to transmit the second channel. That was showing the Russian deputies' session. Well, to make life more cheerful they have adapted the satellite antenna which used to stand on the television tower: The channel on which they used to transmit Poland is filled with video clips. It is unclear whether the military have concluded a contract with MTV or what?

Yesterday I toured the city. Everything was calm, several hundred people were warming themselves at the bonfires outside the parliament building. There were no patrols, no curfew had been introduced.

Health Ministry Reports Army Actions Effects

LD2301202491 Kaunas Radio Kaunas in Lithuanian 1810 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] A report from the information center of the Ministry of Health:

To date the republic's health service institutions have registered 509 persons, including 131 women, who have suffered from the Soviet Army actions. Of these 261 people have affected hearing, 45 were injured by bullets, and 186 people were injured by various other means. At present 35 casualties are still being treated in hospital. As on previous days, the struggle for the lives of three injured persons continues.

The Ministry of Health informs that on 21 January, and not for the first time, chlorpicrin was poured out in the yard of the radio and television center in Kaunas, which affected eye and mouth (?tissues). The case is being investigated.

New Lithuanian Vice Premier Profiled

LD2301231991 Kaunas Radio Kaunas in Lithuanian 1552 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Summary] The new Lithuanian Vice Premier, Vytautas Pakainiskis, was born in 1944 in Plunge rayon. In 1972 he graduated from the Faculty of Law of Vilnius University. Then he was lecturer at the same faculty. From 1 December 1989 he has been working at the juridical department of the Supreme Council. He does not belong to any political party.

Latvia's Gorbunovs Describes Talks With Gorbachev

LD2301165391 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1300 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Statement by Anatolijs Gorbunovs, president of Latvia, at the Latvian Supreme Council session in Riga on 23 January—recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed deputies, I want to inform you about my work yesterday in Moscow. Yesterday at 1100 at the initiative of the USSR President Gorbachev I had a talk with him, a meeting with him. [passage omitted]

Taking into consideration the participants of the meeting, I announced that I dissociate myself from any committees and their leaders who in Latvia do not recognize the lawful legislature elected by the people and the government, or want to usurp power in Latvia in an unconstitutional way.

In connection with this, the president asked whether this was also the stance of the legislature of the Republic of Latvia because, when beginning our talk, I had said that I was there first of all to expound my own personal viewpoint and not that of the legislature. I replied to this question that the legislature has, for the time being, dissociated itself from only one such committee, the so-called All-Latvia Salvation Committee.

Concerning the situation in Latvia, he has extensive information. Nevertheless, I asked once more for his opinion on what kind of role the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] had in this situation, especially the violent action of the OMON. The president expressed very deep regret that this had claimed victims, and he expressed the deepest sympathy to the relatives of those who died.

I repeated once more our stance that the violent action by the OMON must cease and that they must be isolated. I repeated to him our talk yesterday morning with the Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo, in which our stance was confirmed, and Minister Pugo said that he would do everything to discontinue this action, to discontinue this violent action, and to call the culprits of all these deeds to account.

Gorbachev put two concrete questions to me, which I would like also to expound to you, because the talk was very long, two-and-a- half-hours, therefore I would like to describe the most important elements.

Gorbachev asked how, in this situation, when practically a war of laws was taking place, how we imagine we will form our state. Second, whether Latvia can escape the crisis situation in which it finds itself now by going along a democratic road.

Concerning the first question, I expressed to him my standpoint, known to all of you, that the state of Latvia, as an independent, democratic state can be formed only by all the permanent inhabitants of Latvia. They must also express their attitude on that in a referendum. I did

not talk about the concrete aspects of a referendum, but only noted this was a question to be discussed specially, and this question came only under the competence of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia.

I continued further that if the result was positive, then the stages of forming an independent state would begin, which are to be determined through talks between the Republic of Latvia and the USSR, and not as it is currently taking place between the Republic of Latvia, the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the USSR.

Gorbachev noted that as long as there is no referendum, and as long as the USSR Constitution is not amended, according to his terminology, we shall be the Latvian SSR.

In this connection I told him that a return to square one—by that I mean to the USSR Constitution—is not possible either for us or for other republics, and this he should understand well. Still, we cannot revoke those laws which have been adopted, nor can we adopt the USSR laws which he also urges us to adopt.

Gorbachev emphasized that if we wanted to begin official talks immediately then, in his opinion, the independence declaration must be dropped, but of the laws, only those which discriminate against the rights of some people must be changed.

In connection with this I noted the human rights of some groups of inhabitants. I noted that if there are any specific articles and specific proposals on individual laws then, after examination of these laws by experts, such a question may be examined at the Supreme Council, but examined very specifically, in a specific law, and in a specific position of articles.

Perhaps, in concluding this part I could briefly tell you my opinion of what has changed in Gorbachev's position.

First, he really sharply dissociates himself from various salvation committees which want to gain power in an unconstitutional manner.

Second, for the first time in my talks or simply on the occasions of meetings with him, he places stress on the war of laws, not on the declarations as such, but he places it on the laws concerning human rights and, as I already told you, whether there was discrimination against the rights of individual groups of people.

Third, as he also stressed yesterday in his address, he requests Army commanders not to interfere in political arguments, and under no circumstances to use the Army to resolve these arguments. This is the first question.

The second question: Can the society of Latvia get out of the crisis it has gotten into in a democratic way? Is not a special assistance by the president required? Because he does not see that democratic forces dominate in the society of Latvia, and in his opinion the extreme radical standpoints dominate, the standpoints from both sides, and the society of Latvia is at present being drawn into a continuous confrontation which, in his opinion, is not diminishing but increasing.

In this connection I said that the society of Latvia has not said its final word, how democratic it is or how undemocratic it is. In this connection I said that I, as I have already done and want to continue to do, want to assume a certain initiative and even responsibility as the chairman of the Supreme Council, so that the society of the Republic of Latvia expresses its standpoint through some kind of dialogue for a democratic Latvia. I believe that there must, after all, be such a dialogue to protect Latvia from totalitarianism and from dictatorship. And we must definitely attempt to guide Latvia by political means, in this very dramatic and difficult time, among a democratic road.

I said that I am ready to promote the cooperation of all democratic forces, but the cooperation of only those forces that recognize the legislature of the Republic of Latvia as the highest organ of state power in Latvia, that recognize the government of the Republic of Latvia, and under no circumstances am I ready to collaborate with those forces that want to come to power by unconstitutional ways and to usurp this power.

I said, of course, that for this dialogue to have results, there must be preparations for it. I already said that there had been, to a certain extent, an initiative of mine to convene, and to attempt to solve something without preparing for such a dialogue, and that it had failed.

Despite this failure to a certain extent—if you remember before the alternative meeting, I convened at the city's executive committee represenatives of various public organizations—despite this failure, I nevertheless think that history will not forgive us if we do not continue this dialogue and if the republic's Supreme Council does not assume responsibility for the feasibility of this dialogue.

In conclusion we, as always, noted that such contacts must be maintained, and must be maintained as frequently as possible, in order both to discuss the situation and also those proposals which could specifically come from our side, in order to improve this situation and to prevent confrontation in Latvia.

Interviewed After Talks

AU2401111091 Sofia BTA in English 0952 GMT 24 Jan 91

["Gorbachev Has No New Program for the Baltics But There Are Some "Hopeful Nuances in His Stand"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 24 (BTA)—Unfortunately Mr. Gorbachev did not table a new constructive program on the Baltics issue and on the Latvian issue in particular. But there are many new, hope inspiring nuances, Mr. Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of

Latvia, said in an interview for "ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME" immediately after his meeting with the Soviet president in Moscow yesterday.

At this meeting we expressed our common belief that the possibilities for political measures and dialogue with Latvia have not been exhausted, Mr. Gorbunovs said. But the Latvian president stressed that it is no longer possible for Latvia, for Russia or for any other Soviet republic to "return to the initial state of affairs" as President Gorbachev believes, according to Mr. Gorbunovs. The starting point should be the declarations of sovereignty adopted by all Soviet republics, Mr. Gorbunovs stressed. The Latvian leader warns that the road of violence is dangerous and undesirable not only in the Baltics; it is extremely dangerous for the Soviet Union and for the world in general.

If Mr. Rubiks is interested in maintaining a peaceful political dialogue with us he will have to change some of his stands, Mr. Gorbunovs said, answering a question about whether the leader of the Latvian Communists Mr. Alfred Rubiks, who recently called for the establishment of presidential rule in Latvia and who was present at the meeting in Moscow, would take part in the dialogue. In this connection Mr. Gorbunovs said that the legal Latvian Government had never expressed an intention to ask for presidential rule. Such a question was neither put forward nor discussed at the meeting with Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, according to the Latvian leader.

The Latvian president said that in the republic there is no national confrontation but that there is strong political confrontation in which military detachments of the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR are unfortunately also involved. Mr. Gorbunovs has been assured by the competent Minister Boris Pugo that the united militia detachments, acting on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR will no longer take part in any military activities.

Salvation Committee: Gorbachev 'Betrayed Us'

LD2301160991 Kaunas Radio Kaunas in Lithuanian 1430 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Report by ELTA correspondent Stasys Bistrickas]

[Text] Moscow has betrayed us, members of the National Salvation Committee have complained.

Lieutenant Colonel Viktors Alksnis, the USSR people's deputy and senior engineer in the Baltic military region, is well-known as a representative of reactionary military circles and has adopted a firm stand against any attempt by the republics to protect their sovereignty. Alksnis is well informed about what is going on in military circles, and not only in military circles; therefore, statements concerning events in Latvia and Lithuania could not fail to be of interest to him as an informed person.

According to the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, Alksnis takes the following view: The action in Riga was not an amateur one. Evidently orders were received from Moscow. The newspaper writes: According to Alksnis, Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party and head of the Salvation Committee, told him on the phone: You were right. Moscow betrayed us.

Here is what Alksnis said about the events in Lithuania, and I quote: Perhaps I will reveal a secret. I talked to members of the Lithuanian Salvation Committee who told me this: We did everything that Gorbachev asked us to do. After this action he should have imposed presidential rule: however, he betrayed us.

This is, so to speak news at first hand; Alksnis has only confirmed what is taking place behind the scenes of the so-called National Salvation Committee, and told us where the real stage managers of the events in the Baltics should be sought, the ELTA correspondent writes.

Latvia's Rubiks on Presidential Rule for Media

PM2301141991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 91 p 1

[Report by correspondent K. Markaryan under general heading: "Barricades Still Remain"]

[Text] Riga—Yesterday, 22 January, in Latvia despite the strike committee's call to hold a general political strike in the republic, which was supported by the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee, life did not come to a standstill.

Aircraft flew out of Riga airport, trains proceeded along the railroads, work did not abate at the sea port or the VEF and Radiotekhnika associations. Electrical installation workers, construction workers, seamstresses, and drivers were at work.

Will there be support for another call from the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee and the All-Latvian National Salvation Committee, of which A. Rubiks is cochairman? The call is to bring Latvia under presidential rule and there is also a statement from the All-Latvian National Salvation Committee to the effect that it assumes responsibility for the further fate of Soviet Latvia and proclaims the transfer into the committee's hands of all state power for the period of the stabilization of the situation and the dissolution of the republic's Supreme Soviet and government.

And one more statement from the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee first secretary. Speaking of the objectivity of the mass media, he noted: "I have liked 'Vremya' recently.... But to hold a referendum, for instance, radio and television must not be in the same hands. Therefore we must think of introducing something like presidential rule over the mass media so that there is no domination (!?) by one opinion."

Latvian Official on Attack on Interior Ministry

LD2301192191

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1100 GMT on 23 January carries a five-minute recorded interview with Rita Aksenoka, head of the major case investigation administration of the Latvian Republic's Procuracy, concerning the attack on the Ministry of the Interior. She notes that the investigation has already been under way for two days and so far more than 100 people have been interrogated. She continues: "I want to request people not to believe what was published in the press, for example, in SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, ISVESTIYA, and SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, because in those publications the information is completely and categorically distorted, and the attackers have been groundlessly assessed as the victims."

Aksenoka says: "I cannot reveal today everything in this criminal case. However, one thing is clear. This was an attack." Information on the causes and circumstances of the attack will be given when the investigation has reached certain conclusions. All the matters investigated in previous months should also be recalled, beginning in October, "when we said that in our republic special purpose militia detachment is exceeding its authority."

Aksenoka goes on to ask people not to conclude "that this attack was connected with a rape. Our investigation has not been informed about any such rape. I do not want to deny that such a submission has perhaps been made at other investigation organs, as we are taking evidence today." She goes on to describe the attack on the ministry as "a thoroughly prepared, planned, and thought-out attack with far-reaching goals."

Regarding the press conferences at which the attackers were presented as victims, she says: "I would even like to say that the special purpose militia detachment men who committed this crime could perhaps be assessed as executors of the crime."

After saying that she will inform people later about the organizers of the crime, she appeals for more witnesses to come forward, those who were in the area, in nearby streets at the time.

Latvia To Set Up 'Self-Defense' Committee

PM2301094591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Correspondent Colonel M. Ziyeminsh report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "New Victims of Confrontation"]

[Text] Riga—The day and then the evening of Sunday 20 January seemed to promise nothing unforeseen in the already tense atmosphere in the republic's capital. The representatives of a group of USSR people's deputies had set off on their way back after coming for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with what is happening in Latvia. In addition to other conclusions, the group also drew this one: The most likely source of bloodshed in the republic could be the existing situation in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. It was there that the people's deputies saw one of the acutest hotbeds of confrontation.

The point is that subunits subordinate to different structures exist at present in this system. The republic MVD, which is officially a structure of the USSR MVD, is subordinate to the republic minister of internal affairs, and the special purpose militia detachment, which officially is not subordinate to the republic minister of internal affairs, is subordinate to the central leadership.

This contradiction makes itself felt. There had been sporadic shooting before. But on the evening of 20 January special purpose militia detachment fighters began storming the republic MVD building. This happened, so Radio "Sodruzhestvo" reports, after unknown persons had committed violence against and kidnapped the wife of a special purpose militia detachment staffer in the street in the city center on the afternoon of 20 January, and then the special purpose militia detachment had come under fire from the MVD building as it proceeded to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Prosecutor's Office building.

In the evening bursts of submachine-gun fire rang out in the city center, where the MVD building is located, and tracer bullets left trails in the sky. In less than an hour the special purpose militia detachment took over the MVD's duty unit and the fifth floor of its building. According to preliminary data, five people died and 10 were injured as a result of that operation, including cameramen from Central Television's "Vzglyad" program and Finnish Television. Scenes of the storming of the MVD building and the exchange of fire taking place there were instantly shown on republican television, and those shots were picked up by many world agencies, since there has been an unusually great influx of correspondents into Riga during these days.

In expectation of frosts people are bringing up firewood to the bonfires on the Riga barricades, sawing it up right there, piling it in stacks.... But the center of tension and of public attention, including foreign attention, has these days totally shifted to the activity of the All-Latvian National Salvation Committee, which has announced that it has taken all power in the republic into its hands. In this connection the local mass media note the "coincidence" that it was precisely after a similar statement by the similar committee in Lithuania that paratroopers began storming a number of buildings 12 January.

A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, was several times forced to declare that he maintains regular contact with Colonel General F. Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District, and that the military have no secret plans with regard to overthrowing the parliament and government. But these statements by the legislature chairman appear not to have quashed the absurd rumors.

After lengthy checks and rechecks I succeeded in visiting the territory of one of the "strategic" installations—the republic television building. Accompanied by two guardians of public order, the senior of whom was Roberts Millers, I walked over almost the entire territory of Zakusala Island (the television center is located right there). Construction work was in full swing there. The entrance to the building had already been closed off by mighty concrete structures, while wooden structures were being erected on nearby territory to "hamper helicopter landings." At any rate, that was how what was happening was described to me. Provision was also being made for "defensive measures" against the landing of Marines. An evacuation center for the injured is equipped according to all the rules of medical science.

Such a hullabaloo, to put it mildly, is being fanned by ill-considered or, maybe, even perfectly deliberate statements by certain officials, including Supreme Soviet deputies. At one news conference, for example, Soviet and foreign journalists were provided with information claiming that troop movements had become active on Latvian territory. On 17 January, for example, someone's watchful eye had recorded 122 instances of troop movements. And this activity by Army subunits is said to be three times greater than during the preceding three days. And the conclusion—"events in Lithuania, Latvia, and other parts of the USSR are taking place according to a unified plan."

It has also been announced that a self-defense committee headed by A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, will operate henceforth in the republic. Its purpose, as is clear from a television statement by the chairman of the legislature, is to set up, in place of the self-motivating and spontaneous system for the defense of strategic installations, a professional organization which will embrace all the existing legitimate structures for safeguarding public order. It has been decided to create a special self-defense department before 1 February.

CPSU Plenum Debate of Latvian CP Actions Urged

PM2301172191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by Otto Latsis, first deputy editor in chief of KOMMUNIST and member of the CPSU Central Committee: "Ricochet: The Ones Who Are Hurting Their Own People in Latvia—and Elsewhere Too—and How They Are Doing It"]

[Text] Robert Murniyeks was not the target. That is what the expert investigation said. The bullet that smashed this 39-year-old driver's skull had lost its outer casing. Meaning that it had hit something solid before it hit him. The experts' opinion is that it was a ricochet.

So he was not the target. We do not know who was. And who fired the shot is not completely clear. Witnesses claim that the shots were fired by OMON—special purpose militia detachment—fighters. They took aim at what they thought was a suspicious vehicle passing by their barracks. In the belief that it might contain "violent troublemakers." What particular "troublemakers" is not quite clear, because before that there had been no violence in Latvia. Murniyeks was the first victim, removing yet another name from the rapidly shrinking list of republics where blood has not yet been shed. After Lithuania, Latvia. The vehicle supected of carrying "troublemakers" was carrying a family—parents and two children. The vehicle was hit, the gasoline tank exploded, and the vehicle burst into flames, but the driver carried on driving it until it was out of range of the shots. The passengers and driver escaped unhurt, but a stray bullet hit Murniyeks, who happened to be driving past.

OMON members deny involvement in this death. Among the fog of contradictory testimony there are two unimpeachable facts: the dead man and the bullet removed from his body. A 5.45 mm automatic bullet with a displaced center of gravity. In comparison with ordinary bullets, this kind sharply increases the likelihood of wounds being fatal. It is regarded as a particularly vicious weapon and is condemned by international conventions. The Riga OMON is armed with submachine guns that fire such bullets.

When I heard about the expert commission's conclusions on the radio I was on a train, approaching Riga in the morning of 18 January. I had left Moscow in anxiety after the 13 January events in Lithuania. There was anxiety, but there was also hope that further bloodshed would be avoided. But it transpires that more blood has already been shed. Just one thing came into my head after the radio report on the train: Why is a militia unit whose purpose is to extinguish internal conflicts armed with such terrible weapons? I can well remember how our press fulminated at the viciousness of British soldiers who used rubber—not live—bullets in Ulster. It transpires that sometimes even rubber bullets can kill. And they are absolutely reliable in taking out rioters. So why were these particularly destructive bullets needed?

But before talking about what I saw in Riga I first have to remind you of certain events from the preceding months. The press reported them, but it is difficult to see the real picture behind all the information, especially since many newspapers provided only the kind of information that backs up their policy—another kind of bullet with a displaced center of gravity.

So, in November there was a conflict in Jurmala: The city soviet, which had shared a building with the CPSU gorkom [city committee] for decades, decided to take over the gorkom's rooms. Was this legal? I do not know, I have not researched the matter. Was it sensible? Definitely not. Truck drivers came and took the party's furniture away. The gorkom did not spend much time thinking about who to call on for help. Not the court, not the arbitration service, not even Jurmala's Communists. As some newspapers reported, it summoned Marines from the Navy sanatorium and the OMON. The fighters

inflicted defeat on the truckers—presumably not by sweet-talking them—and moved the furniture back in. In response an enraged Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a decision containing thunderous words about "criminal activity" on Latvian territory by the OMON, and also the USSR Armed Forces, and stipulating discriminatory measures against servicemen and their families and a refusal to supply troop units with food. Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Gorbunovs attempted to caution deputies against adopting an unlawful and stupid decision and, when this failed, refused to sign it. Some Moscow newspapers did not report either the previous incident in Jurmala or A. Gorbunovs' actions, with the result that readers got a pretty uniform picture of an unprovoked explosion of nationalist passions—a picture which was not totally false but had a displaced center of gravity.

So what did the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee do? Perhaps it condemned the Jurmala Gorkom for discrediting party policy? No, the rehearsal in Jurmala was evidently a success—soon the Central Committee was itself using the OMON in a property dispute with the republic government. And the subject of the dispute was bigger: the Press Building worth 25 million rubles [R] belonging to the Central Committee publishing house. One side said that the building was built with CPSU Central Committee money, which is true. The other side said that the party took the publishing house away from the state 40 or so years ago and that in the intervening years it has produced R90 million in profit, which also appears to be true. The state is now recovering its previous property and reimbursing the party for its capital investment by granting it a package of shares as co-owner of the publishing house. The party is arguing with this, demanding not part but the whole of the Press Building for itself. And my view is that it is entitled to argue... through the courts or the arbitration service. But it is acting differently. For the second time recently the Latvian Communist Party is using force of arms to have a showdown with Latvia's Soviet authorities: The OMON has taken the Press Building under its protection, expelling everyone not in agreement with the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

Incidentally, the information blockade about which the Latvian Communist Party leadership complained so hard has been over for a long time now. Following the Russian-language SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, the Central Committee established control over the Latvian-language CINA. The trouble was that its circulation plummeted. It transpires that in order to grab a newspaper you first have to grab its readers, and military force is no help here.

What comes next has happened since 13 January. The violence in neighboring Lithuania stirred up the whole of Latvia. In a matter of hours there were barricades blocking the bridges over the Daugava River and the narrow streets of Old Riga, and the legislature and Council of Ministers buildings, the television center, and the radio building were surrounded. As much as by the shooting in Vilnius, people were alarmed by a report that a salvation committee describing itself as the state authority had proclaimed itself in Latvia too. In response to a call from the People's Front people rushed to Riga from all corners of the republic to save their own, legally elected, authorities. They too set up barricades consisting of tractors and heavy trucks and themselves manned the barricades.

I saw all this on the fifth day of the events. Bonfire smoke hung over the center of the city: It may be mild, but it is still winter and people need to keep warm. By then the barricades had already been removed from the bridges. Passage though the Old Town barricades was unimpeded—people wearing armbands were stopping passers-by only outside the entrance to guarded buildings. It was not the Army they feared or the Army they hoped to protect themselves against. They knew that their obstructions would be no barrier to the Army. They knew something else too: The republic Supreme Soviet had suspended the unreasonable November decision discriminating against servicemen. Talks between the head of the Supreme Soviet and the Baltic Military District commander had resulted in accord on all questions. What they feared was Salvation Committee and OMON actions.

Yes, OMON again,—the same detachment that is defending party property. The point is that in Latvia—unlike Lithuania—the Salvation Committee is not anonymous. Its leaders have been announced as Alfred Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, and Albert Kauls, chairman of the Azazhi agrifirm and member of the former USSR Presidential Council. So the people realized that the Salvation Committee is the Latvian Communist Party, which the OMON provenly obeys.

I saw immediately who people here in the republic regard as the forces who have lost out under democracy and want to get power back by force. There are thousands of home-made posters, pamphlets, and cartoons stuck up all over the center of the city. Not printed, but written and drawn by hand—and by thousands of people. I did not see any anti-Russian appeals. There were a few against the Army. The bulk were anti-Communist. What has brought them forth in such abundance at this time?

On 18 January the Communist Party newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA published an appeal to the peoples of Latvia by the "Equal Rights" faction of the republic Supreme Soviet. It contains condemnation of the barricades on the city's streets and in people's hearts and ends with the remarkable words: "We nevertheless urge the opposing forces to sit down at the negotiating table in the name of saving our Latvia." It is signed by "Equal Rights" faction chairman S. Simanis. For those who are out of touch with events: This faction consists of deputies belonging to and supporting the Latvian Communist Party. A praiseworthy appeal, is it not?

But the trouble is that there have been other appeals too. A Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum resolution was published around the same time. Point one: To support the strike committees' demand for the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and local soviets and the resignation of the republic government. Point five: In the event that the dissolution of the soviets is rejected, to demand that the All-Latvia Committee assume the entire plenitude of state power. (The thought that struck me here was: Who is being told to demand what of whom? It transpired that A. Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, is being told to make demands of A. Rubiks, chairman of the Salvation Committee. And how can he refuse to obey?) Point six: To support the strike committees'proposal for a political stoppage, while gorkoms and raykoms [rayon party committees] are to support the strike committees. And, finally, point 12: To accept Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Gorbunovs' proposal for talks, at which the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee representatives are to be guided by this resolution.

It transpired that the talks were proposed not by the opposition "Equal Rights" faction but by the head of state power in the republic, and the Latvian Communist Party was prepared to agree to them... provided this state power was dissolved. Incidentally, there seemed to be no real intention to hold these talks at all because the Salvation Committee reported in a political statement in the same edition of the newspaper that it was already assuming state power, dissolving the existing government, and creating one of its own. The Riga Latvian Communist Party Gorkom newspaper reported that the people's patience snapped and hundreds of enterprises started a political strike, more than 150 of them in Daugavpils.

Illegal but terrifying, the reader will think: As does peasant leader A. Kauls and the workers likewise. Unfortunately Albert Kauls appeared on Latvian television the next day; he said that he has nothing in common with the Salvation Committee and announced that he was leaving the Latvian Communist Party in protest at the unscrupulous exploitation of his name. Meanwhile a television report from Daugavpils was showing a square crammed with people: Russian workers were outraged that a strike was being forced upon them. Nothing terrifying happened, only something illegal. And it transpired that you did not have to look far to find the inspirers of the anti-Communist slogans—they were in the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee building.

I know that after this article, as with my previous one, there will be letters from people who will explain to me in words of one syllable how repugnant the Latvian nationalists are. Don't bother, comrades. There is much more I could say on the subject. Not least about how Latvian nationalists joined the German fascists in killing people in Hitler-occupied Latvia.

I have to confess that when I heard about the explosions that demolished the recently erected monuments to Latvian legionnaires I felt no regret over these monuments. It is the methods I condemn; I do not want explosions even in the holiest cause. But neither do I want to see monuments to Hitler's accomplices on Latvian soil. I have no sympathy with either the "Citizens of Latvia" movement or the verbiage about "occupiers" which even its authors do not really believe: If there really were occupiers here nobody would dare to say so out loud. There is a lot you could say about nationalists, their propaganda, and their unlawful actions. But I feel no pity when the nationalists discredit themselves. What troubles me is when members of the party to which I belong distinguish themselves by stupidity and adventurism.

When I left Riga on the evening of 20 January I was completely calm. The day before I had been to see Gorbunovs at the Supreme Soviet. I crossed Cathedral Square, which had already completely shaken off the bleak expectation of an attack. There was now more of a carnival atmosphere there—but without the drunks. At the barricade in front of the Supreme Soviet building I identified myself in Russian, did not present my documents, and did not say what my name was—I simply said that I was expected. I was let through. Albeit anxiously, but almost complacently, Gorbunovs said that his main concern now was to persuade the volunteers to take away their machinery and go home. They still had some fears, but it seemed that their fears were groundless. The same evening they announced on television: Another couple of days, and we'll discuss the question of leaving the barricades. He said that he does not have and has not had problems of mutual understanding with the military district and there have been no worrying troop movements.

There were grounds for anxiety about the rally, christened the All-Latvia People's Assembly, that the Salvation Committee wanted to hold in the immediate vicinity, in Cathedral Square. But when it was transferred to the stadium, this concern ceased to exist too. The OMON is a worry; somebody is constantly leaning on them. Gorbunovs firmly stated that he does not believe that the president was involved in the events in Lithuania. Why? It is very simple: If he was contemplating a coup in the republics he would have started with Latvia. Yes, it is clear to people who know the Baltics that the chances would have been greatest in Latvia. And the chairman of the legislature went on to say that he was contemplating abandoning his planned visit to Britain and France at the invitation of these countries' governments because the day after next the "Equal Rights" faction had promised to show up at a republic Supreme Soviet session for the first time after a long absence and the chance of dialogue should not be missed.

The day after next the faction did not show up. This was 21 January. When I arrived in Moscow in the morning I was stunned by the news that the OMON had attacked the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] building and there had been five more deaths. At present only one

thing is beyond doubt: The OMON attacked and five people were killed. It allegedly acted on its own initiative. Leaving aside as yet unverified stories, I wish to single out the opinion of the USSR deputy minister of internal affairs who arrived on the scene to conduct an investigation: "The attack on the building looks completely senseless." Mild language. Because, according to the OMON version of events, the "violent troublemakers" (the prime cause of the conflict) who were seized, belonged to the Latvian National Independence Movement. This is not a state organization or the biggest of the social organizations—it is not the People's Front. It is a smaller and more extremist organization. But why did an accusation that the Latvian National Independence Movement had seized a woman mean that it was necessary to attack the republic MVD building? And why did Colonel Alksnis rush to state that the Army supports the OMON? If not a provocation by the attacking side, it is in any event proof that the OMON has become an uncontrollable dangerous force, and those whom it obeys must now answer for the fact that they are using it.

Gorbunovs was right where the shooting was. He was giving a dinner for the marshal of the Polish Sejm at the Ridzen Hotel. This is right across the street from the MVD building. This is the explanation for what some people regarded as the suspicious speed shown by foreign journalists: They knew from their Polish colleagues where the head of the Supreme Soviet was and were waiting for him. It is also possible that many of them were staying there, the most comfortable hotel in Riga. Indeed there is nowhere else for them to go besides here, the center of the city, a few minutes' walk from all the protected facilities and barricades.

On the evening of 21 January Anatoliy Gorbunovs told me over the telephone: "The situation has now become trickier. The volunteers do not want to hear about leaving. They now want to take up arms." Yet only a day before I had not seen a single person by the barricades armed with anything other than a white armband.

Let us leave to the end the consequences of the suppositions, differing versions of events, and suspicions. Let us assess the reliably known facts—God knows there are enough for us to draw very serious conclusions.

Some 120 OMON fighters have blown apart the political status quo in an entire republic, drastically worsening the chances that it might wish to remain part of the USSR. Their negligible military strength (compared with the defenders of the Union) can in no way explain this effect. Rather, a great deal is explained by the "war of laws," which could not fail to become a war of no laws. What is the point, say, of there being two prosecution services in the republic, one of which, incidentally, is protected by the OMON. Of course, the active, purposeful, illegal activity of such a powerful organized force as the Latvian Communist Party in all its guises (The Salvation Committee, the "Equal Rights" faction, the All-Latvia People's Assembly) explains everything.

But is it just the OMON detachment alone that is being pushed from all sides into behaving like a mindless animal? Some people are demanding the mobilization of the USSR Armed Forces. Others are urging soldiers and officers not to obey the command and intend to create a Russian Army. While a popular television reporter manages with great alacrity to add his own fuel to the flames: They are our guys out there—ours, ours! What other kind of concord do you need when some people are regarded as ours but others are not?

If some people regard this as politics, what would they describe as a mad house or a provocation? People will not listen. The shooting goes on, and their own people get hit by the ricochet. In the Transcaucasus and the Baltic, Central Asia and Moscow. Whether it is Russians, Armenians, or Latvians who die—it is their own people who get hurt. Will the country stand it for long?

I request that these observations made in the immediate aftermath of events be examined as a proposal to the next CPSU Central Committee plenum: that there be a discussion of the reckless actions of those Communists who are undermining the unity of the USSR and harming the authority of the CPSU.

I harbor no ridiculous illusions. Most likely the majority at the plenum will not be on my side. Never mind, even Communists need clarity. Seventeen million Communists constitute an entire people. And not the worst people in our country—that I know.

Gorbachev is being roundly abused. I have no wish to add my contribution to the stream of mutually exclusive demands and advice being given to the president. But one thing seems indisputable to me: The task of the president and the general secretary will not ease unless he directly and firmly condemns lawlessness, no matter from whom it stems or which party is to blame.

Funerals, Mourning Declared for 25 Jan

LD2301095291 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0439 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Our republic's Council of Ministers has issued instructions on assistance to the families whose breadwinners and nearest and dearest died during the assault by a subunit of the OMON [special purpose militia unit] on the Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs on 20 January. Their funeral will take place this Friday. This day has been declared a day of mourning.

Rumors of Jakalauskas To Head Government Denied

LD2001142991 Riga Domestic Service in Russian 1209 GMT 20 Jan 91

[Text] There have been rumors in Lithuania that the former chairman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania, Vytautas Sakalauskas, has returned to the republic. He is now an adviser at the Soviet Embassy in Mozambique. People were saying that he will head a new

government of Lithuania. At a briefing these rumors were denied. Sakalauskas has come for his mother's funeral.

Estonian Supreme Soviet Statement on Baltic Events

PM2301163191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent L. Levitskiy: "Tallinn: Postscript to the Explosions"]

[Text] The Estonian legislature's working week began with a discussion of the situation in the Baltic republics. A statement was adopted by a majority of votes.

It says, in part: "On the night of 20 January there was an armed offensive against the legal authorities. There were explosions in Tallinn aimed at destabilizing the situation and creating prerequisites for armed interference." It goes on to say: "The use of violence in an attempt to disband the legally elected state organs of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is the first step in the destruction of democracy in the Soviet Union. In order to preserve their authority, the partyocracy and the military-industrial complex are employing provocations to fuel contradictions between various ethnic groups."

Nearly every speaker mentioned the two explosions that occurred Sunday night. According to some, it was a provocation to spark off strikes. In the opinion of others, it was a provocation to attract the world public's attention and discredit the Army and the Russian-speaking populace.

A statement by the Interregional Council Executive Committee stresses that "irresponsible speeches by certain government and Supreme Soviet leaders, fueling interethnic strife," are encouraging actions of this kind and explosions.

Unfortunately, there was almost another tragedy to add to the list of incidents in the past 24 hours. Some 15- and 16-year-old youths, under cover of darkness, tried to steal weapons from an Army dump. All the youths were arrested. According to them, they were promised 25,000 rubles per gun. Who are the instigators?...

The Estonian Government used to have a fine democratic tradition. Journalists always had access to the government building. Now the press has been divided up. Journalists from some publications are allowed to enter freely, as before, while others, above all those from central newspapers, are stopped at the entrance. For example, I wasted half a day getting into a legislative session.

Dvigatel Factory Strike Continues in Estonia

LD2401114891 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Excerpts] At 1030 today yet another meeting, the fifth, came to an end at the Union-subordinated Dvigatel factory. Some 300 of the 4,500 workers and strikers were present. [passage omitted]

It was claimed that the Supreme Soviet has already given way up to a point to the strikers. There were said to be strikes also at the nearby train stations at Muuga and Ulemiste. Yevgeniy Kogan was said to have gone to Kohtla-Jarve to incite strikes there. The meeting praised Leningrad Television reporter Nevzorov, who relayed in his "600 seconds" program the appeal of Dvigatel workers to start their last battle.

The strike continues. Its duration is said to depend on Director General Yarovoy's meeting with Arnold Ruutel and Edgar Savisaar.

Civil Aviation on 24-Hour Strike

LD2301172591 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Tallin: Our special correspondent Andrey Trapeznikov reports that the Estonian civil aviation administration began a strike today. In support of the demands of the republic's striking collectives, aircrew have stopped work for 24 hours. All flights have been canceled except those for air ambulance duties and for assistance in natural disasters.

Reporter Denied Access to Estonian Legislature

LD2301221691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Report by TASS correspondent Kharchenko from Tallinn]

[Text] The news that Aleksandr Nevzorov, the Leningrad television journalist, had arrived in Estonia with his "600 Seconds" team was received by the republic's Supreme Soviet in the following fashion—literally 600 paratroopers approached the building. Well, this is what one legislator said.

A report that has been widely circulated in the local media about the session's sitting which started on Tuesday morning notes that Nugis, the speaker of the Supreme Soviet, reported that Nevzorov has asked to be admitted to the Supreme Soviet. Although this issue was not put to the vote, those present reached unanimous agreement that no such permission will be granted. The most interesting point is that Aleksandr, whose film about events Vilnius provoked very contradictory rections here, had no intention of forcing his way into the legislature. He was working with his team on another program which should be on the air in the near future.

Political Analyst Interviewed on Baltics

AU2301152591 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 21 Jan 91 pp 136-143

[Interview with "Moscow political scientist" Vyacheslav Dashichev by Fritjof Meyer in Berlin; date not given: "Then the People Will Rise Up"]

[Excerpts] [Meyer] Professor, you have repeatedly and successfully given decisive advice to President Mikhail Gorbachev to bring about changes in Soviet policies. What advice would you give Gorbachev in connection with Lithuania?

[Dashichev] I would recommend to him to acknowledge and respect the sovereignty of the Lithuanian republic, and to withdraw the Soviet troops.

[Meyer] He is sending paratroopers to Lithuania.

[Dashichev] This is a continuation of Stalin's policy. Stalin occupied the Baltic republics in 1940, and also attacked Finland and Romania, before he finally directed his expansionist drive to East and Central Europe. Totalitarian states tend to transfer the internal situation to the sphere of foreign policy, as Hitler did and as Saddam Husayn did.

[Meyer] And as Gorbachev did?

[Dashichev] He is, of course, no totalitarian ruler, but the use of troops represents a confirmation of Stalin's aggression. If Lenin gave freedom to the Baltic states, Finland, and Bessarabia in 1918, why can we not do the same thing today, 72 years later?

[Meyer] If you draw a parallel with Iraq, are you thinking of a corresponding UN resolution calling on the USSR to give up the acquisitions stipulated in the 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact?

[Dashichev] The Congress of People's Deputies has confirmed the invalidity of this pact. We acknowledged that these states were swallowed by Stalinism. We must draw conclusions from this, as we did in East and Central Europe.

[Meyer] Can you rely on public support on this issue?

[Dashichev] Certainly in the countries affected, which is the most important thing. Just think of the uprising against the occupying power in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Poland at the same time, when Khrushchev threatened to intervene, increased Soviet troops from three to eight divisions, and threatened to arrest the popular Gomulka. One can compare this with events in the Gulf. There are many analogies between Stalin's occupation policy and Saddam Husayn's aggression. [passage omitted]

[Meyer] Has perestroyka failed at the national level?

[Dashichev] The Supreme Soviet in Moscow consists mainly of representatives of the nomenklatura, and it unconditionally obeys the president.

[Meyer] This legislature did not even ask questions about Gorbachev's intentions after the military action against Lithuania.

[Dashichev] Democracy cannot work without a multiparty system. Without the corrective function of an opposition, it is impossible for a society to develop in a healthy way. We have learned this from our country's past. However, we have not succeeded to this very day in allowing the development of other parties that are capable of assuming power from the CPSU and of forming a government. This is one of the omissions of the past few years. There is still intolerance toward those who think differently, a tradition that is difficult to overcome. This is something we must learn.

[Meyer] In the West, there is a certain mood favoring the preservation of stability in the Soviet Union at all costs, which prefers a dictatorship to the risk of a civil war.

[Dashichev] Dictatorship does not ensure stability. Quite the contrary, it can lead to a civil war if consensus, tolerance, and a reconciliation of interests are lacking. If the Lithuanian population rises against the paratroopers and resorts to violence, the conflict might assume an international character. This does not lead to political stability and is not in the interest of the West.

[Meyer] What should Gorbachev do?

[Dashichev] He should grant the Baltic republics the full right to self-determination, including the right to secede from the Soviet Union. They will not withdraw completely but will develop new relations on the basis of equal rights at all levels, knowing that this is also for their own benefit. Violence would have the opposite effect. It would lead to a military conflict between the center and the different ethnic groups.

[Meyer] What will happen if the Union disintegrates into its components, and if the republics do not form a confederation of states?

[Dashichev] No matter what shape a future Union assumes, the republics, as sovereign states, should join all institutions of a future all-European confederation, the united states of Europe with a supreme parliament. The era of the empires belongs to the past, and a return to the past is impossible. Thus, perestroyka is ultimately irreversible.

[Meyer] Given the current situation, this does not seem likely.

[Dashichev] The conservatives do not offer an alternative. They have no program for overcoming the economic and political crisis. The economic need for the market economy and the need to develop initiatives and an entrepreneurial and creative spirit will win the upper hand. There is no other solution.

[Meyer] Gorbachev has just forged an alliance with the conservative forces. Is this new alliance conducive to perestroyka?

[Dashichev] I believe that setbacks, deceleration, and even detours will not change the general tendency. Above all, Gorbachev failed to win support from below, to form a mass basis for perestroyka, for the revolution from above. He failed to eliminate villenage in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms] and to introduce private ownership of land. By failing to carry out reforms in agriculture, he also failed to eliminate the real causes of the permanent supply crisis. It is a shame that a country that is so rich in natural resources is facing famine.

[Meyer] The chances for a change have even diminished now.

[Dashichev] I do not see it this way. The transition toward a market economy is unavoidable, and this is incompatible with the monopoly of the old powers, their posts, and their privileges. For this reason, they are putting up resistance. However, it is not possible to boost the economy without democracy.

[Meyer] Do you see evidence that reforms cannot be achieved within the system but that the system must be changed?

[Dashichev] Yes. This question was raised in November 1987 when Boris Yeltsin was removed from the leadership, and when Gorbachev decided in favor of a bureaucratic and against a democratic path. The continued existence of the old power structures, the continued interference of the apparatus in economic problems, the renunciation of the depolitization of the Army and the KGB—all this led to half-hearted measures and Gorbachev's dangerous hesitancy.

[Meyer] Does this reveal the inadequacy of the old system?

[Dashichev] In any case, public opinion has undergone revolutionary changes in the past three years. The old system, together with its ideology, has been discredited. Thanks to glasnost, people realized that since the 1917 October Revolution the leadership of the Communist Party has forced an unnatural system on the country with the help of the state apparatus, that it has been waging a permanent battle against the population, and that it carried out a genocide against its own people. Tens of millions of people were killed, and all human values, such as dignity, honor, and compassion, were distorted. The economy was crippled. There will be no return to these crimes; the people will not allow that.

[Meyer] What about Gorbachev?

[Dashichev] If he makes use of his powers in the next few months, it will be possible for him to correct the mistakes he made and will not go down in history as a dictator who, out of hesitancy and incompetence, wasted his chances, but as the founder of perestroyka who has turned our country into a democratic state where law prevails and which has a flourishing economy.

[Meyer] If the crisis continues to be exacerbated, do you think that a revolutionary situation will develop, like in the fraternal states where the transitional party leaders failed?

[Dashichev] If the situation deteriorates, people will rise up, they will eliminate the old power structures, and democratic new forces will assume power.

[Meyer] Mr. Dashichev, thank you for the interview.

Baltic Republics Described as 'Calm' 23 Jan

LD2301140391 Moscow TASS in English 1326 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—Tuesday night was calm in the capitals of the Baltic republics. President Mikhail Gorbachev's statement on the situation in the Baltic republics is discussed everywhere, although there have yet been no official commentaries by authorities on the statement.

In his statement, Gorbachev said events in Vilnius and Riga were caused by "unlawful acts, the trampling on the Soviet Constitution, disregard for the president's decrees, the flagrant violation of civil rights, discrimination against people of other nationalities and the irresponsible behaviour towards the Army, servicemen and their families", rather than "the manifestation of the policy line of presidential authority".

Gorbachev emphasised the republics' constitutional right to secede from the USSR, noting that a republic could break away from the Union "only on the basis of the expression of the will by the entire population—a referendum—and as a result of the process envisaged by the law". He denied speculation that tension was being heightened in the USSR under the pretext of an alleged right-wing turn and the danger of a dictatorship.

Concerning the possible imposition of presidential rule in Latvia, Latvian Pr sident Anatolijs Gorbunovs said after a meeting with Gorbachev on Tuesday that presidential rule would apparently not be declared there, because parliamentary opportunities for stabilising the situation in the republic had not yet been exhausted. He said Gorbachev shared this point of view.

Meanwhile, the investigation into the incident that occurred in Riga on Janaury 20-21 is continuing. The inquiry is being conducted by the Soviet Interior Ministry commission headed by Deputy Minister Yuriy Kukushkin.

Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo thinks that "a task force unit evidently assaulted the building of the Latvian Interior Ministry in a state of a deep emotional shock caused by the horrible report about the abduction and outrageous treatment of the wife of one of them."

As a result of the fast by two Russian deputies of the Estonian parliament, which ended on Tuesday, the republican Supreme Soviet decided to send all Estonian laws adopted since 1989 for an international legal examination.

Sergey Petinov and Vladimir Lebedev conducted a six-day hunger strike, demanding guarantees for human rights observance in the republic and a proper mechanism to protect the parliamentary minority. They described the Estonian parliament's decision as "the first sprout of the desire to achieve mutual understanding".

RSFSR

Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 22 January

LD2301104791

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1859 GMT on 22 January begins broadcasting a 97-minute recording from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium meeting with leaders of local soviets in Moscow on 22 January.

RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin begins by welcoming everyone present and recalls that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet agenda includes a point on passing a law on soviets and local self-government. He says: We want your advice on what path to follow to ensure that we make as few errors as possible. We want to give you the statement of the leaders of the three Baltic republics and of the Russian Federation on the events in the Baltic republics, other important documents addressed to the citizens of the Baltic republics and the RSFSR. We also want to give you a compendium of all the laws that have been passed—this is to make for better ties with you. He says one reason for these poor ties is that they have not yet developed the Russian information network. Regarding the drive toward greater sovereignty, the attitude toward this, as evidenced in other republics, is one of great respect. It will take some time to arrive at a Union treaty. It has been postponed by several months by what has taken place in the Baltic republics. He says the Russian Federation ought to be the first to sign an agreement on demarcation of powers with the center. Yeltsin says this would be the first stage of the Union treaty.

The second stage will be a division of property. Enterprises now find themselves unable to see who they are subordinate to. Many enterprises have already opted to be subordinate to Russia and to observe its laws, taxation, welfare rules and regulations, and so on. He says their budget has, for the first time in many decades, been compiled by Russia itself. Now the task is to protect it. The struggle with the center is not yet over, budget-wise. During his three-hour meeting with President Gorbachev, Yeltsin did tell him that they would not renounce their law on the budget system—otherwise they would not sign the economic agreement among the republics. He says the bargaining then began. Finally Gorbachev and Yeltsin signed the agreement, but other republics are yet to enter into such agreements. He says that earlier Russia had to give the center 70 billion rubles [R] now they negotiated a reduction of some R40 billion. He says this is the first real result of Russia's sovereignty. Yeltsin then outlines the proposed agenda for remainder of the meeting.

At 1925 GMT a report on the activities of the soviets and the legal foundations for their work is delivered by Grigoriy Semenovich Zhuk, the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's committee on the questions of work of the soviets of people's deputies and development of local self-government. Zhuk says his predecessor, Travkin, has gone off to do party work. The organization and structure of soviets is a crucial issue. There must be a firm legal foundation upon which they can work. Their functions must be clearly defined. He says this is because voters are becoming increasingly apathetic, as evidenced by the low turnout of 13 percent in the recent elections in the Town of Apatity. Zhuk says various reforms must still be carried out to restructure the institutions of state. Self-government bodies must have clearly demarcated powers. They need real executive power. The new soviets must have their own sources of income through local taxation and must be smaller. He says the key questions of transition to the market economy will also have to be dealt with by the soviets. Specialists, experts, and the views of the local leadership will help us arrive at a good law on the soviets. In March 1991, they must examine a draft of this law in the first reading, prior to the Congress of RSFSR people's deputies. Zhuk says it would be good if the media could give broader coverage of their problems.

At 1948 GMT Ivan Silayev begins a speech on the economy, the 1990 results, the 1991 budget, stabilization of the consumer market, the problem of food supply, taxes, material and technical supplies, and the light and textile industry. His speech ends at 2025 GMT.

Following Silayev's speech debates begin. Stupnikov, chairman of Ulyanovsk City Soviet, says that as far as he understands it they are discussing interrelations between the soviets and executive committees on solutions to the current crisis. He expresses dissatisfaction with the way it is being tackled within the context of local power bodies. He recalls meetings held in Donetsk, Volgograd, Kuybyshev, and other cities where there have been lengthy discussions and no real decisions made.

At 2031 GMT Yeltsin says it is about time Stupnikov stops talking—Stupnikov excuses himself and winds up.

Yeltsin says there have been differing points of view from various local Soviet chairmen and executive committee chairmen and they are all to blame for the fact that this debate has been protracted. He says two proposals have been submitted: the law will be adopted before 15 March taking into account all comments and remarks at all levels and from regional associations and

meetings of other soviets, or nothing will be adopted at the moment and a congress of people's deputies be convened around 15 March to adopt amendments to the Constitution connected with this law, or maybe that further recommendations arising from today's debate be considered in the intervening period.

Novikov, deputy chairman of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Soviet, protests at the way proceedings are going on.

Yeltsin says: Let us agree that we cut out the whole of the next session of the debate so that it will not be shown on television. The recording ends at 2036 GMT.

Yeltsin Addresses Session

LD2301151291 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 1859 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Speech by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet, at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session in Moscow on 22 January—recorded]

[Text] Good morning, esteemed comrades. We have not met for a long time with the chairmen of soviets, chairmen of supreme soviets of Union and autonomous republics from the Russian Federation's territory, chairmen of kray and oblast soviets and of soviet executive committees, or with the chairmen of soviets and executive committees of major oblast centers. In the course of our discussions at the end of the second session and yesterday, we arrived at the conclusion that life itself tells us that we must arrive at our approach and our point of view and, it follows, work out the law and the decision on the organizational structure of soviets. Its absence now clearly hampers work in many places. Many local bodies of Soviet power clearly find themselves in a contradictory situation.

Yesterday we included this in the agenda of this session, and we would like finally to adopt the law on the soviets and local self-government and prior to this we would like to have your advice yet again. How and along what path are we to proceed so that we can adopt a decision we will not subsequently regret, so that errors are eliminated or reduced to a minimum? What we had in mind was to give you a number of documents today. This is to be done during the interval. We agreed on this late yesterday evening.

Taking account of the fact that there are conflicting views of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's position with regard to the situation in the Baltic republics and other questions, we want to give you copies of the following documents: the statement by the leaders of the three Baltic republics; the message by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman to servicemen in the Baltic republics called to do their service in the Russian Federation; the message of the Supreme Soviet chairman to the citizens of the Baltic republics; the chairman's message to the citizens of Russia; the treaty on the basic interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Republic of Estonia. Let us bear in mind that a virtually identical treaty has been signed with the Republic of Latvia.

So we are giving you one variant of it, and, in all probability, having familiarized yourselves with it, you will use these materials to clarify the position at home in your republics, krays, oblasts, and towns. We had a discussion yesterday—and, in principle, the support for the leadership of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Soviet Presidium which made a statement on the events in the Baltic republics has been taken note of, although there also have been speeches against, or speeches suggesting corrections of one kind or another—but, nevertheless, in general support was indeed given. We want to give you a draft—I mean not a draft but, to be more correct, a compendium of laws that have been passed. [passage indistinct] This is because information—we became convinced of this both by visiting various localities and yesterday, after a small interval, when Supreme Soviet members and RSFSR people's deputies were taking the floor and they said that we do not have good communications between the Supreme Soviet and local soviets and soviets at all levels. [sentence as heard]

As for these communications, either they did not exist in some places, or they lapsed, or else they did not exist altogether and failed to be set up. The reason for this lies, of course, firstly in the fact that unfortunately we have not yet developed a mass information network for Russia. The reason here is ours and the Union leadership's alike and, secondly, we could make some sort of prompt information available by sending our people and people's deputies to the localities so that they can tell people there about what the Supreme Soviet is doing.

I would like right away to say a few words about my views concerning the drive toward sovereignty within the Russian Federation. Yes, we did not adopt such a decision, such a resolution, since the Union Supreme Soviet and other bodies also did not adopt their own decisions on the question of approving or agreeing with the declaration of sovereignty of the Russian Federation or other republics. All the same, we shall adopt a document of this kind, but so that you can know the position of principle the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium leadership has adopted with regard to this: We support and regard with great respect the expression of will of the republican supreme soviets concerning their sovereignty, as expressed in their public declarations on the sovereignty of the Union and autonomous republics. We must simply continue this process, because it has gotten stuck on the Union level for the time being, and it is not being continued at our level either. Yes, we did issue a declaration, but no further moves followed from that.

Our view is this: We voiced it at the Union level, at the Federation Council, it was voiced by the representatives of, rather, chairmen of our Union and autonomous republics, and I spoke to the effect that taking into account the fact that the Union Treaty will take some

time to arrive at, while the events in the Baltic republics have, I think, postponed this moment by several months, and in view of the fact that republics are, indeed, not overkeen voluntarily to have a center diktat later on. In view of this, we must proceed stage by stage to arrive, first at an agreement being signed by, let us say, the Russian Federation in the first instance and the Union, concerning the demarcation of powers.

In this respect, of course, the commission set up by the Council of Ministers of the Union which now no longer operates, and the new cabinet is, likewise, not operating for the time being, but it is already time for our Council of Ministers and Ivan Stepanovich [Silayev], its chairman, to get involved in this process of interacting with the cabinet—yes, yesterday, following our first conference in the morning, contact with Pavlov has been established—so as to restart this work and to go through the first stage toward this Union Treaty by demarcating the powers of the Union and the Russian Federation.

The second stage is the division of property. A very difficult process is currently underway: What are the enterprises to do? They are in a most difficult situation in our country at the moment, because they do not know who to turn to.

On the one hand, to the Union; but they see a very great paralysis in the authority of the Union government. On the other hand, the Russian laws on taxation, on tax rates on profits—38 percent instead of the Union one of 45 percent—is also enticing. But again, there is some doubt about how the whole of the material and technical supplies, the conclusion of contracts, and so on and so forth will be organized. Well, the very mechanism of transferring these Union level enterprises into the jurisdiction of Russia has simply not been defined by us. It does not exist, and, naturally it is the task of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation to submit it as quickly as possible—and this is on the agenda at the Supreme Soviet meeting—so that the Supreme Soviet can confirm this mechanism.

But this notwithstanding, many enterprises have already gone over to the jurisdiction of Russia, they have gone over. A conference on enterprises is being held. Such a decision is being made. They are travelling here and registering with the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation and operating under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and according to its laws. Say, (?chemical workers) unite in the Union of Chemical Workers of the Russian Federation, taking account of the fact that almost 95 percent of the chemical industry is in the Russian Federation. Or, yesterday, say, the timber and paper industry—Minister Melnikov—98 percent of the working sawn timber is in the Russian Federation—where then should they be? They have no doubts (?like ourselves)—only in the Russian Federation.

Yesterday the minister came and we talked about these issues in oder to go over officially to the jurisdiction of Russia, to adopt such a decision and further...both tax policy and social protection will be under the name of the Russian Federation, and will be taken on by the government and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

I should say in defending its budget—a budget which has for the first time in many decades, in many decades, been drawn up by Russia itself, by the government and Supreme Soviet, for the first time, for the first time a self-supporting budget—for the first time. This is the only republic which has drawn up a self-supporting budget. Our task was to defend it. I don't understand. [Unidentified voice confers with Yeltsin, who responds: "I don't understand why...." further calls from the hall and the platform, from which a voice says that there is no deficit in Russia and comrades will not understand]

Yes, in all oblasts there is a deficit, but in Russia there is no deficit. Then it's clear. I have to say to you that all the same, for the present we have set in motion a preliminary budget, or rather transferred it and brought it to the republics, oblasts, and krays because our battle—I don't even want to apologize for this word—with the center has not ended. It will have come to an end only in the coming days inasmuch as we insisted on not using the example of many decades—then, calculations to the Union budget were always defined in percentages, of what was unclear. From gross output? From gross national income and so on and so forth? So now we have insisted—and you will recall that this was discussed at the First Congress of People's Deputies—that a calculated sum should be fixed. Such a calculation was done and we, in the agreement...I can no longer remember at which stage...committees were working and commissions were working, the Council of Ministers was working very thoroughly.

There was this latest three-hour meeting with President Gorbachev, and I said at the meeting that we had adopted this law and that we would not renounce this law on the budget system; you must understand that we will not renounce it, because otherwise we cannot sign the economic agreement among the republics. Then the bargaining got under way. Pavlov, the former finance minister, came to our help; and because Ivan Stepanovich was away on leave briefly, Skokov, the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, came to our help and we began to look into these sums. Who should receive the regular income on a percentage basis from the oil and gas industry, I mean, further, who should...tax on...the turnover tax...yes, there is a lot of it there. [sentence as heard]

Yes, all in all, it is, incidentally, possible—although no, for as long as all the republics have not signed, it is not convenient to give you this...but, at long last, Gorbachev and I did sign; well, to go on, the tax on sales, according to the new decree and so on. Everything was apportioned there: Who is to get what; what is the republic going to get and what is the Union going to get. Only a fixed sum, or a percentage, remained: 23.4 billion rubles [R] was to

be the contribution on a percentage basis from the fixed sum, to be paid to the Union budget, but everything else would stay in Russia.

If you recall, we used to contribute R70 billion. That is a sizeable difference. But, suddenly, some two weeks before this whole process was due to be completed, they demanded a further R27 billion when they realized that as far as all the republics are concerned, the figures would not tally. So a kind of discussion was under way—not to call it struggle...budget...in order that we...yes...and, discussing it at the Federation Council, and here we have the representatives who attended, chairmen of the Russian Federation supreme soviets, there republics came out in favor of levelling off the percentage of the budget deficit for everyone. [sentence as heard] We said: Why? One republic works this way, another works in a different way, one seeks sources of revenue—and we have, indeed, sought sources of revenue to increase the income—but it may well be that another republic does not seek that.

To have, into the bargain, the selfsame levelling off that we condemned at the production level, to now want to preserve this levelling off at the local, republican, and Union budget level is something we categorically opposed. We can only have a fixed sum by way of budget contributions. And the sum of R23.4 billion we determined through our law at the Supreme Soviet was accepted. That is to say we did not agree to R40 billion and, into the bargain, we likewise did not agree to the additional sum of R27 billion. The deficit-free budget...I speak of this theoretically. Why? Because a budget deficit of about five percent is regarded throughout the world as a budget which is altogether deficit-free. It is not 15 or 20 but, let us say, in Azerbaijan the current budget deficit is 35 percent. In Uzbekistan the budget deficit is 50 percent. In our republic it is 5.3 percent, the 0.3 percent part proving something of a stumbling block. So, five percent it is. That is why we are now simply, evidently—I do not know, Ivan Stepanovich is now surely working with the oblasts, so to speak, and—yes, proceeding from these new figures, and he will continue this later on in his report, but this matter has not yet been fully brought home to everyone. [sentence as heard] But we wanted to adopt it precisely in December, so as for a start, at least, not to leave the teachers, doctors, that is, the organizations which operate from a budget only, without wages.

So that is from the war of laws to the war of budgets. But we believe that this is probably our first real result for sovereignty of Russia, real sovereignty. Before this, everything was in the form of declarations. There were laws as well, but here is a law which is recognized and signed, with two signatures, Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Today, perhaps, this does not alleviate the situation of the enterprises, in the sense that at the same time there exists the decree for enterprises to keep all the ties of 1990, although many of them have already gone over to new, direct ties. That is the paradox—that is, they have already. Some of the enterprises are already introducing market relations and have tied their operations up with other enterprises, and then out comes the decree that everything should be left as it was in 1990, that is, not to do anything, not half a step, toward a market economy.

Federation Council Supports Currency Decree

LD2301210291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1909 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jan (TASS)—Those attending the sitting of the Russian legislature's Federation Council have unanimously supported yesterday's decree of the USSR president "on ending the legal tender of 1961-design banknotes of the USSR State Bank with a face value of 50 rubles [R] and R100, and restricting the issue of cash from citizens' deposits.

According to USSR Central Television, there was an exchange of views at the sitting, which was attended by leaders of the republics, oblasts, krays, and autonomous okrugs forming part of the Russian Federation, on this decree of the USSR president, which aims to improve the circulation of money within the country.

Silayev on Currency Reform

LD2301181791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1527 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Interview with Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, by legislative correspondent Aleksandr Ruvinskiy—place and date not given; live or recorded]

[Text] [Ruvinksiy] You know we have been offered the opportunity to talk to Ivan Stepanovich Silayev. But I want, inasmuch as Ivan Stepanovich has not listened to the previous Mayak broadcasts to state briefly what was in the reports from our correspondents, especially in Moscow, to the fact that in a whole range of State Bank branches in Moscow—Tushinskoye, Khoroshevskoye, and Leningradskoye were mentioned—there is no money now to exchange for 50 ruble [R] and R100 banknotes. Such a complicated situation has arisen, even in the capital. I imagine that in the provinces, in a whole range of areas, they probably are also having some difficulties of their own and the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation was today working on removing in some way these contradictions, these difficulties.

Please, Ivan Stepanovich, what is the outlook for us?

[Silayev] Well, unfortunately, we did not have sufficient time to prepare properly, to implement this step. One can say that there were only a few hours, but Russia is fairly large. And when we had only received the president's decree the new day was already beginning in Vladivostok.

Nevertheless, the situation is such that the necessary measures need to be taken. We have indeed today discussed this matter, the more so as this coincided with

the holding of a meeting of the Council of Ministers in its full composition, including also the leaders of oblasts, krays, and republics.

We support this decree by the president. We believe it is necessary to implement it and the main clauses of the decision by the prime minister, Comrade Pavlov.

However, already taking into account the questions and problems arising, and the large amount of telephone calls, we have found it necessary to give the following explanations and instructions. Well, first, we confirm that the decree needs to be implemented.

After that let's reply to a number of problems and in particular the lack of cash to effect the exchange. We are making it incumbent upon the bank branches and other organizations concerned to accept the funds authorized for exchange and, if they do not have ready money, to issue the corresponding promissory notes or other notes with the guarantee that, as cash becomes available, they will be redeemed. That is to say, in doing this we are defusing the situation so that the working people do not get worried.

A serious matter is time. When we alredy started doing something, virtually 24 hours had already expired in the Far East. Two days remain. Signals are reaching us from everywhere that in inaccessible areas, say somewhere in Yakutiya where there are hunters, reindeer-breeders, and so on, three days is not sufficient to do this. Muscovites, too, have been raising this issue very sharply today.

We believe that it is possible for the republic's State Bank—and we have given it the go-ahead to that effect, already taking into account the special features of the regions—to take decisions on making additional time available for implementation. For without this we cannot manage.

We think that there is a problem with regard to pensioners. R200, not more, is in general, the size of the pension and it causes concern. We are already getting indications that some pensioners have suffered very serious shocks to their nerves. Indeed, they perhaps do not completely trust the official bodies and did not keep their money in the savings bank. They saved up for a long time and suddenly they are allowed only 200 and they are no longer able to save up.

And the fact that there over a period of 10 days they will be looking into things and deciding whether incomes are legal or illegal is to my mind, with regard to pensioners, not very just and we are looking into the possibility—we have not yet come to a final decision.—the possibility of raising this plank, if one can express it in this way, to R500.

But we are instructing the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of the republic to organize a round-the-clock service of qualified specialists to receive any questions and to take the corresponding decisions on the spot. We are also instructing the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs to ensure increased protection for our corresponding organizations and the observance of public order. These are our actions.

[Ruvinskiy] Ivan Stepanovich, one more question. Neither the presidential decree nor the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers mentions in any way such a category of citizens of our country as students at technical colleages or higher educational establishments. Of course, they do not have large savings but perhaps someone might have a R50 note or a R100 note.

[Silayev] Yes, you are right. One of our options does contain such a line concerning precisely those studying at special schools and higher educational establishments and special technical colleges, to make them equal to pensioners in this case. The same approach.

[Ruvinskiy] One more question, Ivan Stepanovich. Did the government of the RSFSR not hold any consultations with the governments of other Union republics?

[Silayev] Well, there was very little time, but I managed to talk with the leadership of Belorussia. They have the same problems and approximately the same intentions and the same actions. I am now waiting for a telephone call to be put through to the Ukraine. After I finish speaking to you I shall also get in contact with them and we are saying that all the same it is necessary to do everything to ensure that this process should proceed more calmly and in an organized manner.

[Ruvinskiy] Can we assure the citizens of the RSFSR in some way that they can keep the money which they have earned honestly although they will, perhaps, have to expend a certain amount of nervous energy for this?

[Silayev] Yes, of course, it is necessary to read once again and with more attention the decree itself and the decision. For some citizens, instead of going to their place of work and resolving these problems there, they dashed to the savings bank and the situation was considerably more complicated there than it could have been. It is simply necessary to act more calmly. Of course, a lot still depends on the work of the commissions. Commissions have been set up practically everywhere and it is necessary for them very actively and deeply look into things and resolve questions.

[Unidentified speaker] Ivan Stepanovich, we have just received a report from Uzbekistan. There, in accordance with a decree of Uzbek SSR president Karimov, the period for exchanging banknotes with a value of R50 and R100 issued since 1961 has been extended for citizens of the republic to 1 February. Correspondingly, the period of work of the commissions under rayon and town executive committees of soviets of peoples deputies has been extended to 10 February. So, Uzbekistan has already taken this decision.

[Silayev] Thank you, this is very interesting information.

Conference Views Budget, Food Supply Disruptions

PM2301154991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "All-Russian Conference"]

[Text] The demarcation of powers between organs of power and the further development of their independence has been discussed at an all-Russian conference of leaders of soviets at all levels. It was held in Moscow 22 January under the chairmanship of B.N. Yeltsin.

This conference was brought about by the need to coordinate the various positions of the republic and local authorities and resolve many acute issues relating to their cooperation before the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopts the law on local self-government.

Diametrically opposed views were voiced. It is obvious that, in dialogue with autonomous entities, oblasts, and krays, Russia has encountered the same problems as the Union has encountered in its dialogue with the republics: The local authorities have been trying to "grab as much as they can."

In his opening speech the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet stated that Russia stands alone among the republics in having for the first time drawn up a balanced budget. Responding to a sarcastic comment from the auditorium—"There are deficits in all areas but no deficit in Russia!"—the head of parliament explained that: "In world practice it is considered that if a budget deficit is within 5 percent it is, in general, a balanced budget."

"The year 1990 was one in which the economic position deteriorated," I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, stated in his report on the economic aspect of cooperation among authorities at various levels. Krays and oblasts have been vigorously refusing to supply food to republic stocks, he said. If we do not implement what we have planned, there will be nothing left to feed the republic.

Last year's disruption to food shipments from 38 territories was a consequence of the sovereignty claimed by certain territories. This year the situation has not changed for the better. The month is drawing to a close, but the plan for food shipments for the republic has only been 25 percent fulfilled.

N.V. Fedorov, RSFSR minister of justice, sharply criticized the string of local sovereignty declarations. The professional [as published] explained the current absurd relations between the soviets at various levels by the lack of any legal underpinning for the decisions made by the local authorities. This legal ignorance has led to anarchy. The expanding practice of establishing treaty relations between different authorities is rendering meaningless the existence of the state as a central authority.

The conference participants adopted a number of instructions for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

More on Yeltsin Appeal on Baltic Events

PM2201123791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 3

[Unattributed report on "main points" of Boris Yeltsin statement: "B. Yeltsin: 'I Believe Reaction Will Not Win Through'"]

[Text] **Let us remind readers: Immediately after the tragic night in Vilnius, there appeared a joint statement by the chairmen of the Latvian, Russian, Estonian, and Lithuanian Supreme Soviets, and an appeal by them to the United Nations. On 14 January, B. Yeltsin, head of the Russian legislature, held a news conference in Moscow, at which an appeal to servicemen drafted into the Army on the territory of the Russian Federation and currently in the Baltic republics was read out. Its appearance is understandable since there is a Russian Federation law banning the use of Russian conscripts in interethnic and other civil conflicts, and it was decided at the Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies that the army cannot be used inside the country, against the people.**

Nonetheless, use was made of the proven method of distorting the stance out of all recognition and demagogically accusing B. Yeltsin and the Russian legislature of virtually betraying the interests of the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic area.

Yesterday the editorial office was handed an appeal by B.N. Yeltsin in connection with events in the Baltic area. Here are its main points.

B. Yeltsin was appealing to those who bear weapons, for the sake of preserving peace in the country and for the sake of relatives' and friends' peace of mind, not to give the order to aim the lethal barrels at the civilian population and not to shoot unarmed people.

The president, the appeal stresses, must return to the logic of peaceful political dialogue with the republics and with the legally elected organs of power. Members of parties and public movements should do all they can to halt the political struggle at least while this difficult period lasts.

It is necessary to shed the monstrous illusion that order and tranquillity can be established by using weapons and military equipment. Violence and intimidation will provoke a violent response and hatred both of the just and of the guilty.

The supporters of dictatorship must be deprived of their chief argument in the Baltic area—that military force is needed to prevent an interethnic war. It is necessary to avoid giving the slightest excuse for the use of military force, which would create incalculable problems for people of all nationalities.

I deem it my duty, B. Yeltsin said, to dwell on the problem of the Russian-speaking population. Not only because it is my official duty, but because my heart so demands. The Russian legislature has complete information on the status of Russians and people of other nonindigenous nationalities in the Baltic republics. The Russian legislature and the government consider it their duty to make every effort to protect Russians.

But we firmly believe, the appeal goes on to stress, that we will only be able to give our fellow citizens outside Russia real guarantees if we have clearly defined political and legal foundations for mutual relations with republics and states.

So far treaties have been concluded with Estonia and Latvia. A similar treaty with the Lithuanian Republic is in preparation. They will form the basis for all the work on protecting the Russian-speaking population in those republics and, correspondingly, their population on Russian territory. Russia will set up missions in the Baltic republics.

Treaties with the Baltic republics will make it possible even in the next few months to remove a significant number of the existing causes of interethnic tension, which people of all nationalities in the Baltic area are equally tired of.

The biggest danger at the moment, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman stressed, is the line of stark confrontation, of effectively overthrowing the legitimate organs of power, which has been gathering momentum of late.

Self-styled structures aspiring to total power are being hastily set up in conditions of profound secrecy. They pontificate on the people's behalf, but they hide from them like cowards. The committee for the salvation of Lithuania had only been in existence for two days when its secret leaders committed a grave crime, flung servicemen into a bloodbath, exposed the soldiers again, made them shoulder the responsibility, and turned the people's wrath against them.

B. Yeltsin asked all the citizens of Lithuania and the other republics to display maximum restraint and strength of character: However difficult it might be, try not to see the military, who are in the Baltic area at the moment, only as a blind and dark force. B. Yeltsin urged everyone to see them as human beings. Things are extremely difficult for them at the moment amd many of them are experiencing massive psychological stress. If all they encounter is hatred and abuse, even a strong-willed person could make a moral mistake, could crack.

The head of the Russian legislature urged workers and employees to think again and again before performing a particular public action.

Our country's destiny is currently being decided, the statement goes on. We will either continue to advance along the path of renewal, or the current reversal will push us way back to the times of tyranny and violence against entire peoples and each human being's dignity.

At the end of his appeal B. Yeltsin expressed confidence that reaction would not win through, but maximum effort will be required to preserve civic peace in each Baltic republic, in Russia, and throughout the Union.

Yeltsin on RSFSR Army, Baltic Troops

91UN0742A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 3, Jan 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with B. Yeltsin conducted by A. Uglanov; place and date not given: "At the Fateful Line"]

[Text] [Uglanov] Boris Nikolayevich, we learned from the broadcast of the USSR Supreme Soviet session of your intention to create a Russian army. How does this accord with the USSR Constitution?

[Yeltsin] First, such a decision has not been made by the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. There should, therefore, be no talk of anticonstitutional actions. Second, I said that we needed to find ways to defend our sovereignty. First, to create security authorities, and the Russian Congress of Deputies had already adopted this decision. Second, to think, perhaps, about the creation of an army also. Because it is not known how events will develop in the republic or in the Union following such actions of the center.

We have just held consultations with a number of specialists. We should, perhaps, start with the creation of a national guard, territorial formations, and a home guard.

I do not intend to start on their formation immediately, the more so because there is more than a sufficient army, with nuclear weapons included, on our territory. But this needs to be thought about, and the first step will be the appointment of an acting chairman of the Russia Defense Committee. After that, we will see. But no anticonstitutional step has been taken as yet.

[Uglanov] One has the impression from information gleaned via official channels that the leadership of the Russian Federation, you in particular, is leaving to the whim of fate the Russian-speaking population of other republics. We have learned from the "Vremya" program that you are unwilling to enter into any negotiations with their representatives.

[Yeltsin] During my recent trip to Estonia a few days ago, I met with quite a sizable group of representatives of the Russian-speaking population. This was late at night, but there was no other time. We had a big discussion. It began quite nervously, but ended perfectly normally. I tried to persuade them that treaties between our republics are needed specifically so that we have legal relations

with the republics and states that have a Russian-speaking population. They cannot be protected otherwise. Otherwise—by the army, fists, shouting? This is useless.

But when there is a treaty that says that there must be equal rights for the whole population and that both parties are guided only by instruments in international law, this is another matter. In particular, a protocol on the creation within one month of a special program for protection of the Russian-speaking population has been signed specially as a supplement to this treaty. This already applies to Estonia and Latvia and will very soon apply to Lithuania.

I have here in Moscow met repeatedly with representatives of the Russian-speaking population of various republics. The details of treaties have been discussed also. This has been going on for several months.

Our missions will open soon in all republics, incidentally. Russian-speaking inhabitants will always be able to apply there and obtain Russia's due protection, but on a basis of provisions of international law.

The "Vremya" program did not, unfortunately, find an opportunity to talk about this.

[Uglanov] Do these treaties presuppose a revision of the discriminatory legislative enactments in the Baltic republics containing an infringement, say, of suffrage and residency qualifications?

[Yeltsin] It is recorded that all enactments must provide for the equal rights of all citizens. We settled on the spot, for example, a number of questions connected with servicemen in Latvia. This applies to food, coupons, and so forth. So we are talking about an equalization of the rights of all inhabitants.

[Uglanov] That is, common sense should prevail. The president also appealed to you for this.

[Yeltsin] But common sense in words is one thing, in actions, another. Remember his speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on Wednesday. Ambassadors of other states, for example, are coming to me and expressing concern—what is the center doing? An abandonment of foreign assistance is possible, many international programs could be terminated. Unequivocally, the country must not be plunged into an abyss of bloodshed and must be turned aside from the line beyond which lies civil war.

Why were the center's negotiations with Lithuania broken off? What if it leaves the Union, so what? We would be left with a friendly neighbor linked by economic and other ties, but not blood. But extreme, impermissible methods were chosen. And the specific culprits must answer for this.

[Uglanov] Many people are discussing your appeal to the soldiers, sergeants, and officers drafted on Russian territory and stationed in the Baltic. It is being said that you are calling for them to disobey the orders of their commanders, but this is rebellion and a crime against the state....

[Yeltsin] This is a direct insinuation, and such words were not said. It was something else: "Before moving to assault civilian targets on Baltic soil, remember your native place and the present and future of your republic and your people. Violence against legality and the people of the Baltic will engender serious new crisis phenomena both in Russia itself and in the situation of Russians living in other republics, the Baltic republics included."

I told Defense Minister D. Yazov: "Do not disgrace the Army. Its authority is declining on account of these ill-considered steps of the leadership." It has to be said that not all the servicemen were Army people, some of them were from the KGB.

A law to the effect that our draftees may not operate in other republics against the peaceful civilian population has been enacted with us, incidentally. But these draftees could face criminal proceedings for failure to carry out an order. So we will consider at the next session a bill on a draftee not being liable in this case for criminal proceedings since he is in compliance with a law of the RSFSR. The tribunal would judge on behalf of the Russian Federation and be guided by the RSFSR Criminal Code.

[Uglanov] Have you been in contact with the president?

[Yeltsin] Since my return from Tallinn, no, but during the nighttime events, several times.

[Uglanov] Do you support the idea of a national strike?

[Yeltsin] This is a matter for each individual. We do not intend calling for one, dissuading people from one, or encouraging one.

Yeltsin Call for RSFSR Army Criticized

91UN0733A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 17 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Krotkov under the "Political Commentary" rubric: "Arm Russia?"]

[Text] **At a news conference on Monday 14 January, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, declared a need for the immediate creation of a Russian Republic army and security committee. This is a grave consideration. But what is it for? With whom does Russia intend to go to war? With the Union, with other republics? From whom will it defend itself? And then, how is the idea to be implemented? What can this lead to?**

The choice of versions for implementation is not great. The first—to snatch a larger slice from the all-Union military-industrial and KGB pie, and the second—to bake one's own republic pie, so to say, out of nothing.

It is clear that, to put it mildly, it is undesirable for Russia to begin military "construction" from a "zero cycle." The republic budget for the year has already been adopted, and, moreover, its expenditures already significantly exceed income, which, among other commentators on this economic cause, was discussed by B. Fedorov, former Russian finance minister. It is possible to try to introduce an additional "military" tax on enterprises. But it is not difficult to imagine how the labor collectives will howl when even today they are laughing through their tears: With such tax collections we will walk into the market without pants. More accurately, we will not walk in, but crawl, in order to die on its threshold from financial starvation. Death for an idea, of course, is beautiful. However, not for the sake of feeding two armies instead of one.

Well, let us suppose that the taxpayer will grudgingly accept another collection. But it should not be forgotten that budget appropriations in our country of undaunted deficits are by far not everything that is needed for existence. Appropriations still have to be "backed up by goods," military equipment has to be procured somewhere, barracks have to be built, soldiers have to be billeted in them, and, finally, generals have to be assigned. However, I do not think that any problems will arise with generals. The names of Kalugin, Gdlyan, Ivanov, etc. come to mind. But whom will they command? Mercenary deserters from the USSR Armed Forces and the KGB with toy rifles and model tanks?..

No, it is hardly likely that Russia will take this path. But if it does, the version of sharing remains. But here then other problems arise. Do not forget that the Union budget has already been formed. It was formed with the participation of Russia which, in the person of Yeltsin, agreed to allocate resources for the support of a Union army and security services. The train has left the station, as the saying goes. To return it, and to break a just completed agreement, will require efforts that are difficult to imagine. The good name of the Russian legislature will be at stake, and also its ability to keep its word. Only extraordinary circumstances can compel the republic to retract its words. And here we come to the second question: Why? Why does Yeltsin need an army and the rest? Is it not, in fact, to guard the top man in Russia from mysterious assassination attempts?

Yeltsin himself does not conceal a connection here with the tragic events in Vilnius, which he fears will be repeated in Moscow. Will people in black berets tomorrow not attempt to disperse the "Russian duma" on the Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya because of "the genuine demands of the public" in the form of heaven knows what kind of committee of what kind of salvation? Not many optimists can be found now who will give a negative answer to such a question. Every authority must be able to defend itself. And here the irony and the mockery directed against the republic's legislature are irrelevant. The motives for their statements deserve sincere sympathy. But every power must be able to defend its loyal citizens. Therefore, it would be nice to know: How will the RSFSR Armed Forces protect their Russian toy soldiers from court martial? For they will be declared deserters for refusing to execute the orders of their overwrought commanders, for whom a "happy" life was arranged in that same Baltic area?

Let us assume that the Russian legislature will appeal to "mutinous" Union regiments to go to the side of the republic (I hope that even Boris Nikolayevich himself does not believe that the Union will voluntarily give Russia some soldiers with their assault rifles and other munitions. And also that the Army ranks on which he recently heaped epithets, accusing them of fierce rightism, will flit happily to him under the left wing). The war of banks and budgets will give way to the opposition of armed people. Seizure of military arsenals, nuclear warheads, and missile carriers and bombers will begin. It is better not to think about what will happen after this. An attempt to push the rock blocking the road into an abyss will lead to the kind of an avalanche in the next spiral of the political winding road that will bury not only our much suffering Union but the entire world as well. This must not be toyed with!

Fine, it will be objected, but what do you do with the rock on the road? How do you make yourself secure from a possible dissolution of the "duma" and the coming of a dictatorship? Or does the author propose waiting for it without doing anything?

By no means! The rock has to be removed immediately. But this has to be done with the combined efforts of the republics, including Russia also, and the Union, and not by way of escalating the confrontation between them.

Evidently, after Vilnius it is difficult to count on the unquestionable success of a referendum on the Union treaty, as well as on the favorable support of our efforts on the part of the West. It should not be said that Gorbachev, if you will pardon me, does not give a damn for public opinion in the country and abroad, inasmuch as, it is said, the president aspires to dictatorship. If this were the case, Mikhail Sergeyevich would not have succeeded in getting financial assistance from the West, and he would not be insisting on a referendum. No, the role of oppressor of democracy is not in his line.

But if that is so, what is hindering those on Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya from remembering the road to the Kremlin, so that they may together put out the fire of the critical conflict in Lithuania? To block the road to dictatorship together, and together to find the scenario writers of the massacre in Vilnius, which, it seems, was methodically prepared a long time ago, and not to suspect one another of malicious machinations and behind-the-scenes intrigues. The "scenario writers" were certainly counting precisely on the last reaction, hoping to catch fish in the muddy waters of the confrontation of the legislatures and their leaders, playing it safe at a time of anarchy in the party.

They must not be allowed to play it to the fatal end.

And the last thing: What is to be done about the USSR Constitution? Because what Yeltsin proposes contradicts the Basic Law of the land. But, to put it mildly, did impudent treatment of the law and individual rights in Lithuania and other republics of the Baltic area not engender the present situation, among other things?

Justice armed with illegality cannot be defended. In any society, only the dictatorship of the law is legal. Otherwise, you get a dictatorship of the Pinochets.

Yeltsin's Supreme Soviet Performance Viewed

PM2301151991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Anatoliy Karpychev "My Opinion" commentary: "Listen Attentively..."]

[Text] When the next speaker went up to the rostrum, the chairman said the following: "Listen attentively." He said this incidentally, as it were, in his usual ingratiating voice, but something put me on my guard...

Television's Second Program was relaying the Russian Supreme Soviet session. The debate was under way. It developed after B.N. Yeltsin's speech about the political situation in the country. The very next speaker (I don't remember his name) discussed the subject of who is to blame for the bloodshed in Lithuania. I listened attentively. He said that the USSR president is to blame. The CPSU and the Central Committee general secretary are to blame, he continued... Applause was heard from one side of the hall.

I refuse to think that anyone foresaw in advance whom this deputy would criticize sharply. But when R.I. Khasbulatov (he was chairing the session) asked another speaker to speak "a little louder," my son sitting in front of the television next to me concluded: "There's going to be more criticism of Gorbachev now." And that was precisely what happened. That's a coincidence for you.

But let us leave conjecture aside. We must indeed listen attentively to everything that was said during and after the 21 January session. We must not merely listen but also ponder and analyze. Make a choice, if you like. The political confrontation has, in my view, reached a critical moment.

It was not events in Lithuania that caused this. They merely served to highlight and exacerbate the situation in the extreme and at the same time dispelled the illusions and the hopes that everything would supposedly be okay, including between M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin.

It is perhaps not a bad thing that the illusions have disappeared. The denouement must come sooner or later. That is why, the complexity and undesirability of this situation notwithstanding, I can see that it is of bitter benefit in that it has finally determined who is who.

After this it became clear what some Russian parliamentary deputies want. In plain terms they want M.S. Gorbachev to resign from the post of USSR president. They want (and one speech said this) the Federation Council to assume power in the Union—and B.N. Yeltsin will play first fiddle there, I add on my own behalf.

But let us not anticipate things. What political conclusions did he draw in his speech?

In the opinion of the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, today we have a "reactionary center" and an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet which should "act as the guarantor of democracy." The guarantor's main task is "to retard and halt the Union leadership's slide into reaction. ...It is necessary to persuade the central leadership by word and deed that today the country can no longer be formed into a single convoy and fettered with a chain. Reality itself will make the supreme leaders realize this."

I wholly agree with B.N. Yeltsin that there is no need to succumb to depression and panic in these conditions. But...I had no high hopes after this speech of a happy end to the confrontation. As the U.S. President has said, it takes two to tango. Harmonious work in the people's name can only be done together, by sweeping aside personal elements as far as possible.

While Boris Nikolayevich was engaging in stern recriminations against the central leadership headed by M.S. Gorbachev, I was also thinking how trustful we all are. At one time many newspapers carried photographs of these two leaders sitting next to one another at the same Presidium table. Some people wanted to show that they are close to one another. Obviously, at a time when they were further away from one another than ever before.

B.N. Yeltsin's speech at the session held no surprises for me. That was the aim. Everything was done to produce a total split with the USSR president. I do not know whether the Russian leader hit upon this himself or whether it had been suggested to him but...that's another matter. I thought previously that Yeltsin's name had been exploited by democrats on several occasions—and not necessarily the same people who were sitting in the hall.

Today it is easy to criticize the founders of perestroyka and President M.S. Gorbachev. Some people are even profiting by this. There are a lot of difficulties, and the people are dissatisfied with the fact that the stores are still empty and that there are lines everywhere. Yesterday I told a friend what I had seen on television at the Russian session and he replied: "Do you know that toothpaste has disappeared from the stores?"

I have the feeling that, while I watched the session that night I was party not to a wise analysis of the situation, nor a democratic meeting, but a court of law. Who was on trial? M.S. Gorbachev. Who are the judges? Those whom the chairman asked to "listen more attentively"?

Forgive me, but that is simply not how a civilized audience treats the president. I would like to hear different viewpoints and different deputies. I did not. My impression is that R.I. Khasbulatov spoke all the time. He was at times disrespectful toward those whom he considered to hold dissenting views.

I was left with a strange impression. One person fulminated against the party, another cited the experience of Stalin. One advocated the observance of constitutional norms, another flouted these same norms. In my view, there was simply no atmosphere of fellowship or harmonious work. It even seemed to me that the details of the session screenplay had been written in advance and that anyone who tried to impede the move in support of B.N. Yeltsin would not be allowed "free rein." I repeat, that's my impression, and possibly it stems from the fact that the chairman was overdoing things somewhat.

And again I drew attention to the upsetting fact that even today, to be on the safe side, people have sung the praises of... "the man under whose leadership we are taking confident steps," "It was our leader and not the president who acted in this situation..." "The leader of a 150-million-strong people"... How painfully familiar all this is. Especially when something you have not, alas, forgotten comes to mind: "Our dear Nikita Sergeyevich, Leonid Ilich..."

Admittedly, not everyone stocked up on agreeable epithets for their speeches. Some deputies who nonetheless succeeded in forcing their way to the rostrum despite the "barrier" represented by R.I. Khasbulatov's electronic machine sharply criticized the leader for his appeal to the United Nations, for going to the Baltics without the Supreme Soviet's knowledge, and for saying on behalf of millions things with which not everyone agrees. In short, some were delighted, others humiliated. And what about us sitting in front of the television? What did we feel? Let us draw our own conclusion. I will venture just one piece of advice.

"Listen to everything attentively. The times we live in are complex times. For that reason even trustfulness should be tempered by reason."

Democratic Russia Movement Appeals to Soldiers

LD2401105191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 24 Jan 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Excerpt] Our office has just received an appeal from the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Russia Movement. The appeal, to servicemen of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Interior Ministry, and KGB is still to be adopted, but here are its main points:

The Democratic Russia Movement demands the resignation of the reactionary group of generals, the immediate arrest of the organizers of the military putsch in Lithuania, and the creation of a Russian National Guard. [passage omitted]

Plenum Discusses Aims

LD1601214691

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1144 GMT on 15 January carries an eight-minute report on the plenum of the Council of Representatives of the Democratic Russia Movement on 12-13 January by correspondent Maksim Sheryamov.

Sheryamov begins his report by saying tht Cochairman Yuriy Afanasyev and Gavriil Popov addressed about 130 delegates representing about 400,000 people. Afanasyev is then heard commenting on differences between himself and Popov in their approach to the situation in the country. He says:

"Since about September last year up until the present one can say that there has been a wide expansion of reactions in all directions. This—the expansion of reaction—is the main feature, I think, of the official political course at present.

"Second, one can already talk of a war being waged by the government and leadership of the USSR, led by Gorbachev, a war against the peoples of the USSR. This war has already taken on open armed intervention in the affairs of other republics and has started to be aimed at armed suppression of republics which have demonstrated their independence and their sovereignty. The only possible reaction must be profound, definite, all round, political opposition to this course. What is underway is the establishment of a dictatorship, with the initiator of perestroyka as this dictator."

Sheryamov explains that Afanasyev advocated forming structures parallel to the current USSR Supreme Soviet and Union government on the basis of interrepublican agreements. Afanasyev believes that the decisive thing will be extraparliamentary activity, jointly with the Supreme Soviet of Russia and the Democratic Movement. Sheryamov reports Afanasyev as saying that they must orientate themselves toward mass, nonparliamentary, peaceful actions, opposing the current political line of the Union leadership.

Sheryamov then goes on to introduce the evaluation by Gavriil Popov, mayor of Moscow, of the situation in the country. "It is wholly obvious from what has happened just recently that a sudden change has taken place, and it is important to determine the nature of this sudden change," Popov said. "The Democratic Movement of Russia has throughout its history frequently been inclined to automatically regard such sudden changes as absolutely reactionary," he went on. What has happened at present, he said, is that "after hesitation and so forth, the country's leadership has made a final choice on ways

to transform the country; I stress, to transform the country, not return to the past. This choice has been made in favor of an especially centralist and especially bureaucratic option." Popov is quoted as regarding the main strategy of the democrats as lying in setting up a mass organization on a party basis, with primary cells in all labor collectives.

Sheryamov says that in the debate following reports from Afanasyev and Popov, the question of a general warning political strike aroused the greatest polemics.

The second day of the Democratic Russia forum followed the events of Saturday night, when assault troops seized the Lithuanian broadcasting house, and news came of killed and wounded. Sheryamov reports:

"In view of the extreme nature of the situation, Yuriy Afanasyev, who was in the chair, called on those taking part in the plenum to voice their opinions only upon what should be done in the emerging situation. The threatening danger of the introduction of a military dictatorship united the delegates: The bloody facts were in evidence. No one doubted that it was Vilnius today, Tallinn and Riga tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, if the black colonels and generals could get away with it all, blood would be flowing on the streets of Moscow and would be shed all over the country." The plenum participants unanimously called for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet to be convened to put its view to the president, and to call for the world community to stop aid to Gorbachev; and if paratroops are not pulled out of the Baltic, then the RSFSR Supreme Soviet should withdraw its agreement on the financial accord reached in the Federation Council. Sheryamov explains that the Democrats think that laws should be adopted on demobilizing RSFSR citizens who are servicemen taking part in the events in Lithuania, and also on the impermissibility of all attempts to establish direct presidential rule on RSFSR territory.

Finally, he reports, Democratic Russia raised the issue of impeaching the president. Sheryamov says that there was consensus on holding a general political strike: "The plenum of the Council of Representatives of the Democratic Russia Movement resolved that political strikes and other actions in solidarity with the working people should begin throughout Russia on 16 January, as a sign of protest against the Lithuanian military adventure undertaken by the Union government, against the onslaught of reaction in the country as a whole.

Sheryamov ends his report with the slogans approved for the strikes.

Economic Damage From Baltic Crackdown Feared

LD1801213891 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations has issued a statement, which says in particular: After the tragic events in Lithuania, views regarding the possibility of unilateral curtailment or reduction of the present scale of economic and business cooperation with the USSR have appeared in speeches of foreign government and business circles and mass media. In the course of this process, the economic interests of the Russian Republic will suffer the main damage. We cannot allow the Russian people and government to be punished for the actions of an army leadership subordinate neither to the legislative nor the executive bodies of the RSFSR.

The republic's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations expresses its confidence that in this critical situation, which has developed in the Baltic republics following the republics following the use of the Armed Forces, Russia's economic partners will provide businesslike and moral support for the Russian government, which is fighting for democratic and economic transformation.

Politburo Says Lithuania 'Betraying' Perestroyka

PM2201131591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

["Statement by the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee Politburo received with deep alarm the news of the tragic events in Lithuania involving human casualties.

Communists, like all Russians, share the grief of their fellow citizens and express profound condolences to the families of the dead.

We are receiving a multitude of telegrams, letters, and statements from working people and servicemen from every corner of the country angrily condemning the national separatism, extremism, and irresponsibility of politicians which have led to these irremediable misfortunes. In this situation the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo deems it necessary to state the following.

The basic blame for the tragic development of events rests with those politicians who, once in power, separate their fellow-citizens along national and religious lines and put them in unequal conditions from the standpoint of fundamental human rights and freeom.

The unlawful [nekompetentnyy] actions of the Lithuanian leadership, which has adopted a number of measures that have materially worsened the position of working people, have led to sharp confrontation and a social explosion which has split society into opposing camps. This is the basic reason for the tragic events.

Betraying the process of perestroyka designed to renew socialism, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and government have deceived their voters, made attempts to

revive bourgeois practices, and have effectively led the republic to economic and political collapse. Such a policy is criminal.

Unfortunately, people who describe themselves as "democrats" are now declaring solidarity with the Lithuanian leadership. They are applying double moral standards in the assessment of political events for the umpteenth time. What is the meaning of the appeal by four republics to the United Nations for our problems to be solved by outside agencies?

Communists condemn the stance of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet leadership, which has, behind the backs of people's deputies, essentially entered into a deal with the forces leading the Baltic republics to split the USSR and effectively link up with neofascist forces. B.N. Yeltsin defends himself and Landsbergis' stance without deeming it necessary to meet with the Russophone population.

The actions of B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in recent days and his irresponsible, inflammatory statements and demands for armed forces to be set up in the republic indicate that he has lost a sense of political responsibility for the future of the republic and the USSR. B.N. Yeltsin and his ilk have consistently pursued a line of confrontation with the USSR leadership and disregard of the USSR Constitution and Union legislation, are helping fuel political and social tension in the country, and are working toward the effective disintegration of the Union. Such actions cannot be supported by Russian Communists.

The RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo urges all Communists and citizens of the republic to resolutely condemn the national separatism, extremism, and political confrontation, to help restore civic accord, peace, and solidarity among all the peoples of our country, and to demand absolute observance of constitutional norms and Union laws.

We urge all honest citizens of the USSR to cast aside that which divides us, to rally together at this difficult time for the country, and to help strengthen the fatherland for the sake of the unity and friendship of all the peoples of the USSR.

[Signed] RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo.

Leningrad Soviet Debates Lithuanian Events

PM1801111591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jan 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by correspondents V. Nevelskiy and Ye. Solomenko: "Leningrad Soviet's Statement"]

[Text] The urgently convened emergency session of the Leningrad City Soviet completed its work after midnight. The main question on the agenda was the political situation which has arisen in connection with the tragic events in the Baltics. Representatives of the Leningrad Oblast Soviet also took part in this discussion.

The speakers at the session assessed the introduction of troops into the Lithuanian capital as an attempt at a military coup, as an open action by the reactionary forces who have resolved to reverse the process of democratic changes in the country.

The deputies adopted appeals from the Leningrad City Soviet to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and the country's president. The latter document points out: The use of military force in Lithuania must be stopped immediately and all military subunits introduced onto the territory of the Baltic republics in January 1991 must be withdrawn. All seized buildings must be freed within two days. The USSR defense minister and the Baltic Military District commander must be dismissed. Apologies must be made to the legal Lithuanian Government and the Lithuanian people and talks with the Lithuanian Government must be begun immediately. An international commission must be formed, bringing in UN representatives to investigate the circumstances which led to the attempted military coup in Lithuania and there must be an open trial of those responsible for these actions.

There was an examination of the question of measures to stabilize the situation in Leningrad: how to prevent the possibility of similar phenomena in this region, to strengthen local executive power, and to set up control of the work of the Leningrad law enforcement organs. It was decided to create a committee for emergency situation.

The session decided to send delegations of observers from the Leningrad city soviet to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and to consider Wednesday 16 January a day of morning and announce a city-wide minute's silence.

Leningrad Obkom Views Lithuania Responsibilities

PM2301101091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the rubric "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow": "Leningrad Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] Plenum"]

[Text] Leningrad, 17 Jan—At the Leningrad CPSU obkom [oblast committee] plenum which took place today, the question of "the current moment in politics" was scrutinized. V.V. Gidaspov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and first secretary of Leningrad party obkom, delivered a report.

Communists said with undisguised alarm that the situation in a number of regions of the country has acquired a dangerous complexion. The demarcation and confrontation between political forces have become acute, and that was the cause of the tragedy in Lithuania. The responsibility for the events in that republic rests with those who, not having heeded the people's will, steered a

course, contrary to the country's Constitution and to Soviet legislation, of separation from the USSR and with a view to restoring antidemocratic bourgeois practices.

The Leningrad Soviet's activities and in particular its extraordinary session, held 15 January, on events in Lithuania, were subjected to criticism.

Obkom Warns Against 'Extremism'

PM2301170591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 91 p 1

[Report by I. Potekhina: "Leningrad Obkom Is Acting"]

[Text] Yesterday it was harder to buy LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA than it was to buy meat. The CPSU obkom [oblast committee] and the Leningrad Oblast party organization control and auditing commission issued a statement to the city's inhabitants from its pages "on the current political moment."

"The forces of political extremism have decided to use what has happened in Lithuania as a chance to switch to the offensive throughout the country. Proof of this was the 15 January Leningrad City Soviet session. Its orientation can only be assessed as anticommunist..."

Then the Leningrad CPSU Obkom puts forward a number of highly serious proposals: "appealing to the country's president, M.S. Gorbachev, to respond to the demands from many labor collectives of the minority [neznachitelnaya] section of the population of the Baltic republics for the introduction of direct presidential rule on their territory..."

"Appeal to the Leningrad Communists, workers, intelligentsia, agricultural workers, servicemen, and those who do not share communist convictions but who hold dear democratic gains, feelings of Soviet patriotism, and our Soviet Motherland, to be vigilant... To be ready for resolute actions if instead of working to improve the city's socioeconomic position the present Leningrad City Soviet majority subordinates itself the power of political extremism."

A day before this statement appeared the city's democratic forces—the Democratic Party of Russia, the Free Democratic Party, the anarcho-syndicalists, and so forth—organized a center for combating the advancing dictatorship.

Gidaspov on Party Position in Leningrad

PM1501132391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 91 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with B.V. Gidaspov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, by V. Gerasimov in Leningrad; date not given: "'We Are Not Hiding in the Trenches'"]

[Text] [Gerasimov] The situation in the Leningrad party organization, which experienced an acute crisis in the runup to the 28th CPSU Congress, remains extremely complex even now. However, this is also typical of other regions. The dismay felt by communists in the face of an ever-mounting wave of demogoguery and extremism is visible in many rayon and primary links. People, including many industrial workers, rural workers, and representatives of the intelligentsia, continue to leave the party. Why is this happening? What is the CPSU obkom [oblast party committee] doing to rally the ranks of like-minded party members and to consolidate forces?

[Gidaspov] I do not think the situation should be overdramatized, let alone oversimplified. Nor can it, of course, be seen in isolation from the overall state of affairs in the country.

The situation is, however—as discussion at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies demonstrated—deteriorating daily. The communists and our party are all blamed for the collapse of the economy, the lack of food, the complete disregard of contractual ties among regions and collectives, and even the present neglect of cities and villages, which have long been run by newly elected soviets... In these extreme conditions our party needs not just to defend itself against ill-deserved accusations, but also needs in practical terms to rediscover its place in society. The old blueprints do not work now. An active changeover of cadres and the arrival of new enterprising people in the leadership of party organizations are a good thing.

Notwithstanding certain reproaches, I do not advocate a return to former times and methods. They have gone for ever, and thank God for that! I am talking about the main lesson which should now be drawn, namely that, by destroying the old edifice without creating anything to replace it, you can easily end up simply homeless and then have to go around begging. Which is what is actually happening.

A host of hasty political decisions lie at the root of our woes. We turned, I think, into a cul-de-sac soon after June 1985, when the slogan of accelerating scientific and technical progress was proclaimed and was then immediately safely "buried." This first zigzag was followed by new ones. The Law on the State Enterprise, for example, killed off labor collectives' interest in scientific and technical progress. The cooperative movement, unrestricted by effective legal norms, took on distorted forms. Do you have enough examples?

We are now living in an unreal, inverted world. We have gotten carried away by legislation, for example. Sometimes draft laws pursue social processes, sometimes they lag behind, at other times they oustrip all and sundry by an unprecedented distance—regions, cities, and even hamlets are succumbing, as it were, to the "sovereignty" epidemic. It's indeed like something out of Saltykov-Shchedrin! Legal nihilism, a dearth of civilized values, and a general lack of responsibility are having their effect. People have lost faith in the state's capacity not

just to feed them but to defend their honor, dignity, and very life. Weariness, irritation, and apathy characterize the prevailing public mood.

Am I laying it on thick? Such assessments were, however, voiced, particularly at the concluding stage of the Leningrad party organization conference, soon after the CPSU Central Committee October (1990) Plenum. The delay in calling the plenum, which was inexplicable to Communists, was seen as another attempt to remove the party from participation in the elaboration of important decisions on the reform of the economy.

I am not one of those people who regard market relations and socialism as incompatible. Everything depends upon the specific path chosen, the sensible combination of different forms of ownership, the extent of state regulation and monitoring, and the presence of guarantees of citizens' social protection. But the market is a very delicate mechanism which demands adequate competence and responsibility. Such qualities are, unfortunately, in short supply in our country. So the market itself is not frightening, but superficial, amateurish approaches to it and an absolutization and idealization of its laws are. There is an enormous gap between general slogans about the market economy as a means of encouraging people's initiative and commitment and its ultimate goal—the achievement of a qualitatively new level of existence. Our party will now be put to the test by society as we try to bridge this gap.

Around 110,000 people, or almost 18 percent of the membership, have left the ranks of the Leningrad organization. Parting with careerists and those who have taken this step out of opportunistic considerations is not a matter for regret. But there is a large group of communists who quit the party because they had lost faith in its leaders. These are as a rule hardworking, creative people. The leadership of both the CPSU Central Committee and the obkom are to blame for our having lost them, because they have frequently acted inconsistently, formulated their objectives imprecisely, and not set an example of flexibility in tackling questions. Perestroyka, which it is customary to describe as a revolution, at a certain moment found itself without effective leaders. It reached a point where even Central Committee plenums began to be called only after persistent demands from local level. The Central Committee Politburo also retired imperceptibly into the background. For a ruling party, if the CPSU remains such today, this position is intolerable.

Initiative from below—alternative programs and proposals—in short feedback, as it is known, is as essential as the air we breathe. In our oblast party organization's program we seek to adopt an objective stance that is honestly informed in the light of the opinion of the broad party masses. And then we seek to communicate our own opinion to people, regardless of figures of authority, as it were, some of whom are bogus.

[Gerasimov] On what immediate areas of practical work are the efforts of Leningrad Communists concentrated?

[Gidaspov] The first thing that we are now seeking to do is to dispell utterly the delusion that the party should withdraw from every sphere of economic activity. If the CPSU does not deal with socioeconomic problems at this present, very grave time for our country, it will simply not be needed by anyone. How will events develop in that case? Our party committees will be ousted from enterprises by other parties. Depoliticization and deideologization are tales for unthinking children. The specific aim behind them is the repoliticization and reideologization of the masses. But some people are already reveling in the easy pickings. Some economic leaders think that you obey one idol only, that of profit, all the rest being secondary. Life has refuted this thesis more than once, and it has been a painful experience. It is now being refuted by the food ration card system and the cracked ribs, heart attacks, and fainting from hunger suffered by people who wait in line. The loud assurances issued by the present Leningrad Soviet's food commission have proved worthless. Reality makes incompetence pay in uncompromising terms. And the masses of the people suffer.

Second, the gaps that have opened up as a result of the destruction of socially significant ideals are being rapidly filled in the one instance by drugs and alcohol and in the other by alien ideology, chauvinism, nationalism, and fascism. Herein lies perhaps the most important work for the party—the intellectual sphere of man, his level of culture, and his opportunity to satisfy his spiritual interests.

The curtailing of party work in collectives is quite often justified in terms of it now being time to conduct it on a neighborhood level. You can easily produce a counterargument: And what are sailors on a long voyage, for example, for whom the ship is at the same time their home, to do? The dispute would seem to emanate from the realm of paradoxes. But not altogether so! A modern megapolis, such as Leningrad, has clearly defined industrial zones. People spend eight or more hours a day there and only go to their "sleeping quarters" to rest and prepare for the next day.

Our chosen system of elections to soviets based on districts rather than party lists, as is it practised in many countries, also demands work at a neighborhood level. But it seems to me that a communist in an enterprise, institute, establishment, or kolkhoz [collective farm] should be charged with this work. He needs to know the social makeup and the milieu, to appreciate which slogans could be popular in a neighborhood and which of its residents is really and truly entitled to contest a deputy's seat.

Creative, out-of-the-ordinary people who are capable of defending their convictions are needed for the battle for party influence in the body of deputies. Technical means of influence—television, radio, newspapers, and many

others—are also needed. "Union," "cooperation," and "bloc" are words that must become part of communists' vocabulary, bearing in mind the need to unite all left-wing forces.

The Leningrad party organization has clearly stated that it will see to it that the intellectual potential of our scientists in the sphere of setting up small state or cooperative enterprises utilizing the ideas of specialists and workers will be tapped within the free economic zone proposed by the Leningrad Soviet leaders. This will attract small and medium Western investors, the people who are most prepared to put in venture capital. Most importantly, this will make it possible to preserve our scientific and technical base and cadres and create new jobs. We expounded our position at the Leningrad Soviet session and will continue to uphold it. We intend to present our social protection program for the needy strata of the population under market conditions through communist deputies.

[Gerasimov] Boris Veniaminovich, you have touched upon the difficult topic of relations between party and soviet organs. In Leningrad they have from the outset failed to shape up for the best. Both sides unstintingly state their desire to improve people's living conditions, but the economy and social and other spheres are deteriorating all the time. Who, forgive my bluntness, is kidding the people here?

[Gidaspov] I think no one is kidding anyone. I have already spoken about the economic situation prevailing in the country. And Leningrad is not an island within a boundless ocean... Although there is no doubt that considerably more than what is being done could and should be done to reduce the problems of their asperity.

We have no confontation at all with the soviets. Of course the statements and actions by individual Leningrad Soviet deputies are regrettable and diminish their own authority and that of the whole body of deputies. This authority has markedly declined, which is particularly shown by the results of the latest stage of elections to the Leningrad Soviet carried out in 18 electoral districts. In none was a candidate elected—on average only 20 percent of the electorate took part in the voting. At No. 125 Polyustrovskiy District, where candidates stood for the vacant post of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy, a little over 30 percent voted.

I think that the problem does not lie just in the general apathy and disappointment generated by mounting everyday problems. The deputies who received a vote of confidence on a wave of frenzied rallies and populist electioneering rhetoric, who are still reluctant to come down to earth, and those simply incapable of doing so, are responsible for the failure of the elections. Solving the problems demands a knowledge of the economic and social mechanisms of our city with its many millions of inhabitants and its connections with the whole of the country. Everyday slog and painstaking, routine, inconspicuous work do not win you immediate political reward. The pose of the "incorruptible member of the opposition" is far more attractive. But in opposition to whom today? To the actual soviets? To Leningraders?

We have repeatedly offered our help and cooperation and urged that prejudice and mistrust be put aside and constructive dialogue established. But our outstretched hand mostly goes unclasped. Nevertheless we continue to abstain from looking for "enemies" or seeking political, let alone civic confrontation. However, we do resolutely reject attempts by the local authorities to pass the buck for their own mistakes onto party organs.

[Gerasimov] Some mass media are strenuously engaged in shaping anticommunist feelings in the public mind. You get calls of "Not a kopek for communist party newspapers!" and the scaring of citizens with the "Red terror!" Attempts to drive party committees out of enterprises are made, rayon committee buildings are blockaded by the "People's Front," matchboxes bearing the labels "Take no prisoners in storming the Smolnyy!" and "29th CPSU Congress in Nuremberg" are distributed. The recent zealots of unlimited civil freedoms, democracy, tolerance, and unorthodox thinking are calling for retribution. And it seems that the threats have not been wasted. It is claimed, for example, that communists have sat tight in the trenches and have feared to raise their heads above the parapet since the powerful newspaper attack mounted on the obkom after the well-known rally in December 1989...

[Gidaspov] I cannot agree with that conclusion. In my opinion, the time of impassioned rallies, oratorical outbursts, and chest-beating has past. That path does not lead to civic peace and a joint and sensible solution of the acute problems in the economy and the social and political spheres, which, incidentally, that December rally confirmed. Seething political passions and a furious wave of slogans and appeals are capable only of further inflaming an already explosive atmosphere.

No, we are not hiding in the trenches, nor are we retreating. But try to get through to the television or radio today! Party influence upon the mass news media, which the CPSU voluntarily forsook, has been replaced by a monopoly by other forces sporting democratic clothes.

We will be expanding the network of our own small enterprises, including new periodicals, a television and radio company, and a news agency.

As far as our links with labor collectives, workers, and the intelligenstia are concerned, we hold regular meetings and exchanges of opinions with them. The voice of ordinary communists and nonparty people who support the CPSU must finally be heard at full pitch. It should be heard in shops and lecture halls and, if need be, in the street.

[Gerasimov] Where, in your opinion, should the renewal of the party be expressed: In a change in structures, a reduction in the apparatus, in cadre changes, in the creation of party clubs and territorial-production committees? Or are new approaches to party organizational and political work the main thing?

[Gidaspov] Perestroyka in the CPSU embraces a whole range of problems. The party has to renew itself all the time. This process cannot stop, as it is impossible to draw it to some kind of logical conclusion and terminate it. And the changes must apply to everything, albeit first affecting the intellectual sphere.

The party and in particular its leadership must be augmented by knowledgeable people who know above all how to arouse their supporters, rally them around, and unite them to make common decisions rather than coming up with speculative schemes for the development of industry, the economy, and literature. This is particularly important in the ideological sphere.

I would like to note that CPSU obkom members and the elected aktiv of very many rayon committees do think alike, but not in the ordinary sense of the term. The polemical nature of discussion can be seen on many questions. That is to say, there has been an increase in the opportunity for making decisions, decisions which are not always unerring but are near-optimal.

Organizational changes are naturally needed too. The same old question about the territorial or production principle. What is good for the communists of such major enterprises as the "Kirovskiy Zavod," "Elektrosila," and "Svetlana" is not necessarily the best route for the organization of party members in a small oblast settlement where everyone knows one another, irrespective of their workplace. There it is clearly advisable to unite communists throughout the territory. I do not rule out that in future some rayon committees could cede their place to associations or councils of party organization secretaries, kinds of political associations.

Life will undoubtedly suggest other decisions to us, decisions which it is difficult to foresee today. It is, after all, the content rather than the form which is important.

Leningrad 'Forced' To Hike Service Charges

PM1501164391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Ye. Solomenko under "Direct Line" rubric: "Service Price Increases"]

[Text] Leningrad—In line with a Leningrad Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] resolution, the prices of a whole range of everyday services to the population have increased.

Rentals, haircutting, shoe and watch repairs, freezer repairs, furniture repairs, and many other services are set to become 1.3-3 times more expensive. The switch to the new prices is being carried out in several stages in the period January through March.

The Leningrad authorities have been forced to present local citizens with this "Christmas gift". For in line with the Union government's resolution, the wholesale prices of raw materials, materials, and power are rising noticeably. Not forgetting the soaring taxes and deductions.

These and other acts have turned the hitherto thriving service sector into a loss-making sphere. Now Leningrad's consumer services must supply an additional outlay of tens of millions of rubles from their own pockets. The gorispolkom had practically no other choice: If prices for services are not raised today, then tomorrow the near bankrupt bathhouses, laundromats, hairdressers, repair shops, and hire shops will begin to close down...

In an effort to do as much as possible to soften the blow to the least well-off, the Leningrad City Soviet will examine a program of social protection and compensation measures. Such steps are doubly necessary: After all, in the very near future Leningraders will be subjected to a further price leap—this time for accommodation and transportation (including railroads) services, and for a range of consumer goods. Thanks to Russian legislation, the Leningrad Gorispolkom is now empowered to maneuver prices as it thinks best.

Foreign Minister Views Iraq, Near East Policy

PM2301221791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 91 p 3

[Interviewwith RSFSR Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev by A. Kartsev, date and place not given: "'MiG's' Approaching From the Right"]

[Text] [Kartsev] The USSR Government's position on the events in the Gulf is well known to everyone, has won the approval of the world community, and is being described as a balanced and sensible approach to what is happening. Unfortunately, this was by no means always the case in the past. Do you think there was any alternative available to us when we were choosing our political line after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait?

[Kozyrev] Various theoretical options could undoubtedly have been discussed, but our policy of condemning the aggressor was entirely natural. That is why to all intents and purposes there was no alternative. The support for the UN Security Council resolutions, the condemnation of the aggressor, and the various initiatives aimed at freeing Kuwait by peaceful and diplomatic means were all and are all wholly in line with our conduct in the international arena.

[Kartsev] I will not be giving any secrets away if I say that the situation in the country now is alarming, mainly

because of the growing onslaught from right-wing, conservative, reactionary forces. Do you think that, if they were to be victorious, there could be a change in our Gulf policy?

[Kozyrev] Undoubtedly there could be. I consider the right-wing alternative to be real, albeit unrealistic. If domestic policy follows the path of strengthening totalitarian structures, all our foreign policy achievements will come to nothing. After all, the Western democracies will criticize a dictatorial regime, and the right-wingers will have to seek new friends and allies in the international arena. Saddam Husayn is ideally suited to such a role. In essence, he is the child of our totalitarianism who was nurtured under the care of our ideology and with the help of huge arms shipments. After all, it should not be forgotten that Soviet-made "Scuds" are currently falling on Israel and Saudi Arabia...

[Kartsev] If we allow the possibility—if only in theory—of a change in Soviet policy as regards Husayn, what specific forms might a new alliance take? Surely our pilots would not appear in the skies over Baghdad to repulse the coalition air force sorties?

[Kozyrev] I don't think things would go that far, because the "Afghan syndrome" is still very strong in our society, and even the staunchest right-wingers realize that. Most probably it would be a question of resuming military-technical aid and diplomatic support. But all this is purely hypothetical.

[Kartsev] You have mentioned that the West has appreciated our position over Iraq. Does that mean it can be seen as a victory for our diplomacy?

[Kozyrev] Yes, and as a victory over ourselves, if we think of ourselves not as the sick man of the world, but at least as a convalescent. We condemned the aggressor, along with most countries. But then what? Many states, while not participating militarily in the coalition operations, have taken the next logical step—they have sent their medics to the combat zone (like South Korea, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, for instance) or, like Japan, are providing financial help or assistance with transport. That is, they have emphasized that they are matching their words with action. But the main thing is that we should have sound positions in the Gulf once the war ends.

[Kartsev] What do you mean by "once the war in the Gulf ends"?

[Kozyrev] There are two possibilities: either the complete military rout of Husayn or an Iraqi troop withdrawal from Kuwait if Husayn finally realizes that he is leading his country to disaster.

[Kartsev] Are you not considering the possibility that the Iraqi troops could defeat the coalition in land battles?

[Kozyrev] That is highly unlikely.

[Kartsev] One last question: Do you think that our diplomacy now has a chance to remedy and strengthen its positions in the Near East?

[Kozyrev] I think that there is such a chance. We should be thinking right now about peace initiatives in the period after the end of the war.

For instance, we could set the entire world an example of change in our military exports policy and call once again for joint measures in which all Near East states and all countries exporting weapons to the area would participate. A great deal can be done to beef up the measures to ensure nonproliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons.

Finally, we should tactfully but consistently raise the question of democratization, glasnost, and the observance of human rights in the Near East region—after all, under democratic conditions it would be impossible for new Saddam Husayns to emerge.

Commission Urges Army Deaths Investigation

PM1801133191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jan 91 Moscow Edition p 2

[Report by Tatyana Khudyakovaunder "Direct Line" rubric: "Investigation Must Continue"]

[Text] Moscow—This was the statement made at an 11 January news conference by members of the special commission for monitoring the objectivity and thoroughness of investigations into the reasons for peacetime deaths and injuries among servicemen.

A. Alekseyev, deputy chairman of the commission and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy, who was conducting the news conference, informed those present that the commission, set up in accordance with a decree by the USSR President, had received for examination 50 criminal cases instituted by the military prosecutor in instances of death and injuries in the Armed Forces.

They were monitored in 10 working groups composed of qualified staffers from the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the military prosecutor's office, lawyers acting for soldiers' mothers, defense attorneys, and people's deputies. The commission members came to the conclusion that almost 80 percent of the 50 cases examined should be remitted for further inquiry or reclassification.

Furthermore, the commission members stated that as of today not one of the points in the president's decree "On Measures for Implementing the Proposals of Soldiers' Mothers" has been completely fulfilled.

The commission's conclusions will be submitted to the USSR president, and their main thrust can be summarized as follows: A commission for investigating the reasons for peacetime deaths and injuries among servicemen should be set up on a permanent basis and in addition an independent investigation group should be

organized, and supervision of cases of this kind should be entrusted not to the military but to the territorial prosecutor's office.

A. Alekseyev reported that as of today the commission had already received over 3,000 statements and appeals from citizens concerning cases of death, maiming, and demeaning of human dignity relating to servicemen in the USSR Armed Forces. This imparts a special nature to the investigation being carried out and means that the commission's work cannot be regarded as finished.

Khasbulatov on Russian Role in Conflicts

AU1701163691 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 15 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov, first deputy of Russian Supreme Soviet President Boris Yeltsin, by Frank Herold in Berlin; date not given: "Bureaucracy Forces Its Course on Gorbachev"]

[Text] [Herold] Over the past days President Gorbachev has stepped up the verbal and now also military pressure on the Union republics. How do you assess these steps?

[Khasbulatov] Of course, as head of a federal state, Gorbachev is trying to strengthen the center, the Union—or whatever he imagines this to be. Our parliament and its president, Yeltsin, categorically condemned the way in which he is doing this. The republics want more independence. Let us take Russia, for instance. We are not striving for secession from the Union at all. Another thing is that we imagine a completely different Union, in which Russia is economically independent and can implement its own political concepts. In this case, we do not at all want to have all rights. We think that the Union must be preserved in the field of defense. We are also ready to delegate a number of other functions. At the first Congress of Deputies of our republic we delineated very precisely those spheres that we place under central leadership. This is also what our other republics are doing. They are increasingly convinced of the inefficiency of the center and call into question its legitimacy as a whole.

[Herold] You do not believe that the process of democratization has failed?

[Khasbulatov] Regardless of what has happened, I would really not say it in this way. There are various aspects. We in Russia are implementing the democratic process. We consider both profound economic reforms and political reforms indispensable. In order to really create democracy we have proposed a new version of the Constitution. In general, the process of democratization of society and state is intensifying in all republics. Of course, there are certain forces—unfortunately, the president is relying on some of them—which would prefer to leave everything unchanged or would even like to reverse the movement. I personally think that all this is anachronistic.

[Herold] What role can or will Russia play in settling the current conflicts between the center and the republics?

[Khasbulatov] We are already playing a rather essential role. We are following the path of concluding agreements with the republics—with the Baltic states, the Ukraine, Moldova, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. At the moment, talks are underway with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan.... These "interrepublican" agreements establish the basis for an actual, new Union treaty. Of course, we are thus strengthening our own position and that of the republics toward the center.

When we recently had conflicts because of the budget, Gorbachev made a massive effort to direct the dissatisfaction of the republics against Russia. They accused us of wanting to keep all the money for ourselves and of stealing from the other republics. But this did not work. Some supported us actively, others remained neutral, but no one attacked us. We already have a strong position, but there is no resistance from our side. We know that we have to move in a common direction. But it is very difficult. To me it seems that this is not even the president's fault. The bureaucracy is strong enough to force its line on the president. It continually confronts him with accomplished facts, prepares some advice—it is making policy. And the central bureaucracy is trying to make policy in such a way that contradictions crop up among us. It is quite clear: Then it is easier for them to continue their rule. Unfortunately, our Union politicians do not always recognize the games of the apparatus.

[Herold] You said that Russia advocates the Union. Is this an alliance of purpose with Gorbachev so that Shatalin's radical five-day economic program can be implemented? Or is this a strategic option?

[Khasbulatov] During the first stage Gorbachev was very interested in our program, and he was really serious about it. He wanted the implementation of this program. I myself was able to see this in talks with him. Unfortunately, the following remained unnoticed: From the very beginning his own government, headed by Ryzhkov, opposed this program—and thus it also opposed President Gorbachev himself. And the government won. It forced the president to give up his support for Shatalin's plan and imposed on him the course which he is now practically pursuing. This is a reactionary course, an undecided course, with vacillations, with half-hearted commitments to private property.

This means the government has been able to force its vague undetermined position on the president. In this situation we naturally consider it necessary to support Gorbachev on those positions on which we actually agree with him. For instance in foreign policy. But as regards domestic policy, we want the president to point out prospects. Because this indecision leads to an escalation of the crisis, and the further developments might not only sweep away the democratic forces but also Gorbachev himself. Unfortunately, he himself does not understand this. Therefore, we consider it necessary to

support him, even though we criticize certain aspects of his policy. In domestic policy we cannot force our line on the president. But we can do what is necessary in Russia, because we proceed from the premise that we are sovereign.

[Herold] Even experts who participated in working out Shatalin's plan are now skeptical as regards its implementation. What is your opinion?

[Khasbulatov] We had to give it up. Shatalin's plan will not be implemented. Another thing is that its basic ideas are our economic policy. We follow many ideas, even though not in the form in which they were originally presented. Shatalin's plan was aimed at the entire country, for a step-by-step, synchronous process. Unfortunately, everything went down the drain. Russia has already been forced to adopt its own action program. As regards Shatalin's plan, I, too, was skeptical. I asked Yeltsin: "Is the president deceiving us? Let us work out a plan so that Russia achieves market economy independently." But Yelsin said: "No, you must understand: We shook hands on it, we signed a document." Things went differently.

[Herold] You mentioned the differences in opinion on the budget. What is the compromise between Gorbachev and Yeltsin like?

[Khasbulatov] The president renounced his demands. He had demanded an additional 27 billion rubles from us. We do not have the money.

[Herold] What is the reason for your visit to Berlin?

[Khasbulatov] Russia considers the deepening of economic relations with Germany very important. Almost 80 percent of the German-Soviet trade turnover is with Russia. Historically, our cooperation has been going on for centuries. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union, Russia will continue to exist, like Germany. Therefore, in my opinion, we have to say precisely: German-Russian relations have to play a priority role. Yes, we really have many difficulties. But the Germans should understand: Russia will not disappear to the moon. It will stay where it is. We will solve our internal problems sooner or later.

Therefore, one should not be anxious, but one should cooperate and invest. We will make a guarantee for that, we will establish favorable conditions.

[Herold] In detail: What do you expect from Germany? What can Russia offer?

[Khasbulatov] Russia can offer traditional goods, which Germany has purchased for centuries. We, on the other hand, must modernize our industry. I understand that Germany currently has difficult problems with unification. But our economies are already interlaced to a certain extent. Now, in my view, one should push aside the psychological barriers and act more courageously.

Yamalo-Nenetsk Okrug Seeks To Leave Tyumen Oblast

LD1801212191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] The session of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Yamalo-Nenesk Autonomous Okrug confirmed its intention to secede from the Tyumen Oblast. It is stressed in a statement which was adopted that the autonomous okrug is an independent subject of the federation and it will remain a part of the Tyumen Oblast till the issue of the recognition the Yamalo-Nenetsk Republic in the Constitution is resolved.

Western Republics

Crimea Holds Referendum on Autonomy 20 Jan

LD2001140191 Moscow TASS in English 1314 GMT 20 Jan 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Lev Ryabchikov]

[Text] Kiev January 20 TASS—A referendum on a state and legal status of the Crimea is today under way throughout the Crimean peninsula. On the strength of polling results, a decision is to be taken whether to recreate the status of autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic or to keep the Crimea's status of southern region of the Ukraine.

Almost 1,500 polling stations opened at seven a.m. Voting lists include all citizens who live in the Crimea and attained the age of 18. Their number is 1,700,000.

For the referendum to be recognised as valid, more than a half of people entered in the voters' lists should take part in the polling. An issue will be considered decided if two-thirds of voters declare in its favour.

The autonomy of the Crimea was abolished in 1945 following the deportation of Crimean Tatars and other peoples that were unfoundedly subjected to repression.

In 1954 the Crimea was brought under the authority of the Ukraine. These acts are viewed nowadays as unconstitutional because no one asked the consent of the Crimean residents then.

The question of recreating autonomous republic in the Crimea as a party to a union treaty is being raised for the purpose of legal protection from similar arbitrariness in the future.

Preparations for the referendum revealed that not everyone agrees to the way the question has been put. The leaders of the Crimean Tatar National Movement believe that only they and members of their ethnic group as the "indigenous" people have the exclusive right to determine the status of the peninsula.

Rukh representatives, who arrived at the peninsula from western regions of the Ukraine, are calling on local Ukrainians to boycott the referendum.

Rukh representatives are circulating leaflets which say that the referendum is an encroachment on the territorial integrity of a future Ukrainian power.

Several democratic organisations demand that the question of bringing the Crimea back into the fold of Russia be put. Which choice will be made by Crimean residents will become known on Monday, January 21.

Voters Favor ASSR Status

PM2401093391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Captain Second Rank V. Pasyakin report: "Referendum Results Summed Up"]

[Text] Sevastopol City Referendum Commission reports that the names of 284,197 citizens having the right to participate in a referendum were included in the lists of participants in the referendum on the state and legal status of the Crimea and the status of Sevastopol City. On voting day 220,774 people, i.e. 77 percent, went to the polling places. Precisely 199,739 Sevastopol residents (90.5 percent of those who participated in the vote) voted for the reconstitution of the Crimean ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] as a subject of the USSR and a party to the Union treaty. Precisely 17,362 participants in the referendum (7.9 percent) voted against the restoration of autonomy. Some 3,306 ballot papers were deemed invalid.

A total of 205,759 people (93.8 percent) voted for the status of Sevastopol City—the chief base of the Black Sea Fleet—as a city of union republic subordination; 10,353 referendum participants (4.7 percent) voted against, with 2,964 ballot papers deemed invalid.

Thus, the vote showed that a majority of Sevastopol residents favor the restoration of autonomy in the Crimea, and Sevastopol—the chief base of the Black Sea Fleet—as a city of Union republic subordination.

But how did the referendum go in the Crimea as a whole?

"A total of 81.37 percent participated in the vote," V. Orekhov, head of the Oblast Soviet Executive Committee Organizational Department, told me. "Some 93.26 percent of those who participated in the referendum voted for the reconstitution of the Crimean ASSR."

The people's opinion has thus been ascertained. This is material of a consultative order. It will be used in an oblast soviet session decision and will then be forwarded to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. That is, legislative acts must follow.

Deputy Criticizes Lithuania Salvation Committee

LD2201155391 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Statement by Ivan Plyushch, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] The decisions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet were adopted rather hastily. [passage omitted] They led to the confrontation between the local and Russian-speaking population. The attitude toward the servicemen doing their stints in Lithuania and other Baltic republics derives exactly from this. Why a Ukrainian should serve his military term in Lithuania is a legitimate question. It should be asked and solved without delay. But to call a Russian or Ukrainian in today's Lithuania an occupant is a bit too much. [passage omitted]

But what I really do not understand is the existence of the National Salvation Committee [NSC]. Where has it come from? Who has organized it? Who rules it? Why is it precisely this committee that finds broad support by the CPSU? Why? To me the NSC is an illegitimate organization. This committee would be all right if it had taken over after the legal government and legal parliament retired of their free will because both were elected on a lawful basis. But what do we see? Alongside them emerges this NSC. Then this committee turns to the military and the latter readily meets its requirements. I am astounded. I myself share the view that here in Ukraine we must do everything possible to prevent such events, to prevent bloodshed here, to prevent any victimization here. But this will depend on both the indigenous Ukrainians and the 15 million non-Ukrainians living here. We must not divide the people of Ukraine into Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians.

Donetsk Miners Issue Demands Over Lithuania

LD1801151691 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] A joint sitting of the council of the "Donetskugol" industrial association's work collective and city strike committee of miners dedicated to analysis of general political situation in the country in connection with latest events in Lithuania took place in Donetsk today. The participants in the meeting have elaborated and signed an appeal to miners, work collectives, inhabitants of Donbass, and all citizens of Ukraine. It says in particular, I am quoting:

The events in the Baltic republics, use of force against the civil population, attempts to overthrow the legally elected government of Lithuania by force, the presidential decree on restoring the institution of political organs in the Soviet Army, the Committee for State Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs, powerful attack against glasnost—all this indicates that the reactionary forces in the guise of the center are strengthening mechanisms

which block radical reforms. A danger to democracy and threat of dictatorship in the country has taken shape. Everyone who does not want to remain in poverty and injustice should stand up in defense of democracy. We support the call from Moscow, Leningrad, Vorkuta, Kuzbass to go on political strike with following demands:

1. Withdrawal of troops which are carrying out punitive actions in Lithuania. End to use of the Army against the civil population and legitimate government on the territory of all sovereign republics.
2. Resignation of the president and his cabinet.
3. Dissolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Congress of People's Deputies.
4. Reversal of the presidential decree on restoration of the institution of political organs in the Army, KGB, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and immediate abolition of the party's control and influence in the armed forces and state institutions.
5. Nationalization of the CPSU's property.
6. Creation of conditions for freedom of information and glasnost.
7. Condemnation of the CPSU leadership's activities on rousing national hatred and curtailing democratic changes in the country.
8. Entering of the question of attitude to the CPSU to the referendum planned for 17 March.

End of quotation. The participants in the meeting have also called on all miners to hold shift meetings on 18 January in all work collectives and determine forms and methods for participating in political actions in support of the demands which have been put foward and on 20 January to take part in a general city meeting dedicated to the sociopolitical situation in the country.

Ukrainian Unification Day Meetings Held

PM2301110591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jan 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent S. Tsikora: "On 'Ukrainian Unification Day'"]

[Text] A new holiday—"Ukrainian Unification Day"—has been celebrated in many of the republic's cities and villages. The pretext for holding it was the historic events of January 1919, when the unification of the Ukrainian people's republic and the West Ukrainian people's republic into a single Ukrainian power took place.

This Sunday the celebration opened in Kiev with a public prayer meeting "for the Ukraine" attended by many thousands on the square outside Saint Sofia's where the unification of the lands of Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia, and the Dnepr Ukraine into a single state was proclaimed 72 years ago. Delegations from all regions of the republic came to the celebration in Kiev. It is symbolic that the prayer meeting was conducted by priests from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church who in daily life do not always get on with each other.

This is the second time the holiday has been celebrated in the republic. Last year this event literally shook the republic. At the time, at "Rukh's" appeal, 5 million Ukrainian citizens of various nationalities formed a human chain several hundred kilometers long from the West to the East.

The main moment of the present holiday was the direct participation of official organs of Soviet power in organizing and observing the day.

Of course the political meeting held outside Saint Sofia cathedral immediately after the religious ceremony was central. At the meeting Ukrainian and USSR people's deputies, the leaders of new parties and movements, and the leaders of various sociopolitical organizations voiced their attitude toward the main events of present-day life—the bloodshed in the Baltics, the draft of the new Union treaty, the change in the center's policy, and the universal offensive on the press and glasnost. The legally elected governments of the Baltic republics were supported, the use of military force against the civilian population was denounced in the most incisive terms, and a demand was voiced that those to blame for the tragedy be taken to task. The speakers noted that the precedent of using troops subordinated to the center on the territory of the republics without the consent of their legitimate organs of power has caused irreparable damage to the idea of concluding a new Union treaty.

After the meeting, which lasted several hours, there was a big procession by its participants.

Meetings and processions to mark "Ukrainian Unification Day" were held in Vinnitsa, Lutsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Rovno, Poltava, Nikolayev, Kharkov, and other cities in the republic.

Moldovan Legislature Approves Property Bill

LD2301125391 Moscow TASS in English 1229 GMT 23 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Fydor Angeli]

[Text] Kishinev January 23 TASS—The Moldavian parliament has approved a republican property bill after two days of debates, which focused mainly on two articles of the new legislation: forms of property and sale of land. A mutually acceptable formula was nevertheless worked out.

Now there will be private, collective (collective farm and cooperative) and state property in the republic. It will have different forms: individual, family, cooperative, joint-stock and state.

There will also be property owned by religious organisations, joint enterprises with the participation of businessmen and juridical persons from other sovereign republics and foreign states. There may also be other forms of property, provided they do not contradict Moldavian laws.

Any physical or juridical person, the state and local government bodies have the right to own property. Private individuals are allowed to own land, dwellings, means of transportation, money, etc. Owners will have the right to sell, present or exchange their property from January 1st, 2001.

Moldovans Deny Salvation Committee Plans

LD2201102391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0935 GMT 22 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Fedor Angeliy]

[Text] Kishinev, 22 Jan—The press center of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee has refuted rumors that attempts are being made in Moldova to create a "committee of national salvation on the Baltic republican model, behind which is the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee allegedly." The denial was published today in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA.

In the opinion of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee "certain forces in the republic want to play the Baltic card in order to stir up mass anticommunist, antiperestroyka moods in Moldova."

The Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee confirmed the immutability of its policy for civil accord in the republic and for the solution of all issues by "legislative means and political methods."

Moldovan Party Unity 'Key Issue' at Conference

LD1901111791 Moscow TASS in English 1024 GMT 19 Jan 91

[By MOLDOVA-PRESS-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Golya]

[Text] Kishinev January 19 TASS - "The unity of the Moldavian Communist Party will be a key issue at a republican conference of the Moldavian Communist Party, which will open in one week's time, Second Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Ivan Gutsu told MOLDOVA-PRESS-TASS. [No closing quotation marks as received] "The party's greatest ailment is separatism," he noted. "Some Communists from the Dnestr left-bank area (where the Russian-speaking population predominantly live), pressed by the leaders of the so-called Dnestr Republic, launched a vigorous campaign aimed at splitting the Moldavian Communist Party," Gutsu stressed. Communists from the Dnestr left-bank area put forth their own platform on the eve of the conference. It concurs with the Central Committee's platform in many ways, although there are also differences of principal. Their platform contains provisions on recognising the unconstitutionally established republics and transforming Moldavia into a federation. "This runs counter to the Soviet president's decree of December 22, 1990, and we cannot agree with these provisions. "If we find a compromise, our unity will be ensured," Gutsu said. Some issues connected with these provisions will be settled at the Central Committee's meeting on Sunday. A conference of Dnestr Republic deputies of all levels will be also held on Sunday.

Belorussian Minister on Deploying Forces

LD2201145391 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 1700 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Summary] Belorussian Interior Minister Yegorov has addressed the third session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet. Replying to allegations about sending personnel of the Belorussian internal forces outside the republic, he said that the 10 July resolution of the Belorussian government on not using the internal forces of Belorussia outside the republic is being carried out.

He said further that the only exception was for the investigation of mass disorder in Osh Oblast, when the government of the Kirghiz Republic asked the Belorussian Supreme Soviet to send 20 investigators to help them out with the pile of unsolved cases. According to him, the 10 volunteers who went will be coming home this January.

Belorussian Deputies Describe Lithuania Visit

LD1801160391 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 0515 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Report by correspondent Mikhail Rutkovskiy on the third session of Belorussian Supreme Soviet in Minsk]

[Text] [Rutkovskiy] The routine session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet was opened by Nikolay Ivanovich Dementey, chairman of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. The people's deputies listened attentively to his report on the results of his visit to Lithuania, where he spent three days as a member of the Union delegation after the tragic events in Vilnius. He suggested discussing this problem separately, at the end of the day's session, giving as a motive the need to avoid emotions and to assist in contacts between the opposing forces with sensible conclusions. Hopeful signs of contact between the opposing forces appeared after the work of the government delegation. But the republican Supreme Soviet's delegation is now back from Lithuania and the people's deputies insisted on discussing the Lithuanian events at the beginning of the session because, in the view of People's Deputy Gonchar, it would be immoral to postpone discussion of this question for some time.

The floor was given to Nil Semyonovich Gilevich, chairman of the delegation. From high civic positions and with respect to the ethnic peculiarities of the Lithuanian people, he gave an objective appreciation of the tragic events. He said that the blood shed in Lithuania is another stroke against democracy and will bring even more distrust of the president of the country. I give the

microphone to Tatyana Mikhailovna Anisenko, people's deputy, who was a member of the delegation.

[Anisenko] What I saw shook me. We visited the Palace of Sports where the caskets containing the dead had been placed. I saw nine caskets. So far, 15 people have already perished, one died in the hospital. You know, I could not hold back my tears when I saw a mother crying over the casket of her daughter. I find it difficult to explain how exactly it all happened, but facts remain facts.

[Rutkovskiy] Mikhail Aleksandrovich Skremnyuk is here. Mikhail Aleksandrovich?

[Skremnyuk] I had a definitely positive reaction to the information on events in that republic which was being spread by the central mass media. But after I went to Vilnius, met and talked with the servicemen guarding the television tower, the television center, and the radio center, it became obvious to me that the tragic events which had taken place in Lithuania can be described as an act of aggression, interference in internal affairs, a striving to prevent people from living as they choose. And I would like especially to underscore the role in this violence, this cruelty, of the so-called Committee of National Salvation. Both I and my comrades were interested in that committee, its composition, the number of its members, and its party affiliation. We asked these kinds of questions in the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

[Rutkovskiy] Excuse me, but it is not known even who the head of that committee is.

[Skremnyuk] We heard the answer from a high party executive: Yes, he said, this committee exists and I am a mediator between that committee and the democratic forces of Lithuania.

[Rutkovskiy] Is this committee underground?

[Skremnyuk] He said: I do not know about that because I work as a cypher clerk.

I started to wonder whether the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party itself is not that Committee of National Salvation. After the meetings I had at the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, I began to suspect as much.

[Rutkovskiy] What other information have you got about these events?

[Skremnyuk] Well, I think that the organizers of that bloody event hoped that they would succeed in bringing the people of Lithuania to their knees. I do not deny the problems which exist in Lithuania through the fault of the Supreme Soviet headed by Landsbergis. I think that for them, too, it will be a good lesson. They will change their ethnic policy, will treat the ethnic minorities living on the territory of Lithuania, more loyally, although I will stress that nationalism in Lithuania exists after all mainly on the so-called social or trolley-car level. After this bloody drama the people of Lithuania—Lithuanians, Belorussians, Russians, and Poles, have drawn together so strongly that they took one another, as they say, by the hand. I do not think that now any threat scares them.

[Rutkovskiy] Other members of the delegation also gave their information. The people's deputies who had not been to Lithuania also offered their opinions. The deputies from the parliamentary opposition even demanded the resignations of USSR Defense Minister Yazov and USSR President Gorbachev.

The Supreme Soviet adopted a statement on the events in Lithuania. The session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet will continue its work today.

Caucasus

Renewed Fighting Breaks Out in Tskhinvali

TASS Reports 3 Killed

LD2401014691 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—Street fighting has broken out anew in Tskhinvali between Georgian militiamen and Ossetian militants, in spite of the ceasefire previously achieved in South Ossetia.

According to preliminary information from the USSR Interior Ministry press centre, three people were killed during gunbattles on January 22 and several others were wounded. The house of the Ossetian armed formations leader was blown up on the same day.

The region is blocked off from the rest of the country. It is running out of food, medicines and other prime necessities.

The Georgian militia now controls more than a quarter of Tskhinvali, while the rest is in the hands of USSR Interior Ministry troops.

TASS has learned from unofficial sources that the first units of the Georgian National Guard interior troops, numbering 80 men, arrived in South Ossetia on January 22. They are armed with Second World War Soviet and German submachine-guns and Makarov pistols. The average age of guardsmen ranges from 30 to 40 years. They have not yet taken part in combat operations in South Ossetia.

Radio Says Two 'Extremists' Killed

AU2301183591 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] According to the agreement that was reached, the removal of the barricades was to be started at noon on 22 January. But in spite of the fact that the Georgian

Interior Ministry reiterated this several times, the opposite side did not start to remove the barricades. Moreover, at 1500 [1200 GMT] the extremists opened intensive fire upon the militia officers. One officer of the Tbilisi Interior Ministry [indistinct] rayon, Sergeant Yuriy [second name indistinct] was wounded, two extremists were killed and several were wounded. Intensive exchanges of gunfire in Tskhinvali continued till evening. At 1900, the extremists [words indistinct] began to shoot from mortars and grenade throwers. A mine exploded at the militia station of the [name indistinct] rayon near the entrance to Tskhinvali. There was a powerful explosion on Pestel Street. At approximately 2100 a shell explosion destroyed a department store wall. At night rockets were fired from the railway station and grenades thrown from the building of the Pedagogical Institute.

There were no casualties among the militiamen or local population.

In the evening of 22 January, workers of the Tskhinvali militia detained Yuriy Sysoyev, who is unemployed and who was found to have several machine-gun cartridges in his possession.

Emergency Measures in Georgia on Electricity

LD2101222191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1642 GMT 21 Jan 91

[By SAKARTVELO-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi, 21 Jan—The acute shortage of electricity that has developed in Georgia has forced the republic's government to pass emergency measures. From today, temporarily—at least until the end of January—the work of virtually all enterprises of the machine-building, light, and local industries has been suspended in order to free energy resources and direct them toward maintaining vitally important plants and public communal services.

Also today, a special schedule for the supply of electricity to the residents of Tbilisi has begun operating: in the course of the day it is being switched off for two hours in all rayons of the city in turn. Broadcasts of Georgian and Central Television are limited to five hours in the republic.

As Batsikadze, first deputy chief of the Transcaucasian Railroad, has reported, from 22 January passenger trains on 16 routes across the republic's territory and beyond it are being cancelled.

President Mutalibov Sends Condolences to Lithuania

NC2001034491 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] Ayaz Mutalibov, president of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], has sent the following telegram to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet:

We have received the reports related to the tragic incidents in the Lithuanian SSR with deep emotion and grief. The people of Azerbaijan, who have experienced the tragic incidents in the dark month of January 1990, share the grief of the people of the Lithuanian SSR. On behalf of the workers, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, and the Azerbaijan SSR Government, I convey our condolences with deep grief to the families and relatives of those who have died and I pray for peace, security, and solidarity for the people of the Lithuanian SSR.

Azeri Deputies Condemn Armenian 'Interference'

NC2101085391 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Excerpt] A significant uproar has taken place in Armenia in connection with the integration of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Shaumyanovskiy Rural Rayon with the neighboring Kasum-Ismailovskiy Rayon. Historical facts have also been distorted.

In view of this state of affairs, a group of USSR people's deputies from the Azerbaijan SSR have conveyed an appeal to President Gorbachev and to USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov. The deputies categorically condemn the decision adopted by the Armenian Supreme Soviet and the disclosure made by the USSR deputies from Armenia in connection with the abolition of the Shaumyanovskiy Rayon. The deputies also described the disclosure by the Armenian leaders as interference in the internal affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, which is a sovereign republic. [passage omitted]

Azerbaijan Leader Marks 20 Jan Mourning Day

LD2001064691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 20 Jan 91

[Summary] Today is the day of mourning in Azerbaijan. People of all nationalities living in the republic will take part in a procession to commemorate the victims of the January tragedy in Baku. Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov addressed the population of the republic yesterday. We resolutely condemn, he said, violence in all its forms. Violence cannot be justified even when its aims and slogans are high. Each of us more clearly than ever today sees that unity is the key to salvation and national accord is the solution. Only by uniting, by closing our ranks, can we serve our people.

Baku 1990 Events Likened to Budapest, Prague

PM2201150391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 3

[Unattributed article under the general heading "It Happened Thus...": "The Same Scenario?"]

[Text] Budapest, November 1956.
...The reactionary underground has committed every crime and atrocity under the sun for the sake of restoring the bourgeois system in the country... The premises of

Hungarian Working People's Party committees have been destroyed. Many secretaries of party organizations in Pest have been beaten up.

Prague, August 1968.
Antisocialist forces are trying to disrupt normal life in the country and create difficulties, hoping to kindle nationalist passions and enmity toward healthy, patriotic forces in Czechoslovakia who are dedicated to socialism...

Baku, January 1990.
Blackmail, disinformation, threats, fueling of hysteria, direct action to block transport routes, blockade government buildings, and capture the radio and television center... This was how life in the city was paralyzed. There were insistent calls for the overthrow of Soviet power and for reprisals against all dissidents and members of their families and against servicemen's families.

Armenia Complies With Currency Decree

NC2401114291 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 24 Jan 91

[From the review of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN]

[Text] On its front page the paper publishes a press release which says: The Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium met on 23 January under Gagik Arutyunyan, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. After discussing the 22 January decree of the USSR president and 22 January decision of the USSR Cabinet, the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to issue a statement addressed to the population of the republic.

The paper publishes the statement which says: Esteemed compatriots, the 22 January decree of the USSR president and 22 January decision of the USSR Cabinet stipulate the removal of 50 and 100 ruble banknotes from circulation within three days as of 23 January. New regulations restricting cash withdrawals of deposits from savings banks have also been introduced.

These measures underline the extreme importance of speeding up the work to create an independent financial system and a separate currency for the Armenian Republic. This would contribute to the consistent implementation of the process of political independence. Nevertheless, we are now facing a fait accompli and it is necessary to speedily organize the replacement of the aforesaid banknotes without succumbing to alarm, chaos and lawlessness.

As our listeners already know, Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers, made a televised address yesterday evening concerning this issue. [passage indistinct]

The paper has also published a last-minute press release stating that the republic's government has extended the deadline for the replacement of the aforesaid banknotes [words indistinct].

Armenian Premier Describes Gulf War as 'Just'

NC2301124791 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan has held a news conference at the meeting hall of the Armenian Council of Ministers. Before replying to reporters' questions, he spoke about the general political situation and specifically noted that events in the Persian Gulf must inevitably affect us too. He said that that war is just, particularly as it shows that it is no longer possible to subjugate an independent state by brute force in the last decade of the 20th century. Unfortunately, we have compatriots in Iraq who may suffer from the war.

The prime minister then referred to the processes taking place in the Soviet Union as well as to the situation in Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. In reply to reporters' questions, Vazgen Manukyan touched upon a number of questions pertaining to socioeconomic life in the republic.

Armenia's Ter-Petrosyan Visits Italy

NC2201172291 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Excerpts] Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, arrived in Venice on 17 January. He was greeted by (?Gianfranco Premulezo), president of the Veneto regional administration. During their talks they discussed the issue of establishing close ties between Armenia and this Italian region. Premulezo gave a dinner in honor of Levon Ter-Petrosyan.

During Levon Ter-Petrosyan's meeting with Italian Transporation and Civil Aviation Minister Carlo Bernini in Venice on 18 January, they raised the issue of activating of ties between Italy and Armenia. Carlo Bernini noted that an important role should be assigned to the Veneto region in rendering the relations between the two sides more productive, as contacts between Veneto and the Armenian people go back centuries. [passage omitted]

Ashot Bleyan, an Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet people's deputy, and Aleksandr Arzumanyan, assistant to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, are accompanying Levon Ter-Petrosyan on his visit to Italy.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan gave a press conference for the Italian reporters on 18 January.

Meets With Pope

NC2301113391 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Pope John Paul II received a delegation from the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan at the Vatican yesterday

His holiness had a separate audience with Levon Ter-Petrosyan after the meeting.

A number of questions related to the situation in Armenia and Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] were taken up during the meeting and the audience. The pope also expressed interest in the developments in Lithuania and the Armenian Supreme Soviet's stance on these developments. Pope John Paul II asked Ter-Petrosyan to convey his greetings to Catholicos of All Armenians Vazgen I.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet, met representatives of the Armenian community in Venice on 19 and 20 January. He also visited the Mekhitarists congregation [Armenian monastery on St. Lazarus island in Venice], and on 20 January he attended a church service on St. Lazarus island. The mass was broadcast on Italian television.

To Visit Switzerland 1 Feb

NC2201165091 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Excerpts] HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN reports that Levon Ter-Petrosyan will take part in the Davos meeting. Annual meetings to examine problems in international politics and economy have been taking place in Davos, Switzerland for about 20 years. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, has been invited to this year's Davos meeting, scheduled for 1-7 February. [passage omitted] Levon Ter-Petrosyan will attend the Davos meeting between 1 and 4 February. [passage omitted]

Armenian Movement Warning on Totalitarianism

NC2001033891 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN has published a protest statement by the Armenian Pannational Movement. The statement specifically says: The violations of legality and the arbitrary acts committed by the military under the guidance of the Kremlin are nothing new for Armenia. Now, the grave danger of a brute totalitarian reaction is obvious to all. The chain of tragedy which started in Nagorno-Karabakh and Yerevan continued in Tbilisi and has now struck Vilnius. What happened there confirms once more that these are not isolated incidents. Instead, a general process is taking place, and the unavoidable collapse of the empire is the source of the evil. The potential of all peoples struggling for their independence should be mobilized. We are convinced that the people of Lithuania will emerge from the existing situation with unbending tenacity.

Armenian Local Soviets' Chairmen Elected

NC2001033791 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] The Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium met under the chairmanship of Gagik Arutyunyan, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. The meeting was briefed about the first sessions of the local soviets and specifically about the results of the elections of the chairmen of the soviets. It was noted that the formation of the local administrative organs in the republic is basically going ahead normally. As of today, chairmen have been elected in 52 out of 67 city and rayon soviets in the republic. In Kapanskiy Rayon a plenipotentiary representative [of the government] has been appointed.

The meeting then summed up the results of the work of the previous Supreme Soviet Presidium meeting and of the preliminary work done by the Supreme Soviet's standing commissions on the eve of the resumption of the Armenian Supreme Soviet session. The meeting discussed other matters pertaining to the republic's political life.

Central Asia

Uzbekistan Extends Banknote Exchange Deadline

LD2301172991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] In accordance with the decree of Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic President Karimov, the deadline for exchanging Gosbank 50 and 100 ruble notes of the 1961 format has been extended until 1 February for citizens of the republic. The commissions attached to the rayon and town executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies are also to carry on functioning until 10 February.

This decree has been adopted in response to numerous appeals from citizens on this issue and in line with the specific character of the region and of money circulation in the republic.

Uzbek Law Agency Chiefs Discuss Enforcing Draft

PM1101144591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafyev report: "Uzbekistan Has Its Own Approach"]

[Text] Tashkent—Problems of preparing young people for Army service and fulfilling the USSR Law "On Compulsory Military Service" were discussed in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Prosecutor's Office at an enlarged coordinating conference of leaders of the

republic's law-enforcement organs, with the participation of representatives of the Turkestan Military District Military Prosecutor's Office and military commissariats and personnel of the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

Colonel A. Kim, first deputy military prosecutor of the Turkestan Military District, reported that the conference discussed the need to activate military-patriotic work with young people in every possible way and to foster the culture of interethnic communication in them. The conference participants were particularly concerned about problems of young men's moral education. It was pointed out that in recent years there has been an increase in the number of draftees inclined to use liquor and drugs, and there are more and more persons registered with internal affairs organs or with convictions. Serious shortcomings were exposed in the activities of the republic's health care organs and military commissariats with regard to medical backup and the preparation of young people for military service.

Against the background of the interethnic conflicts which have developed in the country and the anti-Army propaganda all these factors have resulted in a sharp increase in the number of citizens in the republic evading military service under various pretexts. It was emphasized at the conference that draft dodging is a socially dangerous act. The proceedings provided for in law must be instituted against everyone who fails to fulfill his constitutional duty.

The decision adopted at the conference outlines measures for the strict and unconditional fulfillment of the USSR Law "On Compulsory Military Service." City and rayon prosecutors, military prosecutors, commissariats, and MVD organs are recommended to step up control over the actual elimination of the violations exposed. Special attention is to be paid to supervising the execution of legislation connected with the draft for active military service.

Tajik President Condemns Using Force in Baltics

LD2301152791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Makhkamov, president of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic has expressed sincere condolences to the families of those who died as a result of the tragic events in Lithuania and Latvia. He condemned the use of military force by the conflicting sides. Speaking at a meeting with literary and arts figures, devoted to assessing the sociopolitical situation in the country, the president of Tajikistan urged the USSR Supreme Soviet, the government, and President Gorbachev personally to make every effort, jointly with the parliaments of the Baltic republics, to ensure peace and calm in this region, and the protection of the rights and liberties of citizens irrespective of their ethnic origin.

Kirghiz Legislature Statement on Lithuania

PM1801151491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 91 Union Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Ryabushkin report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Statement by the Kirghiz Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] Frunze—The Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, deeply concerned about events in Lithuania, issued a statement on 17 January.

The statement extends sincere condolences to the families of the dead and expresses concern that negative processes may have even more tragic consequences. Such processes will deliver a tremendous blow to democracy and affect the development of our rule-of-law state. This must be stopped at any price and there must be no further increase in tension.

The republic Supreme Soviet Presidium protests strongly against the use of force by rival parties during the acute political crisis in Lithuania and calls upon the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to resolve all existing problems through political methods alone, on the basis of dialogue, accord, and mutual understanding.